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Introduction 
The Justification for Social Welfare Policy in the American Political Economy  
Since the Great Depression American elected officials have sought ways to 
assuage the harsh toll that extreme poverty takes on American citizens by enacting 
legislation designed to provide a modicum of economic sustenance either by direct 
distribution of funds or in-kind support.  Crafting effective social welfare policy has also 
been a subject of contention among legislators.  In the years after the New Deal social 
welfare policies have been adopted, implemented, evaluated, and changed according to 
the perception of what citizens need by those who have the authority to make decisions at 
the national, state, and local levels of government for the purpose of creating a minimal 
level of economic equality and social and political inclusion in the United States.   
The two major parties in the United States criticize one another for their positions 
on various areas of social welfare policy.  The Republican Party blames the Democratic 
Party for excessive spending to finance social welfare programs while the Democrats 
believe that the Republicans are not inclined to do enough.  To varying degrees, members 
of Congress support, or are expected to support, policies that are aligned with the 
preferences of their constituents. For some members this leads them to support 
conservative policies since those who are most well off and therefore less likely to benefit 
from social programs are significantly more likely to make their preferences known 
(Verba et al., 1993).   While responsiveness to constituents plays a role in determining 
which social policy bills members of Congress will support, the political ideologies of the 
individual legislators are important as well as the overall philosophy of both major parties 
regarding the roll of government in alleviating problems with policy initiatives.  
  2 
Republicans, tend to prefer less intervention from the federal government advocating 
personal responsibility and self-reliance as alternatives to increasing benefits to those 
who qualify for assistance in areas such as housing or supplemental income. The result is 
inconsistency, at the federal level, of support for social welfare policy initiatives over 
time depending on which party is in the majority.  These inconsistencies produce major 
problems for persons and whole communities that have benefited from discontinued 
programs (Wilson, 1996).  For example, the discontinuance of government funded 
programs that created jobs in poor communities left economic vacuums in areas that 
flourished when they were in place.   
President Reagan’s budget cuts for urban centers changed the portion of these 
budgets made up of federal dollars from 22 per cent to 6 per cent.  Revenue sharing to 
cities was discontinued and funding for public service jobs and training was decreased 
significantly.  The result was deterioration of school systems, increased unemployment, 
and decline in city services such as sanitation, police and fire department protection. 
It is important to examine the causes of rises and declines in support for social 
welfare bills in the U.S. Congress because of the resulting changes that affect the lives of 
poor and middle class Americans, who represent a significant portion of the population.  
Civil societies such as the United States recognize the need for social and justice and thus 
the need for national level legislation to maintain or improve systems that provide it.  
Social Welfare and Distributive Justice 
Because the policy area that is examined in this study of legislative behavior is 
social welfare policy, an important topic to address is distributive justice.  Distributive 
justice, in particular has been the focus of some of the most illuminating works in 
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political philosophy. Conceptions of justice been debated by liberals and libertarians and 
to an extent has been part of the debate between liberals and communitarians.  Liberals 
such as John Rawls have advocated distribution of goods in such a way that the least 
fortunate would have at least a modicum of support while libertarians such as Nozick 
claim that it is unjust for the state to take away resources to which a person has claims in 
order to distribute them to others in any situation.   
 Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness proposes that for social arrangements to be 
just, distributions of goods must be fair (he doesn’t advocate that they be equal).  In order 
to achieve fairness, Rawls proposes, the following concepts must be considered:  1) 
impartial reasoning (termed the original position) and 2) the two principle of justice 
(Rawls, 1972). 
 Although the original position has been criticized on the basis of whether or not 
persons would act according to Rawls’s predictions (Frohlich et al., 1987) Rawls uses it 
as a justification for distributive justice.  He believed that if a person had no knowledge 
of what his or her lot in life would be, that is if the person could be placed behind a veil 
of ignorance, then that person would agree to a distributive system in which those who 
were worst off would have a minimum amount of resources (Rawls, 1972).  Thus, he 
advocates a system of distributive justice on the basis that it is fair and that it would be 
what individuals in a given society would want.  The system of distribution would be part 
of the justice system and be subject to the various preferences of members of society.  In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls restates the Principles of Justice developed in A Theory of 
Justice as follows: 
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 “1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme 
the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society” (Rawls, 1993) . Justice therefore relies on fair distributions of 
political liberties and social and economic opportunities. 
 Sandel’s criticism of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and hence his 
justification for distributive justice begins with his conception of the individual and his or 
her relationship to the community.  His criticizes Rawl’s view of the person as being 
prior to the good arguing that the good of society should have priority since it is from 
society that the person takes cues on how to live the best life.  Although Sandel states that 
the good of the society should take priority over the good of the individual he does not 
extend this view to a concept of redistribution or distributive justice.  At the core of his 
views as a Communitarian, as articulated in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel 
believes that each person learns from social structures how he or she is to fit in and live a 
life compatible with the circumstances into which the person was born.  He does not, as 
Rawls does, place emphasis on personal autonomy and the ability to carve out a way of 
life different than what is consistent with a person’s place in his or her community 
(Sandel, 1982) 
 When the arguments and positions taken by Rawls and Sandel are considered 
against current discussions in public policy it is clear that Rawls’s philosophy is aligned  
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with command and control policy implementation (when considering redistribution) 
while Sandel’s is less concerned with issues of reliability and consistency in 
implementing policies that are redistributive in nature such as social welfare policy.  
Rawls believes in reaching agreements to allow persons with differing conceptions of 
what is preferred (explained as the concept of overlapping consensus) to live together 
without conflict.  For Sandel formal prior agreements are not necessary and the absence 
of conflict should occur naturally by way of common communal indoctrination. 
 Rawls believes that  it is not enough to depend on anything other than a prior 
agreement to ensure that the modicum of sustenance will be available to those who are 
most in need such as those who currently depend on social programs that are the results 
of redistributions of assets.  Government provision for the needs of the poor is necessary 
because it offers first an entity besides individuals with their own conceptions of the good 
as the provider of social programs.  Second, it offers provision of goods in a way that is 
expected to be consistent and equitable, as it is not subject to the changing preferences of 
individual persons.  Sandel argues that a person in a society that does not place the good 
of the individuals ahead of the good of the society has a better chance at achieving a good 
society.   For example if a person borrows an item or a sum of money from another it is 
better for repayment to be the result of a relationship based on mutual trust and concern 
for the wellbeing of each party than of a contractual agreement. Arrangements that 
nurture each individual as connected members of society, therefore, will more likely 
result in the provision for the good of those in need as a matter of morality instead of the  
result of a state mandate (Sandel, 1982).  
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Further, according to Sandel the likelihood of there being those in need who 
would have to depend on redistributions would decrease in a society that focused on 
communal ties and upholding communal traditions.  He argues from the communitarian 
standpoint that each person is to understand his or her position in society and focus on 
developing his or her life according to the situation or place in society into which he or 
she was born.  In opposition to Rawls he believes that the good of the community comes 
before the right of the individual to pursue his or her own conception of a good life.  The 
problem with distributive justice that Sandel believes is a result of Rawls’s justification 
of redistribution stems from the fundamental difference in the way each views the 
relationship of individuals to their communities.  Justice based on policy set forth by the 
state is less valuable than the ability to act in ways that would be considered just based on 
moral frameworks that exist in society and are adhered to by members of society.  Sandel 
contends that his emphasis on individuals focusing on living according to the morals of 
society go further than legislated justice because persons would be driven to go beyond 
what would be called for by legislation.  
Rawls’s views are consistent with liberals in the political sense while Sandel 
appears to advocate a position that is consistent with political conservatives.  Political 
liberals have sought to provide for those in poverty and retirement by seeking legislation 
that would provide monetary and in kind support for those who need help.  Legislation, it 
is expected, will provide consistency in delivering the services that are needed which is 
the arrangement that Rawl’s advocated in A Theory of Justice (1972) and Political 
Liberalism (1995).  Sandel on the other hand is more in tune with the conservative 
legislators who would like to see more of the responsibility of attending to the needs of 
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the poor to private organizations, including the faith based groups.  These types of 
organizations are reminiscent of early forms of social welfare dating back to the colonial 
period in the United States.  Care for the needy came from churches, relief societies, and 
self-help organizations before social welfare took its place on the political agenda.   The 
orientations of the groups reflected the parochialisms and mores of the communities in 
which they existed and served.                                                                                                                        
The constructs that Rawls, Sandel, and others contribute to discourses in political 
philosophy are relevant to the debates addressing the role of redistribution in the 
maintenance of the welfare state in the United Sates.   They offer illumination of 
important considerations for deciding whether distribution of goods to those who are in 
need is just or unjust for the reasons offered by Nozick, for example, who contends that 
any one who has acquired resources by legitimate means has a right to these resources 
and that any redistribution by the state of these goods is unjust (Nozick, 1974).  
 Redistribution it may be argued is justified in the United States because of the 
nature of the economy. It is known that the performance of the economy impacts the 
ability of persons to acquire the resources that they need to sustain life.  Social welfare 
resulting from redistribution is therefore acceptable and necessary as well as consistent 
with the thinking that advocates a free market economy. For example, economic trends 
that result in rising levels of unemployment cause those who have lost their jobs to seek 
help in maintaining the basics of their lifestyles.  Situations of chronic poverty necessitate 
the provision of social welfare remedies as well as empowerment initiatives, such as 
welfare to work programs to assist those in this situation in finding their way to self 
sufficiency.  
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 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis believe that redistribution is necessary in 
states with free market systems.  The contribution that they offer to the distributive 
justice literature has considerations for inequality resulting from market forces but 
suggest plans for redistribution that go beyond the traditional practices of providing 
monetary and in-kind support for the needy.  In Recasting Egalitarianism (1998) they 
advocate arrangements that prevent poverty instead of mitigating it when it occurs.   This 
is done by distributing economic empowerment to promote equality within a laissez-faire 
economy.   Fostering worker-ownership of firms, home ownership, children’s rights and 
education vouchers for the poor would alleviate poverty in a more sustainable and 
efficient fashion.  Empowerment, Bowles and Gintis believe is a more effective solution 
than giving the type of remedial support that is most common. 
Although their recommendations for eliminating poverty differ from traditional 
methods of redistribution they involve arrangements associated with the state and with 
markets which is contrary to the belief that markets are self-regulating.  These 
arrangements necessary to produce worker-ownership, home ownership, children’s 
rights, and school vouchers are seen as justified because of the belief that equality, in 
terms of the ability to live decently, is necessary (Bowles and Gintis, 1998).   
 Bowles and Gintis recognize inequality of resources as stemming from market 
failure.  They favor taking definitive measures to promote egalitarianism however they 
are critical of the traditional methods of doing so.  Redistribution of wealth through 
governance structures in the forms of the social welfare programs that currently exist, 
they argue, is inefficient and unreliable.  It is subject to the preferences of those who 
  9 
control the legislative process.  As a consequence the process of promoting equality or at 
least a minimum level of economic viability for all is unstable. 
Ideally, a structure of governance is a means of avoiding or 
attenuating coordination failures but there is nothing in the 
process determining the evolution of governance structures 
that insures the results.  Government structures may endure 
because they are favored by powerful groups for whom 
they secure a large slice of a given pie, not because these 
structures foster the growth of the pie itself (Bowles and 
Gintis, 1998). 
 
 The conservative view, it is stated in Bowles and Gintis’s proposal for adjusting 
the means by which we seek egalitarianism, expects that allowing the market to regulate 
itself is the best hope for all members of a given society.  They view governance 
structures meant to foster equality as flawed because they view the “state as an arena fore 
wasteful rent-seeking, while the market economy is efficient” (Bowles and Gintis, 1998 
p. 9).  The opposing view of liberals who support egalitarian economic policy is that state 
mandated remedies are the cure for poverty.  Bowles and Gintis believe that both the 
conservative and liberal points of view fail to notice the importance of communities and 
the sense of trust that exists among members.  Their “reconstruction of egalitarian 
political economy begins by recognizing that market, states, and communities, each with 
its characteristic capabilities and deficiencies, will necessarily play a complementary role 
in any governance structure worthy of support” (Bowles and Gintis, 1998, 10).  From the 
recognition of the importance of the role of community in economic equality comes the 
idea that allowing all community members to had a stake in the success of the economy , 
such as being part of a worker owned firm is far more efficient than other means to 
achieving an egalitarian society. Agreeing with Robert Dahl’s view in An Economic 
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Theory of Democracy, Bowles and Gintis believe it is cost effective because workers who 
have more than a passing interest in the success of the firm need less supervision (ibid). 
The question of whether or not social welfare policy should be provided on a 
consistent basis calls to mind the question of whether or not it is necessary in the first 
place.  Normative discussions advocating the provision of social welfare benefits by the 
state have claimed that it is the responsibility of the government to protect those who 
cannot provide for themselves and to assist those who provide for themselves under 
normal conditions but cannot in the case of market failure events such as unemployment 
or inflation.  Still others feel that there are some who should be considered as entitled to 
receiving assistance from government and those who should not. 
Applebaum (2001) distinguishes between the two types of poor people that 
government programs are designed to support in her article which examines affect toward 
the two groups of poor, termed deserving and undeserving.  Two studies were involved in 
this research.  The first was to determine whether or not the concept of deservingness was 
actually related to policy decisions.  Respondents were asked if they believed that people 
made distinctions between groups of poor people viewing some as more deserving of 
assistance than others. This first study showed that liberal policies were more likely to be 
advocated if the group slated to benefit from them were made up of people perceived as 
deserving rather than underserving. 
 The second study focused on identifying factors that caused the respondents to 
classify certain people as deserving or undeserving.  People were considered deserving 
were those who were “white and followed mainstream norms” (Appelbaum, 2001, 420).  
Applebaum goes on to identify the “attribution responsibility” which the respondents 
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held for certain poor people.  The moral argument here is if a person was deemed to be 
the cause of his or her own problems then no one is obliged to help. 
 Karniol (1985) believes that individuals make a choice to remain poor instead of 
taking actions to secure wealth.  He feels that policy recommendations should be for less 
in terms of providing benefits to those who are responsible for their own misfortune. 
 Hochschild notes that liberal political theorists value equality and are receptive to 
policies that redistribute resources for the purpose of achieving.  Equality of resources, 
she argues, has now come to include “rights to economic and environmental well-being” 
for all (Hoschchild, 480, 1979).  “The answer to ‘how should equality by defined?’ is 
increasingly substantive equality of outcomes, either as an end in itself or as a 
prerequisite for liberty and true equal opportunity.  Thus a strong argument for 
redistribution falls well within the traditional American values of freedom, individualism, 
and opportunity according to Hochschild.  Further, she points out that economic growth 
rates make the demand for redistribution more plausible since “Decreasing economic 
growth can only exacerbate the economic problems of the poor and middle classes” 
(ibid).  Other democratic nations have moved in the direction advocated by liberal 
theorist since the end of the Second World War.  Social welfare policies and progressive 
taxations to support them have appeared in Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain (ibid). 
 Analyzing social welfare bills in this study of Congressional voting behavior has 
the effect of linking domestic political economy and legislative behavior in a way that 
illuminates degree of stability that exists for the social safety net in the United States.  
Above, I discuss the views of others who argue that distributive justice is necessary on 
moral grounds and political grounds.  Social welfare policy can be considered 
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inextricable from justice especially in a democratic society with a capitalistic economy.   
Democracy requires that individuals are able to decide for themselves (insofar as they are 
capable of doing so) what is best for them in regard to lifestyle (Dahl, 1972).  In a free 
market democratic economy this requires that everyone have the ability to participate at 
least minimally in the in the functioning of the economy and the polity as democratic 
citizens.  This is the only legitimate way of acquiring the goods necessary to sustain life 
as a free and autonomous person. If this ability is limited to only a segment of the 
population then the reality of freedom and democracy cease to measure up to the model 
of democracy that is perceived to exist in the United States1. 
 The central research question of this study is “What explains change in voting 
behavior by members of the United States House of Representatives with regard to social 
welfare bills?”  It is often assumed that legislators have personal political ideological 
orientations that determine the way they vote.  However, other studies have determined 
that personal ideology is not the only factor that influences legislators’ vote choices.  This 
study focuses on determining which variables sometimes supercede ideology in the 
decision making process of each member of Congress and at what times these variables 
intervene. 
 Other studies have focused on questions such as how does presidential influence 
affect voting outcomes in Congress or how do campaign contributions or citizen 
awareness affect decision making by members of Congress.  Most of these studies have 
aimed at uncovering the effects of single factors.  This study will analyze the effects of 
the President, economic conditions, the presence of scandal, and the Speaker of the 
                                                 
1 The political behavior literature has demonstrated at length that economic resources are related to political 
participation.  Studies in this subfield have shown that income levels are tied to education and efficacy 
levels both of which are positively related to levels of political participation (Brady et al. ; Campbell et al.) 
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House (for the last 10 years) on the way members of Congress vote on bills pertaining to 
social welfare policy in order to determine at what times each are dominant or not. 
 Plan of the study: 
 The first chapter includes a review of the key trends in the literature on 
congressional voting behavior and strengths and weaknesses of these contributions.  
Attention will be given to the fact that these theories focus on only one of many factors 
that would determine how members of Congress vote rather than how the set of factors 
become more or less important at different points in time.  Here, I discuss my strategy to 
add to this set of theories by introducing my theory of congressional voting in which 
legislators make decisions about which one of a set of motivating factors will influence 
his or her vote on a particular bill affecting social welfare policy.  My theory emphasizes 
the concept that certain factors have more influence at different times and discuss how 
established theories provide accurate descriptions of Congressional behavior at particular 
time intervals.  Additionally, I discuss the data to be used to test the theory. 
 The second chapter provides a historical overview of changes in social welfare 
policy and address events surrounding the formulation of social policy over the period 
between 1972 and 2002.  A key focus will be the historical implications of Congress and 
the role it played during this period as an institution and as a body interacting with the 
various presidents.  
Chapter three contains the qualitative component of the project.  Case studies of 
bills for which votes were analyses in the micro level analysis will be presented.  Chapter 
four includes an analysis of roll call votes using the bill as the unit of analysis.  This is an 
analysis of macro level data in which all bills selected will be analyzed in one equation.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to observe general trends in voting behavior that are 
identified by the explanatory variables used in the analysis.  This is done using Ordinary 
Least Squares Regression since the dependent variable is operationalized as a percentage 
of the vote of all legislators considered, in favor of the bill.  This chapter includes a 
detailed description of the methodology, the findings of the analysis, and a discussion of 
conclusions drawn from the analysis. 
 Since the macro level analysis, briefly described above, does not account for 
district level variables, the micro or district level analysis presented in Chapter six is 
conducted using the individual legislator as the unit of analysis.    Since the dependent 
variable is the vote supporting or not supporting the bill, a qualitative and dichotomous 
variable, Logistic Regression is used.  As with Chapter three a detailed description of the 
methodology, the findings of the analysis, and a discussion of the conclusion in addition 
to a comparative discussion of the macro and micro level analyses is included.  The need 
for two levels of analysis is detailed in Chapter five.  
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Chapter 1. Major Theories of Legislators’ Decision Making Strategy 
The literature addressing congressional voting behavior in the field of American 
Politics is vast.  We might distinguish among works that explain the effects of particular 
institutional characteristics of Congress on the way members of Congress vote while 
appreciating those that offer explanations of the influence of factors external to Congress.  
Regarding the second category, the presidency, constituents and interest groups have 
been the focus of many congressional behavior studies.  This chapter focuses of the major 
theories that offer explanations of what drives voting decisions by members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  It reviews works dealing with presidential and party influence 
on legislators’ voting decisions and those that claim that decisions are made according to 
ideology and not subject to outside influences such as party.  Before proceeding to the 
discussion of theories that attempt to explain voting behavior among members of 
Congress I discuss the agenda setting stage of the policy process since it is the stage at 
which it is determined whether or not a policy problem will be addressed by Congress. 
Agenda Setting 
John Kingdon defines the agenda of a governing body as “the list of subjects or 
problems to which government officials… are paying some serious attention at any given 
time” (Kingdon,1994, p.3).  He further distinguishes between the governmental agenda 
and the decision agenda.  The former is “the list of subjects that are getting attention” 
while the latter is “the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an 
active decision” (Kingdon, 1994 p.4). 
Similar to Kingdon, Sinclair regards the political agenda as “a set of problems and 
policy proposals being seriously debated by the attentive public and policy makers” and 
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agenda setting as “the process through which issues attain the status of being seriously 
debated by politically relevant actors” (Sinclair, 1986, 35).  Policy issues vary in 
importance and the set of agenda items take hierarchical form with there being fewer 
highly salient items at the top of the list and more items of decreasing saliency toward the 
bottom of the list. Sinclair examines the role of congressional committees to determine 
what if any influence they have on the political agenda.  She argues that if agenda setting 
entails issues being brought to the attention of the public and policy makers for debate 
then congressional committees are appropriate actors in the agenda setting process and 
that other members of Congress will be especially attentive to issues raised by a 
committee (Sinclair, 1986). 
 In the absence of their ability to shape the policy agenda as they had before the 
loss of majority status in the 1980 general election, the Democratic party leaders began 
their quest to regain control of Congressional the agenda by effectively communicating 
their preferences to the electorate and asking for the support of other House Democrats 
when legislation was being drafted on the floor (Herrnson and Patterson, 1995).  The 
Democrats saw the need to revive the House Democratic Caucus which would “create 
task forces to develop policy proposals that would serve as the basis for the political 
agenda” and also “undertake a sustained effort to develop a Democratic vision for 
America’s future and to articulate coherent policy positions on several interrelated issues 
rather than develop issues on an ad hoc basis, as it had done during the 1970s” (Herrnson 
and Patterson, 1995, 611). Herrnson and Patterson document that the Democratic Party, 
following the recommendations of the APSA committee for communicating effectively 
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and building party cohesion allowed them to exert some control over the agenda even in 
the presence of a Republican majority in Congress and a Republican president (ibid). 
 Other scholars have documented that the president sets the national policy agenda 
(Moe, 1994).   Still others demonstrate that House majorities have more of a role in 
determining what issues become parts of Congress’s agenda (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 
Rohde, 1991, Cox, 2001).  In addition to taking charge of the agenda, Sinclair reveals that 
since the late 1960s members of Congress have sought to determine the agenda despite 
opposition from the president (Sinclair, 1992, 1993, 1995). 
Taylor focuses specifically on the domestic agenda and finds that leaders in the 
House and Senate have become more responsible for the agenda in the years between 
1947 and 1994 (Taylor, 1998).  He defines an agenda as “a set of concrete legislative 
proposals that have been thoroughly thought through and explicitly offered by the 
president or members of Congress” (Taylor, 1998, 375).  In examining patterns of 
domestic agenda setting during the years specified he finds that in the presence of divided 
government the domestic policy agenda is increasingly determined by the majority party 
leadership in Congress, specifically by their proposal of agenda items (ibid). 
Although Congress receives much attention for their role in agenda setting the 
president is also viewed as a key player in agenda setting process.  Cohen (1995) argues 
that the more attention presidents have given particular policy issues in their Sate of the 
Union Addresses, the more salient these issues have become to the public.  He finds that 
presidents can simply mention policy issues and do not have to present detailed 
arguments in order to generate public responses and popular presidents, according to 
Cohen, are no more influential than unpopular presidents 
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 Hammond et al. find that at least 80 percent of congressional caucuses actively 
pursue agenda building.  Congressional caucuses are, in some instances, the initial 
contact between Congress and actors outside of Congress.  They “identify emerging 
problems, define parameters or those problems, and may develop legislative solutions 
before the issue appears on the agenda of any committee” (Hammond et al., 1985, 603).  
Besides placing items on the Congressional agenda, caucuses have prompted 
organizational change with respect to the administrative agenda by proposing and gaining 
personnel appointments.  They have also placed program proposals on the administrative 
agenda in addition to helping agencies formulate the proposals that will be sent to 
Congress (ibid). 
 Another important consideration involving the agenda setting stage of the policy 
process is the presence of strategic agenda setting.  Mouw and Mackuen argue that when 
forming the National agenda political actors use a strategy that accounts for long-term 
political goals, presidential politics, and institutional changes that may occur. Thus, 
similar to strategic voters in the electorate, legislators propose policy options that are 
imperfect representations of their actual preferences and of their constituents’ preferences 
(Mouw and Mackuen, 1992). 
 Strategic agenda setting has two implications for the overall policy making 
process.  First, the policy content of proposals are altered so that they may be more likely 
to move through the other stages of the policy process and become laws to be enacted.  
Second, factors that are outside of the policy content will influence the way the agenda 
will be set. The consequence when these implications are considered from a democratic 
theory stand point is that legislation, instead of reflecting the needs of the electorate, will 
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reflect the compromises sought be legislators concerned with serving their political 
purposes (Mouw and Mackuen, 1992). 
 It is evident from the above account of the leading theories of agenda setting that 
many players have an effect on the congressional agenda.  One might argue that this stage 
of the policy process is the most important because it is where political actors decide 
whether an issue will be considered for action by Congress at all.  The next stage, voting 
is important to the overall policy outcome that a congressional session will produce.  
Whereas agenda setting initially impacts policy outcome voting continues to affect that 
outcome since it is the stage at which items that have made it to the agenda will either 
become policy or be rejected.  The following is a discussion of congressional behavior at 
the voting stage of the policy process.  
Voting decisions without party influence 
 The theory of responsible party government requires that parties adopt a well-
defined platform, the existence of unified government, and members of the majority party 
voting cohesively to ensure implementation of the party’s platform and realization of 
policy outcomes and repetition of this process (Schattschneider 1942; American Political 
Science Association, 1950).  When these conditions are met, policy outcomes will reflect 
the preferences of the majority party.   
Schattschneider offers further discussion of the effects of party on policy 
outcomes addressing the question “What sort of control could American parties in any 
case exercise over the administrative establishment”? (Schattschneider, 1942).  He posits 
that party control, to the extent that it could influence policy outcomes, is difficult to 
detect and that policy outcomes are largely the result of legislation that is “developed 
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across party lines and in spite of party divisions more often than it evolves as a 
consequence of party conflict” (ibid).  This is problematic for Schattschneider since he 
believes that Responsible Party government is necessary for democracy in the Unites 
States.  Through the two party systems the electorate is able to choose among the two 
parties which will produce the types of policies that will be most beneficial 
(Schattschneider, 1975).  As an example he discusses the need for party cohesion to 
remedy the high unemployment rate in the year 1945. 
According to the prevailing opinion among thoughtful person, the 
government is now faced with problems in the solution of which 
it dare not fail.  For the successful execution of the complex and 
delicate policies which it is hoped that a new depression may be 
avoided, political means must be found to bring about 
unaccustomed teamwork of Congress and the President and all 
agencies and branches of the government in order to integrate 
closely a great variety of public activities.  For all of these 
reasons, the launching of a new program for high-level 
employment implies that the political system will be made to 
work in ways in which it never worked before.  This situation 
calls for a political plan, on the general theory that a good cause 
deserves a superior political strategy (Schattschneider, 1945). 
 
 Thus, Schattschneider believed that the two party system was necessary and that 
party cohesion needed strengthening in order for policies that were most needed to 
emerge.  Thus, according to Schattschneider, it is assumed that parties would be 
consistent in the types of policies that they promote.  Milkis discusses the merits of 
Responsible Party government in the context of the New Deal arguing that New Deal 
party politics revealed the limits and possibilities of party government (Milkis, 1992).  He 
notes that Schattschneider said in an address to the New York State League of Women 
Voters in 1940 that the commitment to party reform that accompanied the New Deal was 
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one of several factors that would lead to “stronger centralized party control” (Milkis, 
1992). 
 According to Milkis, however, Roosevelt’s work in promoting the New Deal 
caused the demise of any hope of achieving the Responsible Party model.  Roosevelt set 
out to overcome state and local parochialisms especially where Southern Democrats were 
concerned.  He wanted to forge a new ideology for the Democrats as one of “militant 
liberalism” (Roosevelt, vol. 7, XIII).  The campaign to reform the character of the two 
major parties had effects on the Democrats and the Republicans. However it also 
established a more direct link between the president and the public.  Party organizations, 
as a result became much less important (Milikin, 1992).  The institutional reforms of the 
New Deal promoted government in which party government was replaced by a system of 
governance insulated from localized politics that allowed Roosevelt to create the New 
Deal policies by executive actions eliminating the need for cooperation among party 
members in Congress (Milkis, 1991). 
 Milkis demonstrates that in the case of the New Deal, the Responsible Party 
model fails. However, Schattschneider insists that it should still be pursued for the sake 
of promoting government that is responsive to the needs of the electorate as he argued in 
“Party Government and Employment Policy” (Schattschneider, 1944).  “What people do 
about the government depends on what they think the government is able to do.  
Therefore, the idea that the government is now able to protect people against the most 
dreaded of the manifestations of economic instability is almost certain to have a great 
impact on the political behavior of millions of people, many of whom have never before 
been drawn into the orbit of politics”  (ibid).   Thus he feels that people will mobilize if 
  22 
they believe it is worthwhile.  What should follow is the mobilization of a majority that 
ideologically reflects the policy preferences of the people.  “That is, political means 
ought to be found for the mobilization of an effective majority and the organization and 
implementation of the power of this majority over the government as a whole, including 
the power to keep control of the government as a whole, including the power to keep 
control of the government steadily while policies are formulated and executed” (ibid). 
 A theoretical basis for understanding voting behavior and the problems that may 
arise among voters is developed by Duncan Black.  Black proposes an understanding of 
group decision-making by exploring the ordering of preferences among members of 
groups.  He uses the theory of “relative valuation of orthodox Economic Science or the 
theory of indifference curves” (Black, 1948).  In doing so he shows that points arrange on 
a straight line representing voters or other decision makers and the schedule of 
preferences associated with those involved.  The voting outcome or the decision made by 
the group will depend on where along the continuum the majority of the voters’ 
preferences lie.  If everyone votes according to his or her preferences the committee 
would adopt the motion corresponding to the median voter’s optimal choice.  If one or 
more voters with optimums above the median voter’s optimum choice votes in such a 
way as to give a different option a majority of votes then the outcome will be the 
rejection of the median voter’s optimum choice  (Black, 1948).  If all of the above 
premises are true and the outcome of the vote is different than what Black stated as the 
expected outcome then an explanation of the change in the expected voting behavior is 
expected. 
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 Black believed that this model of group decision making could be used in 
explaining decision making in politics and could “present the basis for the development 
of a pure science of politics” (Black, 1948).  Doing so would apply the same logic to 
political science as used in economics; however, a different definition of equilibrium 
would be in place.  Equilibrium would now be considered in “in terms of voting, in place 
of the type of definition employed in economic science” (Black, 1948). To this end Black 
proceeded to develop the median voter theory which provides the basis for a large 
segment of voting behavior literature in political science.  Noting that a variation of the 
median voter model predicts the degree to which legislators’ voting decisions will reflect 
the preferences of the median voters in their districts, Gerber et al. present empirical 
evidence that indicates that in many cases legislators make voting decisions that are 
significantly different from the preferences of their districts’ medians. 
 Gerber et al. test the median voter model by “constructing superior measure of 
voter preferences from a unique data set.  The data set is made up of 2.8 million 
individual-level vote returns.  They estimated the means, medians, and variance of the 
voters’ ideological preferences within a sample of districts (Gerber et al., 2004).  By 
mapping the districts’ ideological orientations they were able to attach the policy 
preferences of the voters more accurately to that of the legislators who represented them.  
The result was the ability to estimate the effects of the median voters’ preferences with 
their legislator’s voting behavior and determine where the median voter model held and 
where it did not. 
 Despite its limitations the median voter model is still used to describe voting 
outcomes in other works.  In the case of legislative voting behavior the median voter 
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model is understood as an illustration that represents an odd number of legislators 
ordered in an issue space in such a way that their policy preferences are single-peaked.  
The policy outcome corresponds to the median legislator’s ideal point (Black, 1958).  
Bills will pass if they are of an ideological nature that does not alienate the most centrist 
voter.  For example, if a bill that is primarily conservative appeals to the median voter 
and enough of those to the left of the median voter, it will pass.  Similarly a liberal bill 
must have the support of the median voter and enough of those right of the median if it is 
to pass. 
The median voter theory also provides the foundation for Kenneth Krehbiel’s 
work in Pivotal Politics (1999) and his article, “Where’s the Party” (1993).  In Pivotal 
Politics he attempts to explain the behavior of legislators in situations in which gridlock 
is broken in Congress.  The explanation he offers for ending gridlock requires that we 
view legislators lined up on points along a liberal/conservative continuum.  Also on the 
continuum are points representing the bill and the status quo.  The bill must occupy a 
point on the continuum just far enough on either side of the median voter to get enough 
votes from the conservatives if it is a liberal bill or from the liberals if the bill is 
conservative in order to avoid the possibility of a filibuster or a veto.  In Krehbiel’s 
theory the pivotal legislator is the one who occupies the last point on the side of center 
opposite the bill that must support the bill in order for it to pass. 
 According to the pivotal politics theory, then, the closer a bill is to the legislator’s 
ideal point the more likely he or she will vote to pass the bill.  This is a fundamental 
assumption in Krehbiel’s work that is also present in “Where’s the Party” (Krehbiel, 
1993).  He argues here that one can observe activity by party leaders in the legislative 
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process but partisanship still does not “explain much variation in the observed stages of 
organizing the legislature” (Krehbiel, 1993).  He further argues that “theories of 
legislative politics with a party component while perhaps more realistic than their more 
parsimonious non-partisan counterparts—are not necessarily superior predictors of 
observable legislative behavior” (Krehbiel, 1993). 
 Krehbiel asks, “In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote 
with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question, or 
do they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about the policy in 
question?” (Krehbiel, 1993). This question is in keeping with another theme in his work 
which is that Republicans vote like other Republicans because they are individuals who 
happen to be Republicans and likewise for Democrats.  Krehbiel argues that he is 
supported in the view that parties do not influence the votes of their members, however, 
the analysis that he presents does not disentangle the effects of individual ideology and 
party activism. Because the effects are indistinguishable, he concludes that there is no 
justification for accepting party activism as an explanation for vote choice. 
 Similar to Krehbiel, Cox and McCubbins, in Legislative Leviathan, adhere to the 
rational choice view of parties which they state are “too internally divided to be either 
practically effective or theoretically interesting” (Cox and McCubbins, 1993).  In general, 
they argue, legislators do not vote as their party votes.  Rather, they vote according to 
their individual preferences.  If their voting patterns appear similar it is because they are 
of similar ideological orientations.  In essence, what we observe is legislators supporting 
Republican or Democratic bills because they happen to be Republicans or Democrats.  
The difference between the arguments presented in Pivotal Politics and in Legislative 
  26 
Leviathan is that in the latter it is argued that parties act as floor and procedural coalitions 
and that homogeneous party are likely to take on both roles.  Thus, when able, members 
of the same party act together to promote rules for consideration of bills that are likely to 
have the affect on the vote that they would prefer.  While such activities promote voting 
cohesion among members of the party involved, they take place, according to Cox and 
McCubbins because those congressmen and congresswomen have similar preferences 
regarding passage of the bill being considered.  Prior to Legislative Leviathan, Cox and 
McCubbins argue that party voting in Congress began declining early in the twentieth 
century.  They document trends for Republican and Democratic members of Congress 
from 1910 through 1980 by analyzing roll call votes while accounting for how the floor 
leader and the majority and minority whip voted.  “If a party’s leader whip both voted on 
the same side, then that side was taken to be the party leadership’s position” (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1991) 
Voting decisions with party influence 
 Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman (1999) through the use of statistical analysis 
and journalistic accounts of the actions of members of the House on the A to Z bill were 
able to provide support for the theory that party can determine voting outcomes.   The A 
to Z spending plan, H.R. 3266, in 1994, was the budget proposal for that year which 
contained deep and very controversial spending cuts. In considering the actions on the 
proposal Binder et al. argue against Krehbiel’s assertion that is impossible to prove that 
parties are responsible for the outcome of the vote and not preference in their article on 
the outcome of the A to Z plan.  If politics operated without parties, they conclude, there 
should have been a discharge of the A to Z bill.  “A majority of the House had 
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cosponsored the bill, so a majority of the House should have signed the discharge 
petition.  That did not happen.” (Binder et al., 1999).   
 The use of journalistic accounts was valuable to this study because it provided a 
justification to look beyond the statistical analysis that Krehbiel presented and bolstered 
the theoretical grounds of their own analysis.  The accounts reported the actual reasons 
for the votes.  They gave statements as to why legislators voted as they did thus giving an 
explanation that went beyond the observations that one could make as an outside 
observer.  Therefore while statistical analysis has an important role in research, the 
observations which are converted to data are not able to tell the full story of the 
motivation for vote choice in this instance.  This is important to note because Binder et al. 
take the position against Krehbiel that party matters and that he fails to demonstrate that 
it does not in his analysis because the observations that he uses are without objective 
explanation.  Krehbiel’s position that Republicans vote cohesively because they are 
Republicans is unfalsifiable and not useful in scientific inquiry. 
 Further, the use of the median voter theory as the foundation for the pivotal 
politics theory fails because while illustrating the function of the pivotal voter in breaking 
gridlock it also demonstrates the ideological diversity of members of both parties.  If 
party members vote independently of party influence cohesion can’t be explained by the 
“coincidence” of party membership.  This approach is also used in Evans and Oleszek’s 
Congress under Fire in which they give a narrative account of actions by the Republican 
Party leadership during the first congressional session that the Republicans controlled in 
the 1990s. 
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 Conditional party government predicts that if the majority party has homogeneous 
preferences it will be strong enough to pass non-centrist policy outcomes.  According to 
this theory, the condition for party strength is related to the legislators’ preferences.  
There may be heterogeneity across parties and homogeneity of preferences within parties.  
In this case the majority party, it is predicted, will be strong enough to pass non-centrist 
policy outcomes (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rohde, 1995).  Responding to 
Krehbiel (1991), Rohde (1994) argues that the power of parties in Congress is more 
significant than Krehbiel concedes.  Likewise Jason Roberts produces evidence of 
persuasive party politics by showing that changes in rules and procedural details 
influence roll call votes (Roberts, 2007). 
 According to Krehbiel (1991), preferences are exogenous and are induced by the 
values, needs, and wants of the electorate through the electoral process.  Against this 
view, Rohde (1991) argues that there are many other motivations for the vote.  He 
emphasizes that appointments to committees are offered as rewards for voting a particular 
way.  Additionally he states the following:  “the interaction of the partisan, distributive, 
and informational considerations produces a complex legislative environment, which 
cannot be captured adequately by a single-motivation, universal perspective.  The 
challenge for students of congressional politics is, I believe, not to prove that one 
theoretical view is superior in all situations but instead to specify the conditions under 
which each view applies to behavior and outcomes of interest” (Rohde, 1994). 
 This idea is further developed in the article “The Transition to Republican Rule in 
the House:  Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics”.  Aldrich and Rohde 
(1997) revisit the conditional party government theory as an explanation for the impact of 
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political parties on behavior within the legislature in contrast with Krehbiel’s idea that 
majority rules and outcome is related to the preference of the median member.  Their 
focus here is on party activism, not votes in the same sense as the median voter theory, 
and takes into account action to produce cohesion by parties.  Aldrich and Rohde give 
narrative accounts of actions taken by the members of the Republican Party after they had 
become the majority party aimed at creating cohesion.  Party cohesion is necessary, they 
argue, if the party is to advance its agenda.   
Complementing Aldrich and Rohde, Roberts and Smith (2003) find evidence of 
polarization along party lines towards the end of the twentieth century.  In their analysis 
of Congresses between 1971 and 2003 they compare the frequencies, over the years 
1971- 2000, of House votes, total votes, and Committee of the Whole votes in several 
categories.  The categories are:  composition of Roll Call Votes, the percent of party 
votes by vote type, mean party difference in voting by vote type, Democratic Party 
cohesion by vote type, Republican Party cohesion by vote type and the proportion of 
cutpoints between party medians by vote type (taken from Poole’s D-nominiate data 
base). The findings reported are that party influence is present in all but one term of 
Congress.  Further demonstration of the presence of party influence is found in Young 
and Wilkins (2007) “Vote Switchers and Party Influence in the U.S. House.”  In this 
article the authors tested the party persuasion assumption by comparing votes on final 
passage of legislation with the votes on closed rules.  The patterns that were revealed 
from the pairs of closed rule and final passage votes could not exist in the absence of 
party influence.  Similarly, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (2006) find that strong party 
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influence is present in votes on final passage and that legislative outcomes are generally 
on “the majority party’s side of the chamber median.” 
 Majoritarian chaos theories hold that majority rule is utterly unpredictable.  By 
contrast, stability-inducing theories are intended to illuminate predictability in legislators’ 
behavior.  It is assumed that certain players have certain procedural abilities that allow 
them a certain amount of control over policy outcomes.  For example, the rules 
committee decides the terms under which a bill will be considered on the floor (closed 
rule or open rule, for example).  This determines the chances of the bill being amended 
and ultimately has influence on the most practical way to vote (Ferejohn, 1986; Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1987).   
The theories of conditional party government and responsible party government 
appear to account for the result of votes on bills in the House of Representatives at certain 
times.  These are times when situations exist in which influence by the party leadership is 
strong enough to influence the legislators’ decisions.  Conditional party government and 
responsible party government imply the existence of catalysts for cohesive voting 
behavior at crucial moments in history of the U.S. Congress.   
Conditional party government comes into play when strong party leadership 
pursues an agenda with more vigor than usual.  One example in which strong party 
government and conditional party government appear is the period following the change 
of majority status in Congress from Democratic to the Republican in the 1994 House of 
Representatives election.  Led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, the Republican 
Party leadership appeared to have changed the distribution of votes on the 
conservative/liberal continuum in such a way that more liberal bills received less support 
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from continuing Republican legislators than the year before (Evans and Oleszek, 1997).  
Another example, prior to the years considered for this study, is the influence of House 
Speaker Cannon.  Prior to Gingrich, Cannon was able to exert some degree power over 
the committee system and successfully promote his party’s legislative agenda (Lawrence 
et al., 2001).  These events invite investigation of the conditions under which legislators 
will vote differently on bills that representative of certain policy areas than they had 
previously. 
 But perhaps the role of parties is dependent upon characteristics present at the 
time the vote is considered.  Influences external to Congress may exert a force greater 
than party influence or personal preferences on the decision making process of the 
legislators at certain times.  For example, the strength of the executive branch or the state 
of the economy relative to the legislators’ own districts may at times play a stronger role 
than party in the decision to support or not to support a bill (Neustadt, 1990, Shull et. al 
2000, Kingdon, 1989).  It is worth noting that implicit in the theory of Conditional party 




Related to theories that emphasize strong influence of party leadership are those 
concerned with the ability of members of Congress to influence policy outcomes through 
institutional means.  In Competing Principles; Committees, Parties and the Organization 
of Congress, Maltzman examines the roles of committees in Congress and compares the 
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validity of theories of the roles of congressional committees at different times and against 
different contexts. 
Focusing on three dominant models of committee performance, the chamber-
dominated model, the party-dominated model, and the independent committees model, 
Maltzman offers a theory of the role of committee performance.  He recognizes that the 
fit of the three is subject to change over time and attempts to explain the conditions under 
which each is appropriate. 
For Maltzman, it is important to understand where power lies in Congress.  For 
more than 200 years, he states, power has shifted between party leaders, committee 
members and the rank and file members of Congress.  Committees, he argues are 
“remarkably sensitive to demands placed upon them by contending principles, both inside 
and outside of the institution” (Maltzman 1998).  Generally they seem to mirror the 
preferences of the majority party caucus and the chamber (Maltzman1998). 
The relationship between individual legislators and institutions of governance is 
further explored by Lupia and McCubbins.  In considering the theory that policy experts, 
to whom many legislators defer when making vote choices, are present in most legislative 
bodies they argue that legislators do not simply defer to their judgment without seeking 
additional information about the decisions that the experts make.  In fact, Lupia and 
McCubbins argue, seemingly docile legislators exert a considerable amount of power 
over the legislative process by seeking information about the actions of those to whom 
authority is delegated.  This control is present when authority is delegated to legislators 
who are policy experts but not when non-experts abdicate their authority.  The difference 
between delegation and abdication in this case is how much the legislators are willing and 
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able to learn about the actions of the legislators who are the policy experts in question.  
Institutionally, the “legislative rules, procedures, and practices” provide the opportunities 
for learning (Lupia and McCubbins, 1994). 
 
Sources of influence 
Kingdon (1989), in considering how legislators decide how to vote, examines the 
roles that sets of actors play in the decision making process of the members of Congress.  
He finds that of all the actors, including constituents, interest groups, party leadership and 
the President, no one actor plays a preeminent role.  According to Kingdon’s model, 
when a legislator prepares to make a voting decision he or she first asks “Is it 
controversial?”  If it is not controversial he or she finds out if there is opposition.  If there 
is no opposition then he votes with the “environment”2.  If there is opposition then he 
votes along with members of his “field of forces.”3  If there is opposition among his field 
of forces then he questions whether his goals pass a critical threshold of importance.  If 
the answer is no, he will vote with his fellow congressmen and congresswomen if they 
are of major importance.  If he has any goals of importance he weighs a set of 
considerations including how salient the issue is, if the president ( of his party) considers 
it a high priority issue, if there is a constituency goal involved. 
When examining the particular role of constituents Kingdon finds that awareness 
is weak.  People don’t know the roll call record and members of Congress receive little 
constituent guidance on how to vote.  When a Congress member perceives that 
                                                 
2 Environment-Kingdon (1989) uses this term to mean the collective position of the chamber. 
 
3 “Field of forces”- Kingdon (1989) uses this phrase to refer to the collective position of legislators that a 
particular member of Congress may normally vote with. 
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constituents have a position he or she will vote that position with .76 probability.  It is not 
the complete explanation for congress members’ votes but constituency preference is 
certainly a consideration (Kingdon, 1989). 
Besides their constituents congressmen and congresswomen gain a large amount 
of information from elites who know more about what is at stake than constituents. There 
is a strong influence on the vote from other members of Congress.  Members of Congress 
consult their fellow legislators who have expertise in the policy area in question Kingdon 
(1989) argues.  He discovered that the most important consideration for choosing whom 
to consult is whether or not the informant agrees with the point of view of the one 
seeking advice. 
Kingdon does not consider party leadership very important but he perceives the 
president as having influence in voting behavior and as the public focal point and the 
author of the legislative agenda.  Members of the president’s party appear to be more 
supportive of his policy agenda than those of the opposing party (Kingdon, 1989).  The 
majority party can, however, exert sanctions through its institutional powers.  “The party 
leadership is in a position to sanction negatively congressmen who do not behave as they 
would wish, by withholding certain favors over which they have control” (Kingdon, 
1989). 
Interest groups vary in importance with regards to influence on legislators’ votes.  
Their influence appears minimal unless they have a connection to a legislator’s 
constituency.  They seem more important, however, when there is a constituency 
connection and there is a salient policy issue at hand (Kingdon, 1989).   
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With regard to the president as a significant actor Aldrich and Rohde (1985) 
document the relationship between the president and members of Congress relative to 
policy outcomes.  They recognize that there will be compromising and that “no individual 
actor will often get exactly what he or she wants” in terms of policy (Aldrich and Rohde, 
1985).  They also believe that there may be some aspects of legislation that the actors 
may not like but which may be “the price by which the president purchased the support of 
powerful members of his own or the opposition party for those aspects of the legislation 
that he did favor” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1985).  Consistent with the assumption in Aldrich 
and Rohde’s conception of conditional party government, is their belief that party 
strength or the effort to vote cohesively is endogenous to the legislature.  The legislators 
decide whether or not it is in their best interest to vote with the rest of the party.  If they 
collectively decide that it is more advantageous they become a cohesive voting force 
producing desired outcomes (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, 2000b). 
The theories discussed here are the prevailing theories in American politics that 
attempt to explain congressional behavior.  As Maltzman points out in his study of the 
roles of committees and parties, one theory cannot be expected to explain the behavior of 
members of Congress in all cases or under all sets of circumstances.  For this reason one 
of the goals of this study is to determine at what time in the years between 1972 and 2002 
and under what conditions certain factors impacted the voting decisions of members of 
Congress. 
To illustrate the statement above, one variable that has had effects on 
congressional voting behavior is the Speaker of the House.  Speakers have varied in their 
strength, and abilities to promote their parties’ agendas over the history of the U.S. House 
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of Representatives. When all of their characteristics and goals are considered, however, 
the Speaker, to some degree must have the cooperation of other members of the party 
leadership.  Accounts of Gingrich’s  tenure as  Speaker discuss his leadership strategies 
and decisions that he made such as  overriding seniority of members of the House in 
order to exert control over the committees which had a roles in shaping legislation that 
was of importance to the Republican party leadership, especially in terms of the budget  
(Sinclair, 2000; Palazzolo, 1997).  Domination of the committee system was crucial to 
obtaining desired policy outcomes because committees play a vital in shaping policies 
before bills appear on the floor for a vote (Hinkley, 1971; Fenno, 1973).  Although 
Gingrich was able to promote the Republican legislative agenda, to a point, and increase 
voting cohesion within his party, he eventually lost the support of his party’s leaders. In a 
rare move, House Republicans threatened to choose a Democrat as Speaker of the House 
if Newt Gingrich did not step down.  In the end Gingrich left the House of Representative 
entirely (Evans and Oleszeck 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/06/gingrich/). 
 Changes in the temperament of the electorate also contribute to changes in 
congressional voting behavior.  One way the effect of the attitudes of voters is manifested 
in congressional voting behavior is through the institution of the presidency. As 
mentioned earlier, Presidents are able to promote their legislative agendas because of 
their access to the listening American public (Evans and Oleszek, 2000).  The president is 
able to rally public support for his positions by making use of the “bully pulpit”4 to 
persuade Congress to support his positions (Neustadt, 1990).  This influence also depends 
                                                 
4 The use of this term in association with the presidency stems from President Roosevelt using it to describe 
the White House as a platform advantageous to promoting his agenda. 
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on strategic choices that the president makes on which issues to promote to the public.  
The president will promote policy issues to the public on which his position is popular 
and for which Congress would not otherwise vote in favor of his positions (Canes-Wrone, 
2001).  Past presidents have also enjoyed high levels public approval in times of crisis 
which increased the likelihood of success in obtaining support for their legislative 
initiatives and preferences from Congress (Muir, 1992). Conversely, the president may 
lose his power to affect Congressional behavior for various reasons.  A natural and 
expected occurrence is the “lame duck” period or approximately the last two years a 
president is expected to serve.  Involvement in scandal by a sitting president could have 
the effect of limiting his power over congress because of decreasing public approval and 
limiting his ability to rally public support for his positions (Kernell, 1997). As Maltzman 
(1998) states, therefore, because of ever changing conditions, one theory of congressional 
behavior cannot explain all behavior at all times as the Pivotal Politics theory asserts. 
 
A Theory of changing impact of exogenous factors on legislative decision 
making 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the median voter theory explains the voting 
behavior of a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress in terms of a continuum such as 
the liberal/conservative one.   In these cases the members of the body occupy points on 
the line which indicate how liberal or conservative they are. In that illustrative case, the 
farthest right point would represent the most conservative member while the farthest left 
represents the most liberal member and those approaching the center of the line are more 
moderate.  Whether or not a bill will pass depends on where it falls on the line.  If the 
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majority of the legislators are liberal and the bill falls on a point on the line left of the 
center, it is assumed by the median voter theory, that it will have enough votes to pass 
since the majority of those voting are liberal and themselves left of the center point of the 
liberal/conservative continuum.  This theory rests on the assumption that legislators vote 
according to their ideology, or some force that serves as a proxy for ideology.   
In Figure 1 the bill is located on the point of the continuum just left of center and 
includes all of the liberal members who happen to represent the majority.  The bill (B) is 
on the liberal side of the continuum yet it is not so far left as to exclude or be too liberal 
for legislators g, f, and so on and the preference of the majority is the outcome of the 
vote.  
Figure 1  Liberal / Conservative Continuum 
 
  
 The median voter theory and Krehbiel’s pivotal politics theory are spatial 
representations of voting behavior in that they show voters in an equilibrium state with a 
predicted out come5.   I do not attempt to argue against the median voter theory or the 
                                                 
5 Krehbiel refers to the pivotal politics model as representing behavior in an equilibrium state.  “Players in 
the game are assumed to adopt strategies that maximize their utility, conditional on the expectation that all 
other players in future stages of the game do likewise.  The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash.  
In more common terms, the behavior captured by this equilibrium concept can be summarized as strategic 
proposal, voting, and veto behavior by players in a multistage, interbranch, superjmajoritarian setting.  
Players know the game, know each others’ preferences, understand who is the pivotal voter in any given 
setting, and adopt optimal strategies accordingly” (Krehbiel, 1998, 25).  
 
                                                       ↓B ↓C (center)                             ↓status quo  
  |__|__|___|__|___|____|__|___|___|____|____|____|___|__|__|___| 
                          a   b   c    d    e   f       g                h       i       j        k     l       m 
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pivotal politics theory.   While Kriehbiel’s theory is helpful in my analysis, the main 
objectives are different. My objectives diverge from his when considering cases in which 
ideology or legislators’ ideal points, as used in the pivotal politics theory, are overridden 
as the determining factor for vote choice by other factors. When legislators cease voting 
according to their personal ideology their behavior can be represented differently and 
explained by a different theory. Instead of occupying fixed ideal points along a 
continuum in a situation in which the bill must appeal to the range of voters that includes 
the median voter and enough others to the right or left of that voter, legislators’ positions 
are not fixed.  Instead, I assert that cases arise in which the legislator takes positions 
either right or left of his or her usual position to support a bill when circumstances arise 
which make it more beneficial to do so.  
 The theory I propose is that in the absence of equilibrium, every time a legislator 
votes he or she considers which among a number of factors including his or her ideology, 
is the most influential at the time the decision is made.  Otherwise stated, each legislator 
has a number of considerations to take into account when he or she is making the choice 
to vote for or against a bill.  They may consider whether or not the president supports the 
bill, if the president proposes an incentive in the form of benefits to the legislator’s 
district, or the position of his or her party leadership or whether or not passage of the bill 
will have a negative, positive or neutral impact on the legislator’s constituents. The 
decision is made, I suggest, with regard to the consideration for external factors as well as 
his or her personal ideology.  
  Poole and Rosenthal call the legislator’s ideal point the place on the preference 
space where the legislator is located as a result of the combination of ideology and 
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external influences.  While I accept Poole and Rosenthal’s theory, the theory that I 
propose is different because it offers an account of the way in which various factors are 
ranked by the legislators.   If, for instance, a bill is being considered at a time when the 
president is enjoying high approval ratings and has indicated a strong degree of support 
for the bill, the legislator may feel more compelled to align him or herself with the 
popular president by supporting the bill instead of opposing it.  In a different case the 
ideology of a legislator may direct him or her to vote in favor of a bill; however if the 
legislator’s party leadership opposes the bill he or she may feel that there is a greater 
benefit associated with voting against it.   
 In sum, following Rohde (1994) and Kingdon (1989), this project does not seek to 
demonstrate that one theoretical view is superior to another in the congressional 
literature.  Rather the attempt is to specify the conditions under which each view applies 
to congressional voter behavior.  Thus, I attempt to explain the interactive effects of a set 
of motivations (including ideological preferences, but also other political and individual 
factors).  I do not argue that one theory is more plausible than the other.  Instead I look 
over time to see when circumstances were such that the theory of conditional party 
government, for instance, was the appropriate explanation or when presidential power 
was the strongest explanation for voting behavior in the House of Representatives or 
when some other combination of political and individual factors explained changes in 
voting behavior. 
 The advantage to analyzing bills related to social policy, for this study, is that 
legislative voting behavior in regard to social policy is usually so ideologically driven 
that changes in behavior are more significant and interesting to research than issues in 
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areas that are less ideologically driven.  Changes in behavior on ideological issues beg 
explanation as to what causes the legislator to shift either to the right or left of the way he 
or she normally votes on the same type of bill.  Less partisan issues are less interesting 
for this study because by being less ideologically driven the legislator is not expected to 
stand on ideology as strongly as he or she is on issues that are more ideologically driven. 
 Congressional voting behavior concerning Civil Rights policy is an example of a 
policy area in which voting decisions were ideologically driven. Shifts to the right or left 
of the legislator’s normal voting pattern are discussed by Barbara Sinclair as the 
conversion hypothesis in the context of changes in voting behavior in Congress on Civil 
Rights bills in the 1970s.  Sinclair found that Congress as a whole began to vote more 
liberally favoring Civil Rights bills than they had previously (Sinclair, 1989).  This 
change is more noteworthy among those who had previously opposed Civil Rights bills.    
The theory stated that instead of Congress becoming a more liberal body because 
conservative members were replaced by liberal members, continuing members began to 
vote more liberally on issues than they had previously, affirming the conversion 
hypothesis.  
Hypotheses 
 A generally accepted hypothesis regarding decision making by members of 
Congress, is that they vote according to their personal predispositions, or political 
ideology.  Some studies have defined political ideology as a function of race, gender, 
occupational background, and district demographics.  These factors are among those 
considered when ADA scores are calculated for individual legislators. ADA scores are 
measures of ideology that include information regarding district characteristics, coalitions 
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in the district as well as outward indications of the legislator’s ideology.  The 
combination of these variables creates an endogeneity problem in the generation of ADA 
scores   Therefore, as addressed by Carson and Oppenheimer (1983), the use of ADA 
scores would introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the analysis.   
 Although ideology is discussed as a determinant of the vote in this study the use 
of a quantitative measure of ideology is not useful to the analysis of the problem.  The 
theory assumes that legislators have ideological positions on most bills that they consider.  
The strength of those positions varies according to their area of expertise if they are 
considered policy entrepreneurs.  A legislator is likely to hold fast to his or her position 
on a bill that affects their district whereas he or she may defer to the judgment of a 
legislator who is an expert on a policy area that is unfamiliar.  What is of concern here is 
what factors cause change in the vote because change in behavior is an observable 
indicator of a change in position whereas ideology is not as readily observable.  The 
focus on change instead of attempting to determine the thoughts of the legislators is 
necessary because assessing the individual thoughts of the legislators is nearly 
methodologically impossible whereas change is observable and therefore quantifiable 
(Clinton and Meirowitz, 2004).  My theory rests on the assumption that legislators have a 
position on certain policy areas and that change in behavior when votes on similar bills is 
considered reflects the possibility of shift, either to the right or the left, the cause of 
which is investigated in this work.   
 The main hypothesis that is tested in this study is that as certain factors become 
more important to the legislator than personal ideology, in regard to achieving his or her 
personal goals, and then those factors will override personal ideology as the determinant 
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of the vote.  Examples of these factors are presidential power, party leadership, and the 
presence of crises such as the Iran hostage situation and the attacks of September 11th.  or 
scandals such as the Watergate and Lewinsky scandals.  As indicated by this list of 
factors or variables, two related hypotheses are included.   
 Related Hypothesis 1:  If the president has high approval ratings then legislators 
are more likely to support his policy preferences.  Approval ratings reflect how well the 
president is doing his job and how accountable the public holds him for crisis or scandal. 
 Related Hypothesis 2:  When party leadership is strong legislators are more likely 
to vote according to the preferences of the party leadership. 
 The hypotheses discussed above address variables in the theory that are expected 
to explain legislative voting behavior over time.   A fundamental assumption of any set of 
variables is that the values are different from case to case.  Thus, the qualitative 
dichotomous (independent) variables that represent the presence or absence of certain 
persons or phenomena is important to this study because these variables address the 
element of the theory that states that factors that vary may influence the behavior of 
members of Congress. 
The main hypothesis, which states that personal ideology may be overridden as 
certain factors become more important to the legislators, is included because it offers an 
explanation for variance in voting patterns when similar bills are considered.  It is 
intended to provide support for the theory that ideology is not the only determinant of 
legislators’ votes and that factors other than ideology may, at times, influence a 
legislator’s vote.  The related hypotheses discussed are intended to give substantive 
support to the theory by specifying exactly what factors are expected to have influence on 
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the legislators at the time frame addressed by in study.  These two hypotheses are 
instances of the general theory and it is assumed that other factors that may occur would 
be episodically important.  
Summary: 
 In this chapter I discussed the major theories that address Congressional voting 
behavior and how they contribute to our understanding of this subject.  I outline my 
theory of changing influences on voting behavior highlighting the idea that influences 
external to Congress members’ ideology have varying amounts of strength.  To proceed, 
the next chapter is a historical account of social policy bills over 30 years; 1972 through 
1992.  Its purpose is to provide information about social policy legislation and the actual 
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Chapter 2. History of Social Welfare Policy; 1972 through 2002 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there are those who argue that a system to 
protect members of a society from the inevitable shocks and changes associated with a 
free market economy is needed in all civil societies.  Such a system, commonly referred 
to as a social welfare system or welfare state, provides assistance to those who need help 
securing for themselves the basic necessities of life.  This chapter the documents major 
changes in the American social welfare system that occurred between the 1970s and the 
end of the twentieth century. 
Social rights, including the right to benefit from a welfare state, are  part of the 
democratization process, however, the welfare state did not begin to develop  in the 
United States until Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the Social Security Act of 1935 
(Quadagno, 1999).  “Programs of social protection granted social rights:  ‘The right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security, the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in 
the society’” (Quadagno, 1999).  Need based aid to those whose income is below the 
poverty level and social insurance which assists older citizens in their retirement years is 
meant to give recipients the means needed to live at an acceptable level of economic 
sustenance.  In the United States this means the provision of basic needs including 
shelter, health care, and nutrition in a consistent manner.  Ebbs and flows in the provision 
of welfare benefits due to changes in voting behavior poses risks to the integrity of the 
social welfare system and thus to the wellbeing of those in need. 
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In the United States, welfare programs are considered as parts of two categories 
for analytical purposes.  They are social insurance which is not means-tested6 and welfare 
assistance which is means-tested (Lester and Stewart, 2000).  Social insurance includes 
Old Age Survivors Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI), Medicare, and 
Unemployment Compensation.  Welfare assistance includes Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF) formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),  Food 
stamps and in-kind assistance such as housing, Medicaid, and other social services 
(Lester and  Stewart, 2000).  The two tiered welfare system is also viewed, by some, as 
aid to two classes of people:  deserving and undeserving recipients.  Social insurance is 
viewed favorably by more Americans and members of Congress than Welfare assistance.  
Issues regarding Welfare assistance have traditionally been outwardly more divisive than 
those regarding social insurance (Wilson, 1996). In recent years, however, there has been 
an erosion of support for continuing the same level of social insurance particularly from 
President Bush and Republican leadership in Congress.  
In the United States citizens depend, to some degree, on their Congressional 
representatives to advocate policies that will help them in times of need.  This chapter 
describes changes in social welfare policy, specifically Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, now Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Social Security in the form 
of OASDHI from 1972 through 2002 and the role that Congress played in shaping it.  It 
contains accounts of policies that were enacted between 1972 and 2002 and how they 
affected the delivery of welfare assistance and social insurance.  Rather than attempting 
                                                 
6 Mean-tested programs are distinguished from non means-tested programs based on the those who benefit 
from the programs.  Benefits such as TANF and Medicaid which are distributed to the poor are considered 
means-tested while those such as OASDHI and Medicare are distributed to older Americans who in most 
cases have paid into the systems that provide the benefits. 
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to provide a comprehensive account of the United States welfare state, this chapter, in 
keeping with the general intention of this work (to account for changes in the welfare 
state), addresses changes in policy. 
The 1970s 
Welfare Assistance 
In 1969 President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan to replace AFDC.  
Under FAP families of four with no source of income would receive $1,600 per year.  
This payment would be reduced by 50 cents for each dollar earned beyond $1,600.  When 
a family’s income reached $3,920 all government benefits would cease (Piven and 
Cloward, 1977).  Congress rejected this proposal for several reasons.  First, liberals 
feared the elimination of in-kind support such as food stamps.  Second, conservatives felt 
that FAP eliminated the incentive for the poor to seek work.  Third, public opinion was 
strongly against the proposal and the guarantee of a minimum income (Lester and 
Stewart, 2000).  By 1972 Congress had rejected FAP.  Instead they enacted a multibillion 
dollar general “Revenue Sharing” program (Piven and Cloward, 1977).  State and local 
officials advocated relief reform from the federal government but not necessarily in the 
form that FAP took.  FAP reforms, after all, were designed to end growth in AFDC rolls 
rather than help with fiscal difficulties. 
 For those who supported reducing the number AFDC recipients, problems that 
were associated with poor people, specifically civil disorder and crime, were blamed on 
the current welfare structure (Piven and Cloward, 1977).  Moreover it was thought that 
public concern with current welfare programs had more to do with the recipients than the 
programs themselves (Rogers-Dillon, 2004, Reese, 2005). The report by David Patrick 
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Moynihan, advisor to President Nixon perpetuated these perceptions. The Moynihan 
Report contained the following information. 
The social fabric of New York City is coming to pieces.  It isn’t just 
“strained” and it isn’t just “frayed”; but like a sheet of rotten canvas, it is 
beginning to rip, and it won’t be too long until even a moderate force will be 
capable  of leaving it in shreds and tatters….Among a large and growing 
lower class, self-reliance, self-discipline, and industry are waning; a radical 
disproportion is arising between reality and expectations concerning job, 
living  standard, and so on; unemployment is high but a lively demand for 
unskilled labor remains unmet; illegitimacy is increasing; families are more 
and more matrifocal and atomized; crime and disorder are sharply on the rise.  
There is, in short, a progressive disorganization of society, a growing pattern 
of frustration and mistrust…This general pathology, moreover, appears to be 
infecting the Puerto Rican community as well as the Negro.  A large segment 
of the population is becoming incompetent and destructive.  Growing 
parasitism, both legal and illegal, is the result; so, also, is violence.  It is a 
stirring, if generally unrecognized, demonstration of the power of our welfare 
machine (Moynihan, 1965). 
 
Armed with the Moynihan report which partially blamed the welfare system for 
problems that were thought to be concentrated among poor people, welfare reformers set 
out to restructure the lifestyles of poor people with efforts to enforce work requirements.  
They believed that this was the action necessary to restore family stability and diminish 
social pathologies associated with lack of work (Piven and Cloward, 1977).  One 
consideration that seemed to be lacking in Moynihan’s analysis is that poor people did 
not choose to place themselves in the situations in which they lived but that the jobs that 
were moved out of the urban centers had not been replaced (Wilson, 1996).  An 
additional problem was the lack of reliable public transportation for those who lived in 
the urban centers to go from home to work in a reasonable amount of time.  Work that 
was available in the urban centers became inaccessible resulting in the reliance on 
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welfare benefits by those who did not have the means to move from their communities or 
commute to places where jobs were located (ibid). 
In the late 1970s President Carter attempted to overhaul the welfare system by 
revisiting Nixon’s plan.  He proposed an income support program and a work benefit that 
would replace AFDC, SSI, and food stamp programs. Carter’s plan would have allowed a 
family of four to receive a payment of $2,300 until its earned income passed $3,800.  
This measure would have lessened the benefits that the poor could receive as their earned 
income rose.  Arguably, the policy would have worsened the situation for the poor who 
might have found that low paying jobs coupled with a decrease in benefits would not 
have enabled them to lift themselves out of poverty.  The supplement would then be 
reduced by 50 cents per dollar earned above $3,800.  This measure did not pass.    
Social Insurance 
Social Insurance began with the Social Security Act of 1935 which included the 
following: 
Old Age Survivors Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI) which is distributed to 
retired persons or their survivors.   Those eligible had reached the age of 65 and had 
made contributions to the system and those over 72 were eligible regardless of whether or 
not contributions were made.  Medicare is available to persons over the age of 65 
regardless of income category. Unemployment compensation is available to those who 
are temporarily unemployed.  
Since 1935 Social Insurance has been changed to accommodate the changing needs 
of the older segment of the population.  The Older Americans Act was signed into law by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and included the following:  nutrition programs in the 
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community as well as for those who are homebound; programs that served Native 
American elders; services targeted at low-income minority elders; health promotion and 
disease prevention activities; in-home services for frail elders; and services that protected 
the rights of older persons such as the long term care ombudsman program (Texas 
Department of Aging and Disability Services, 2005). 
Deliberation on how to improve the social security program went on for three years 
before the Social Security Amendments of 1972 were agreed upon. They became Public 
law 92-603 on October 30, 1972 and included a raise in benefits for elderly widows and 
widowers. The Act was amended in 1972 to include a national nutrition program for the 
elderly.  By the later 1970s funds became more limited as a result.  Vulnerable 
populations were frail elders, older women, minorities, rural elders, and the oldest of the 
elderly (United States Department of State) and forced reductions in services that they 
depended upon. 
 The repeal of the provision of the Social Security Act that treated men and women 
in similar situations differently improved benefits available for men approaching the age 
of 62.  Under the old law a man the same age as a woman and with the same earnings 
received a lower benefit than the woman.  Thus, men needed more social security credits 
in order to receive the same social security benefits upon retirement.  The retirement test 
was changed so that the longer a beneficiary worked and earned, the more his or her 
benefit would be.  The annual exempt amount of earnings was raised from $1,680 to 
$2100.  This became an automatic adjustment to keep up with earnings levels increases 
(ssa.gov/history).   
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Other changes as reported by the Social Security Administration were the 
following: a special minimum benefit for those who have worked in covered employment 
for many years, but at low levels; Higher benefits for workers who do not get social 
security retirement benefits before 65 but continue to work past that age; improvements 
in disability insurance protection (including a reduction in the waiting period for benefits 
and extension of childhood disability benefits to persons disabled between ages 18 and 
22) as well as improved protection for a worker’s dependents and survivors; extension of 
Medicare protection to disability insurance beneficiaries who have been on the social 
security disability benefit rolls for at least 2 years (ssa.gov/history).  Additional changes 
enacted in 1972 were: a 20 percent increase in all social security benefits to be effective 
in September of that year; the inclusion of provisions to automatically raise benefits as 
the cost of living increased; and raised from $9,000 to $10,800 in 1972 and to $12,000 in 
1973 the maximum amount of annual income that could count in calculating families’ 




 Under the Reagan administration the focus on need based welfare programs 
shifted from plans of guaranteed income to the reduction of the welfare rolls.  “President 
Reagan’s approach was to force welfare recipients into the job market by reducing 
expenditures for most social welfare programs and by tightening up eligibility 
requirements  for the programs” (Lester and Stewart, 2000).  This period marked a 
change in the philosophy guiding welfare policy.  At the federal level, it was no longer 
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the case that recipients of welfare benefits would have the opportunity to receive 
assistance as long as was needed.  In some cases they were forced to give up their 
benefits before they were able to provide for themselves economically. 
“The passage of the Family Support Act (FSA) in 1988 marked Congress’ third 
try in the past twenty years to revamp AFDC” (Deperez, 2002).  FSA was primarily 
aimed at moving welfare recipients from AFDC rolls to the workforce and was largely 
supported by both Republican and Democratic members of both chambers of Congress.  
“The FSA passed by an overwhelming margin of 96-1 in the Senate and 347-53 in the 
House (Rogers-Dillon, 2004). FSA contained the following four components:  The JOBS 
program required that states enroll 20 percent of its AFDC recipients in programs to 
develop employability plans by 1995 in order to continue to receive federal AFDC grants.  
States were required to withhold child support payments from the wages of parents 
without custody and to set up systematic reviews of child support agreements to ensure 
that payments were adjusted upwardly in response to inflation and changes in the parents’ 
wages.  Transitional benefits were to be provided to AFDC recipients who were in the 
JOBS program.  Medicaid and child-care benefits would continue for one year after the 
participant moved from the JOBS program to the workforce.  For minor parents, the new 
laws allowed states to permit them and their children to live with their parents and still 
qualify for AFDC benefits. 
The FSA failed to have the effect desired by its supporters when it was put into 
practice however.  The JOBS program only affected 13 percent of mothers receiving 
AFDC benefits and by 1992 60 percent of mothers receiving AFDC were exempted from 
the program entirely (Rogers-Dillon, 2004). 
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The Reagan administration received public support for its plans to improve the 
welfare system.   It considered the questions of “what responsibility does the federal 
government  have in assuring that there is a basic level of support available and in place 
for those who find themselves in need of financial help?” and “how should welfare 
assistance be provided to those who work but have wages insufficient to meet family 
needs?” (Story, 1982).  Public opinion supported the administration’s position as 
reflected in the 1982 national opinion survey which was sponsored by the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Deperez 2002). The report of the survey 
contained the following statements:  “Public welfare headed the list of services 
Americans would cut most severely if money were short… The Reagan program of 
welfare retrenchment capitalizes upon the growing public perception of substantial fraud 
and abuse in welfare programs…Many believe that welfare rolls are grossly inflated by 
the presence of able-bodied persons who should be required to work” (Deperez, 2002).  
The Reagan administration argued that AFDC wasted funds on “undeserving women” 
and increased bureaucracy as it depleted the treasury and added to the deficit 
(Abramovitz, 2000).  Additionally, Reagan expressed his view that it was specifically 
blacks who benefited from welfare programs when they were able to work but faced 
economic problems and breakdown of family because of their own habits (Williams, 
1998).  He also stated his characterization of welfare mothers as professional cheats who 
lived better than the average American.  He referred to a woman in Chicago “who:…has 
eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards, and is collecting veterans’ 
benefits on four nonexistent deceased husbands…She’s collecting Social Security on her 
cards.  She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each 
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of her names.  Her tax-free cash alone is over $150,000” (Reese, 2005;173).  Welfare 
assistance programs, in Reagan’s view, needed to be overhauled because they enabled 
individuals to receive benefits by cheating and did little to protect the public against such 
behavior. 
Reagan believed that the welfare state reflected ideals of the Great Society 
programs of the 1960s which produced citizen entitlement without reciprocity (Deperez, 
2000).  Expenditures for social programs, he believed, were responsible for the slowing 
of economic growth.  During his first term his proposed budget called for a $75 billion 
decrease or a reduction of one sixth of the funds appropriated to welfare programs.  The 
reductions included “52 percent for Food Stamps, 29 percent for AFDC, 64 percent for 
WIC (Special Supplemental Feeding Programs for Women, Infants and Children), 46 
percent for child nutrition, 38 percent for Low-Income Energy Assistance, and 20 percent 
for housing” (Deperez, 2002).  Economic recovery, Reagan believed, could only come 
with the dismantling of social programs.  Instead of dismantling all programs Congress 
limited the cuts to “14 percent in Food Stamps, 14 percent in AFDC, 28 percent in child 
nutrition, 8 percent in energy assistance, 11 percent in housing assistance, and a 9 percent 
increase in WIC” (Deprez,2002). 
Social Insurance 
 The 1980s saw the development of community based long-term care structures for 
the elderly.  This meant significant state and local planning and increased involvement of 
private and for-profit providers.  In 1984, Congress increased FICA taxes and began 
including federal employees as contributors to Social Security (Lester and Stewart, 
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2000).  This legislation was meant to ensure fiscal solvency of Social Security retirement 
through the year 2010. 
 During the 1980s the most significant amendments to the Social Security Act 
occurred in 1983.  Public Law 98-21 was enacted on March 11, 1983 to include more 
people as possible beneficiaries.  All federal employees hired after January 1, 1984 were 
to be covered by the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program.  
This change also required inclusion of the “President, the Vice President, all elected 
officials and political appointees, Federal judges, members of Congress and all legislative 
branch employees who are not participating in the CSRS as of December 31,1983” 
(ssa.gov).  Those who worked for nonprofit organizations were included for work 
performed after December 31, 1983.  The amendments also included those who worked 
for non-profit organizations and were 55 or older by January 1, 1984 and those fully 
insured under Title II of the Social Security Act provided they earn a specific amount of 
qualifying credits. 
 Changes to OASDI permitted surviving divorced spouses who remarried after the 
age of 60 to receive benefits from their former spouses.  They also allowed disabled 
widows and widowers who remarried after reaching the age of 50 to receive benefits as 
well as disabled surviving divorced wives who remarried after age 50. The 1983 
amendments mandated reductions in the old-age and disability benefits for those who 
would reach the age of 62 after 1985 and who are also eligible for benefits for having 
worked in non-covered jobs.  Those who worked at least 25 years in covered jobs and 
those who worked for nonprofit organizations were exempted. 
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The 1990s- 2002 
Welfare Assistance 
By the 1990’s welfare programs, especially AFDC had become more unpopular 
than ever.  The public perception was that those who were categorized as “being a poor, 
single parent or guardian of a minor child—received a check for as long as he or she met 
those requirements” (Rogers-Dillon 2004, 60) which was thought to be unfair in 
rewarding those who did not plan for their own financial security.  By 1994 fewer than 20 
percent of Americans believed that most welfare recipients deserved any benefits at all 
(Rogers-Dillon, 2004, 60).  Many welfare reformers of the 1990s wanted a return to the 
discretionary system of the 1960s under which social workers alone had the power to 
decide who was eligible, under a set of arbitrary living standards, to receive assistance.  
At this time both Democrats and Republicans were seeking support among “traditional 
white working – and middle-class” voters (Reese 2005, 174) and therefore tended to lean 
to the right when it came to making decisions regarding means-tested welfare benefits.  
President Clinton adopted the views of the Democratic Leadership Council regarding 
welfare as he pledged to “end welfare as we know it”.  By 1994 the newly elected 
Republican majority was in the position to control key congressional committees and 
give conservative groups, the Christian Right and right-wing think tanks influence in the 
design of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA).  
Clinton and moderate Democrats in Congress initially supported training 
programs, job creation, and improvements to child care associated with PRWORA.  The 
cost of such measures to reform welfare, however, did not fit in with efforts to reduce the 
  57 
nation’s deficit.  Furthermore, he met with considerable opposition from Congress; 
particularly the Republican leadership.  “Frustrated by congressional opposition to his 
welfare proposals, Clinton eased restrictions on the approval of welfare waivers to show 
his commitment to reform” (Reese, 2005;176).  The result was termed by the Washington 
Post as a race to the bottom.  Congress had given control of allocations to the states by 
substituting block grants for AFDC entitlement cash.  Since block grants are not 
earmarked, states spent less on welfare benefits.   
 After many years and numerous attempts to make drastic changes in welfare 
assistance programs, President Clinton’s Welfare Reform Act of 1996 replaced AFDC 
with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. With the conversion 
from AFDC to TANF federal support was no longer adjusted to meet the needs of states 
based on the fluctuations in the caseloads.  “The AFDC entitlement was based on an 
open-ended grant-in-aid in which the federal government matched state expenditures on a 
sliding scale that provided proportionally more resources to poor states.  Regardless of 
the number of cases, the federal government paid from 50 to 80 percent of the statewide 
average cost of the caseload.  Congress replaced this open-ended grant with a block grant 
and capped spending at $16.5 billion annually” (Brown, 2003). 
Under TANF states received federal funds in the form of block grants and were 
limited to providing welfare assistance for two consecutive years with a five year lifetime 
limit.  States were allowed to deny welfare benefits to unmarried teenage mothers in an 
effort to discourage illegitimate births (Lester and Stewart, 2000).  Critics on the left 
claimed that this was the worst case for welfare policy.  Because of the Republican 
control of Congress, “Democrats were forced to move rightward in order to pass a 
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welfare reform bill” (Reese, 2005; 177).  Furthermore, Clinton and congressional 
Democrats did not want to come across as obstructing welfare reform and lose the 
opportunity to gain support among white voters, especially in the South (Reese, 2005; 
177). Thus, according to Reese’s research, members of Congress voted for a policy that 
was more conservative than their personal preferences would have dictated. 
 When President Clinton faced divided government in 1995 the Republicans were 
organized and ready to proceed with transforming their agenda into law.  “The 
Republicans were better able to keep their members together at the various stages of the 
legislative process than the Democrats of the 103d Congress” (Ferejohn, 1998; 52).  To 
strengthen party unity the Republican majority had the advantage of many freshmen 
ideologically committed to the Republican Party and recruited as candidates for that 
reason (Ferejohn, 1998).  In addition Ferejohn states “the Republicans of the 104th 
Congress had to rely on enthusiasm, energy, and a willingness to sacrifice individual 
goals for shared purposes, which seems far more unusual.  It is remarkable, in this regard, 
that this unity of purpose and action was sustained for most of the  first session, even in 
the face of repeated warnings of electoral danger” (Ferejohn, 1998; 53).   
In order to succeed in passing the legislation that they advocated the Republicans 
needed to work to overcome the disadvantage of their numbers.  Although they were the 
majority party their majority status was due to only a few seats.  They did not have 
enough seats in the Senate to prevent filibusters and they did not have enough seats in the 
House to overthrow a presidential veto.  They would have to have unprecedented 
cohesion and propose policies that would appeal to moderate Democrats and Republicans 
or appeal to public support for their policies.  They chose the latter course much to the 
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disadvantage of some of its own members.  “To win support for a plan that was based on 
tax cuts for the rich and spending cuts for the poor and middle class, the budget cutters 
had to create enthusiasm for their plan among those who traditionally supported welfare 
and among the legions of people who stood to lose from a low minimum wage and 
massive cuts in health, housing, education, and social insurance” (Abramovitz, 2000).   
Support, however, for some of the Republican policies cost members from marginal 
districts their seats in the election following the 104th Congress by forcing them to take 
positions that opponents could exploit during their campaigns.  
The Republicans also made use of leadership driven legislation with the use of ad 
hoc task forces to propose legislation.  This strategy usurped the power of the committees 
as well as overrode members’ seniority.  The committees were left with “the more 
mundane tasks of hearing complaints from the minority party and filling in details” 
(Ferejohn, 1998, Evans and Oleszek 1999).  The internal workings of the committees 
became easier to monitor giving the Republican Party leadership more control over the 
legislation that left the committees.  The Republicans thus had success in producing 
changes in social welfare policy that reflected their more conservative positions. 
The committee system was used strategically with the manipulation of House 
Rules in the following ways:  Term limits were imposed on committee chairs which was 
a change from previous procedures.  Committee chairs’ abilities were weakened by term 
limits, as well as staff cuts and the elimination of proxy voting (Sinclair, 2000).  While 
the position of committee chair was generally weakened, Democratic chairs were 
weakened more than Republican chairs because “They controlled the entire majority staff 
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of the committee and had more control over the choice of subcommittee chairs and over 
the assignment of members to subcommittees” (ibid). 
Gingrich went beyond the rules that were specified by the 104th Congress in terms 
of designating committee chairs as part of the push to enact the Contract with America.  
He designated Republicans to serve as committee chairs even though doing so was a 
preemption of the normal process in which seniority had been a factor in a member of 
Congress’s becoming a committee chair (Sinclair, 2000).  “The 104th Congress saw 
enormous party leadership involvement and oversight on major legislation; committee 
leaders were clearly subordinate to party leaders on Contract with America bills and on 
much of the major legislation that went into the Republicans’ attempt to balance the 
budget” (Sinclair, 2000, 105).   
 To protect programs such as medicare, medicaid, social security, and the 
environment Clinton shifted his focus from being a legislative president to a more 
executive one leaving Congress to wrangle with legislation.  After the Republicans went 
so far as to shut down the government as part of the confrontation over the 1995 budget 
they lost favor with the public.  Clinton was able to take advantage of this situation by 
taking stronger positions on several issues and using the veto symbolically and as a 
bargaining tool (Ferejohn, 1998).  By contrast the Democrats, having enjoyed majority 
status for so long, were unprepared to become the minority party and were, therefore, 
willing to follow Clinton’s agenda since they would at least be able to rely on 
“presidential resources and visibility to commit their congressional party to an ambitious 
course of legislation” (Ferejohn, 1998). 
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 If one considered both tiers of the American welfare system a necessary and basic 
social right of people living under a democratic political system, then consistency in the 
delivery of benefits is necessary.  Changes in policy should reflect society’s needs and 
not arbitrary preferences of legislators.   Examination of a time line of the American 
welfare system reveals less of a situation in which inconsistent support makes a 
difference in the lives of welfare recipients and more of one in which consistent support 
for weakening the system makes U.S. citizens more and more vulnerable to economic 
forces which can drive them to dire stages of poverty with less and less assistance to 
recover. 
Social Insurance 
Title XII amended the Internal Revenue Code to exclude Social Security benefits 
paid to citizens of U.S. possessions (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands) from taxation if the benefits are taxed under a local law equivalent to the IRC 
provision which taxes U.S. citizens on their benefits. 
 Part A of Title XI of the Social Security Act was amended to provide Social 
Security Account Statements to all eligible individuals.  The statement is to contain 
information regarding the person’s wages and self-employment income; an estimate of 
the individuals’ contributions for OASDI benefits; and an estimate of the potential 
monthly retirement, disability, survivor and auxiliary benefits payable on the individual’s 
account together with a description of the benefits payable under the Medicare program 
of Title XVIII. 
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 was enacted on November 5, 
1990 and contained directives to make information for Medicare beneficiaries more 
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accessible.  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was directed to 
provide information, counseling and assistance to individuals who were eligible for 
Medicare.  The purpose was to educate potential recipients as to procedures required to 
apply for Medicare benefits and other related matters. HHS was also required to provide 
a toll free telephone number that individuals could call to receive information regarding 
Medicare programs as well as Medicare supplemental programs.  This measure increased 
the availability of knowledge about Medicare benefits to senior citizens who were 
eligible for those benefits.  The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to ensure that 
communications sent to beneficiaries were written in clear and simple language with the 
address and telephone number of the local Social Security Association office.  This 
measure was to be implemented on July 1, 1991. 
 The Older Americans Act amendments of 1992 directed the Commissioner of the 
Administration on Aging to urge State and local agencies to implement outreach 
programs that would inform elderly persons of eligibility requirements for SSI, Medicaid 
and Food Stamp programs.  They also required that any Federal agency administering 
similar programs consult and cooperate with the Administration on Aging. 
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased the percentage of 
Social Security Benefits that were subject to taxation from 50% to 85% for single 
taxpayers whose income exceeded $34,000 and for married taxpayers who filed jointly 
and whose income exceeded $44,000.  Those who had income between $25,000 and 
$34,000 and were single and those who were married, filed joint returns, and had 
incomes between $32,000 and $44,000 continued to be subject to the 50% rate.  This 
measure went into effect on December 31, 1993. 
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 Under the Social Security Independence Program Improvement Acts of 1994 
(enacted on August 15, 1994), the Social Security Administration (SSA) became an 
independent agency as of March 31, 1995.  As a result of this legislation, Social Security 
fraud was to be treated as a felony as of October 1, 1994. 
 The 1994 legislation clarified the SSA’s authority to review OASDI and SSI cases 
that had been closed, where there was sufficient reason to believe that an application or 
supporting documents were fraudulent.  The SSA was also empowered to terminate 
benefits or disregard evidence in cases where it was determined that the reliable evidence 
to document a disability was insufficient. 
 
Summary 
 Means tested welfare programs have been targeted for reduction since Nixon’s 
proposal of FAP.  They underwent changes that affected the amount of benefits that 
recipients were entitled to as well as those which restricted eligibility requirements.  The 
most recent and major change was the transitions from AFDC to TANF during the 
Clinton administration.  Most notably this change shortened the amount of time that any 
person could receive welfare benefits under the now defunct AFDC program.  Previous 
attempts to end welfare as we know it did not receive the amount of support that was 
present during Clinton’s terms from either Democrats or Republicans.  This is partially 
due to the shift in public opinion that was concurrent with changes in legislative behavior 
in Congress.  The chart below depicts the percentage of the total national budget that was 
targeted for means tested and social security programs between 1972 and 2002. 
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Actual percentages are shown in the appendix. 
 
Social insurance benefits that were in place for older Americans changed at a 
slower pace than need based benefits.  Due to the common conception that the older 
segment of the population is more deserving than those who are simply poor, members of 
Congress were less likely to support cutbacks in their benefits as they were to support 
changes in need-based benefits. Thus between 1972 and 2002 the percentage of the 
budget designated for social insurance programs is consistently higher than that 
designated  for means tested programs.  During the first twenty years represented in this 
chapter, social insurance programs were expanded to make more Americans eligible, to 
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They remained protected against intentions to reduce them until the beginning of the 
George W. Bush administration.  As the chart shows there is a steady decline in the 
percentage of funds allocated to social insurance programs between 1997 and 2002 with 
the exception of an increase in 2001.  At the same time, however, means tested programs 
seem to receive a greater percentage of the federal budget.  In short, the American 
welfare state, when considering both social insurance and welfare assistance, has 
declined in the extent to which it is able to help those with economic need regardless of 
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Chapter 3.  Case studies of Key Roll Call Votes 
Introduction 
Case studies of the bills that are analyzed at the micro level in Chapter 6 are 
included here to better represent the substantive nature of the social welfare policies in 
question than the statistical analyses alone.  They are structured in a manner that gives 
accounts of the policy background, the reactions of legislators to the bills as proposed, 
and the eventual outcome of the bills.  This qualitative component of this study also 
serves to lend a better focus on legislators’ voting behavior, which is a key focus of this 
work. 
In describing the policy background of the bills, I report the problems that existed 
which posed a need for a policy remedy at the federal level. These problems included 
changing needs of public housing residents, social security, and food stamp recipients.  
Public housing issues included issues regarding expansion of existing programs and the 
creation of new guidelines for public housing agencies to follow.  The case studies of 
social security bills and food stamp bills addressed levels of funding and changing 
eligibility criteria.  Bills related to unemployment insurance were concerned with 
extension of benefits in the face of prolonged unemployment in the major urban centers.  
Finally the Family and Medical Leave Act introduced a new benefit that would serve 
employees in need of time off from their jobs allowing them to attend to family matters 
such as illness or the birth or adoption or children.  After describing the policy 
background of the bills studied, I report the reaction of members of Congress who sought 
to have their input considered before final passage of the bills.  The communications 
from the various members of Congress are in the forms of floor speeches supporting or 
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criticizing the bill, and the content of amendments proposed. Finally the outcome of the 
final passage votes on the bills is given along with the changes to current policy that the 
bills entailed if they passed, were not vetoed, and became public laws. 
The ten bills that were chosen for analysis at the district level and for case studies 
are key bills make up a sub-set of the 30 year analyzed in the macro analyses which were 
meant to show change in support for social welfare bills over time. They are 
representative of the following policy areas: AFDC/TANF, unemployment insurance, 
Medicaid, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. 




Rising purchase prices for homes, high interest rates, and the decreased demand 
for homes during the recession in 1975 combined to create a strain on the housing 
industry which, at that time, was the worst since World War II (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac Vol. 31, 1975, 419).  The consequences of the recession impacted families 
tremendously (Moen, 1979). To respond, in 1974 the Federal Reserve advocated 
monetary policy that raised interest rates and reduced investment purchases including 
homes.  By the end of 1975 signs that recovery was imminent were apparent.  President 
Ford, therefore, believed that general economic recovery would transfer into recovery for 
the housing industry (Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. 31, 1975, 419). Alan 
Greenspan, who headed the Council of Economic Advisors for President Ford devised an 
economic stimulus plan which involved tax cuts for families and businesses and tax 
increases on foreign petroleum.  Thus in response to the package of emergency aid that 
Congress developed in HR 4485, which included plans to stimulate the housing industry, 
  68 
Ford promised a presidential veto.  HR 4485 would have provided subsidies for down 
payments and mortgages.  
Legislators’ Reactions 
In floor debates Republicans initially attacked the bill however, their unity on this 
issue eroded when several members with large numbers of constituents, who would have 
benefited from the bill, made their preferences known.  Division among members of 
Congress along to party-line became less apparent when Representatives of large urban 
areas combined their efforts to make the bill more beneficial to their constituents (ibid, 
425). 
 Highlighting that the 15.9 percent unemployment rate in the construction industry 
along with the second-lowest rate of housing starts on record, Representative Henry S. 
Reuss (D- Wisconsin) argued that emergency aid was needed to stimulate new housing 
construction.  Families were reluctant to buy homes because of economic uncertainty and 
the government subsidies; he argued would overcome this, the “greatest roadblock to 
construction activity” (ibid).  Parren J. Mitchell (D-MD) a noted advocate of housing for 
the poor argued that the recession and inflation had made homeownership less of a reality 
for young couples and working families by virtually forcing them out of the housing 
market.  This was an effect of the general performance of the economy and not the fault 
of these people he argued (ibid). 
 Republicans argued that the bill was poorly crafted and would have an effect 
opposite of what the Democrats expected.  In particular, Representative Brown (R-
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Michigan) asked “Would anyone advise a constituent to buy a house now if he might 
qualify for a subsidy later? This time lag will be critical… and this bill could turn a 
burgeoning recovery [of the housing industry] into a disaster” (ibid). 
 Republicans proposed several amendments to HR 4485.  The first was a substitute 
that would extend the 1974 Mortgage Assistance Act (PL 93-449) until October 18, 1976.  
The total mortgages would have increased in value from $7.75 billion to $15 billion.  
This substitute would have had to depend on rates rising no higher than 7.5 percent.  It 
was rejected by a vote of 126 for and 242 against. 
 Another amendment supported by Republicans and proposed by McKinney would 
have required those families receiving subsidies to commit 25 percent of their household 
income toward making house payments.  This measure targeted middle income families 
and was an attempt to impose the same type of regulations on them as were in place for 
poor families.  McKinney argued “that it was not fair to require the poor to pay a specific 
proportion of their income for housing if they participated in public housing or rental 
subsidy programs but placed no similar requirement on middle income families” 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975, 426). 
 Herman Badillo (D- NY) argued that the subsidy programs would not be able to 
operate in the 11 large metropolitan areas including New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles.  In these cities the median sale price of a house exceeded the $42,000 maximum 
according to the current version of the bill.  Badillo suggested raising the maximum to 
$48,000 thus allowing comparable homes in the large metropolitan areas eligible to 
benefit by the HR 4485 provisions.  
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The House Banking, Currency and Housing Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Housing began hearings on several emergency housing proposals that were suggested 
alternatives to HR 4485.  The objectives included stimulation of new construction, 
reduction of current housing inventory, and protection of homeowners who had become 
unemployed. 
 Henry S. Reuss (D Wis.) proposed HR 29 which would stimulate new 
construction by providing a mortgage rate subsidy program to enable middle-income 
families to purchase new homes.  The bill would authorize HUD to provide subsidies to 
make up the difference between the actual interest rate and an interest rate of 6 per cent.  
These subsidies would be available to families whose income did not exceed 120 per cent 
of their area median income if they planned to purchase home that did not have appraised 
values of over $38,000. 
 The second proposed alternative to HR 4485 was introduced by Ashley and 84 
other members of Congress.  HR 34 would have provided emergency federal assistance 
to those who were in danger of defaulting on their mortgages because of becoming 
unemployed or experiencing other economic setbacks such as pay cuts.  The Ashley 
proposal would authorize HUD to grant subsidies to make mortgage payments for 
qualified homeowners to avoid foreclosure.  Qualified homeowners were those whose 
income had declined more than 20 per cent and were not expected to regain the income 
over the next two years.  The funds would have to be repaid to the federal government at 
a later time and the maximum payment provided by HUD was $375. 
  71 
 Gary Brown (R Mich.) proposed HR 2640, which would have extended the 1974 
emergency mortgage credit program.  Brown’s position was that there was enough 
existing emergency legislation which should be put to use (CQA 1975).  The 1974 
program authorized HUD to buy conventional mortgages that were not ensured by the 
federal government.  The proposal called for increasing funding for the program from 
$7.75 billion to $10 billion. 
Outcome 
The bill passed in the House and the Senate but it received 16 votes too few in the 
House of the required two-thirds majority to override Ford’s veto.  Ford stated that he 
vetoed the bill “due to its cost, ineffectiveness and delayed stimulus, would damage the 
housing industry and damage the economy” (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 489.  As 
an alternative legislative strategy Ford proposed an authorization of an additional $7.75 
billion, under the 1974 mortgage program, in federal mortgage purchases (ibid).  
President Ford’s veto of this bill and Congress’s failure to override the veto can be 
considered a failure to protect the American people from economic shock by providing 
the necessary assistance to facilitate home buying, however, the analysis presented in this 
work demonstrates that higher unemployment rates increased the likelihood of a 
Representative voting yes (a yes vote in this case is a vote in favor of improving or 
maintaining social welfare policy). 
  
  72 




 In 1981 the United States was still contending with the economic recession that 
caused the need for the previous bill in this series of case studies with the unemployment 
rate reaching 10.7 percent.  In the recent past, Democrats in Congress used jobs programs 
to create work and therefore economic stimulus in an effort to speed economic recovery.  
President Regan, however, was opposed to the “make work” solution and favored the 
approach of creating incentives for employers in the private sector to begin hiring and 
training of the “hard-to-employ” (Congress and the Nation 1981).  An ailing economy 
with no practical remedy by 1981 had begun to affect those who were retired and 
receiving Social Security benefits. 
The viability of the Social Security system had already been in doubt and the 
recession combined with decrease in federal tax revenue caused the Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund to come close to going broke.  The solution Reagan 
proposed was to redirect funds from OADSHI, the program that provided retirement 
benefits, to save OASI.  This was to be done by eliminating the minimum benefit that a 
person could receive from either program.  In opposition to this proposal from the White 
House Congress proposed HR 4331 which would allow OASI to borrow funds from the 
more financially sound Hospital Insurance and Disability Insurance trust funds.  This bill 
would also restore the $122 minimum monthly payment that OADSHI beneficiaries were 
currently receiving. In a political turnabout, Reagan supported the restoration of the 
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Social Security measure by publicly lauding it on September 24, 1981 after demanding 
abolishing the minimum on May 12, 1981 (Congress and the Nation 1981).   
Legislators’ Reactions 
 For a week after Regan’s proposal to eliminate the Old Age Survivors, Disability 
and Health Insurance (OASDHI) minimum, Democrats and Republicans attacked his 
plan.   Many members of Congress, of both parties, received high volumes of calls from 
their constituents urging them to oppose Regan’s proposal.  Although the Republicans 
did not support Reagan’s position on this legislation, the Democrats were the most vocal 
in their condemnation of the proposal.  “The House Democratic Caucus May 20 
unanimously adopted a resolution calling the proposed changes an ‘unconscionable 
breach of faith’ and vowing not to ‘destroy the program for a generation of retirees’” 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981).   Also many Democrats and their senior 
citizen constituents staged a protest march on the Capital to protest the changes to 
OADSHI benefits (ibid). 
 There were mixed feelings among both Democrats and Republicans in the House 
and the Senate on the content of this bill. Senator David Patrick Moynihan the ranking 
Democrat in the Senate stated that the bill put “’a little cheer in the holiday season’ while 
giving Congress ‘some breathing room for devising a longer-term solution to the question 
of Social Security funding’” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981).  Although as 
Moynihan expressed, most thought that saving OASI from bankruptcy was a positive step 
toward improving the condition of the Social Security system many criticized that it was 
not enough 
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Outcome 
Passage of HR 4331 restored the $122 minimum monthly benefit to those who 
were receiving it prior to its being discontinued but those who became eligible for 
benefits after December 31, 1981 were excluded.  In addition it included the following 
provisions:   
• Members of religious communities became eligible to receive the minimum 
benefit until December 31, 1991. 
• OASI, Disability Insurance (DI) and Hospital Insurance (HI) would be allowed to 
borrow from each other’s trust funds until December 31, 1991 
• Payroll tax was extended to the first six months of sick pay to the exclusion of  
payments from and employee’s third party sick-pay plan. 
• The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was required to establish 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children home health aid experiments by 
December 31, 1991 in no less than seven states. 
• The Federal Privacy Act for prisoners was waived so that agencies could give 
their Social Security numbers to HHS in order to prevent them from receiving 
disability benefits illegally.  
• HHS was required to report to  Congress its status on preventing Social Security 
payments from being sent to deceased individuals within 90 days.   
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981). 
 
  75 




 Prior to the 99th Congress, Democrats and Republicans were at odds over the 
appropriate legislation to enact concerning public housing. “Democrats on the House 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee could not convince the Republican-
controlled Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee to accept a $14.3 
billion reauthorization the House had included in its budget reconciliation bill (HR 
3128).” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1985).  HR 3128 passed but Democrats felt 
that it fell short of what was needed. Thus, HR 1 was introduced by Representative Henry 
B. Gonzalez (D- TX) to enhance public housing programs by improving programs that 
were already in place and adding better programs. 
 HR 1, the Housing Act of 1986 contained provisions to increase funding for 
housing by 50% over the fiscal 1985 appropriation by adding $22 billion to the new 
budget authority and 283,605 new housing units (CQA, 1985).  Gonzalez’s proposal, 
however, was seen as too costly by Democrats who were involved in rejecting President 
Regan’s request for a two year moratorium on most housing aid programs along with the 
elimination of rural housing and grants for construction of new rental housing.  The 
Democrats agreed to freeze funding for public housing at the 1985 levels which were 
$16.7 billion for the construction of 222,962 subsidized housing units. 
 John Hiler (R-IN) proposed an amendment that would have deleted the 
requirement for HUD to notify Congress of “proposed new regulations as they were 
submitted to the office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review” (CQA, 1985).  
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This amendment was defeated by a voice vote.  “Many members blamed the 
deregulation-minded OMB for killing or revising housing rules, and HR 1 would require 
‘before and after’ disclosure of rules that HUD wanted to promulgate.  Hiler met 
bipartisan opposition” (CQA, 1985). 
 Stan Lundine (D-NY) proposed an amendment that would save $1.3 billion by 
“allowing FHA to sell loans in the secondary mortgage market, which in turn would sell 
them to investors” (CQA, 1985).  This amendment was adopted. 
 Bill McCollum’s (R-FL) amendment which would have eliminated rental housing 
development grants was rejected.  McCollum’s position was that “the $76,000 it cost to 
build each new unit would be better spent on other programs, such as rent subsidies, 
which provided housing at less expense” (CQA, 1985).  Steve Bartlett’s (R-TX) 
amendment was accepted.  It called for the distribution of “public housing modernization 
funds by formula, which would be drawn up by 1987, rather than requiring  local public 
housing authorities to apply for funds as they currently did.” 
Outcome 
The bill passed by a vote of 223- 180 including the Bartlett amendment to limit 
the obligation of funds for new construction of public housing units to repair and 
renovate existing units except in limited circumstances. 
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HR 3299: Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/ 
and the Catastrophic Repeal of Medicare 1989 (101
st
 Congress)  
Policy Background 
 
House Rule 3299 in 1989 was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1989.  It 
was considered a key bill related to social policy because of the major changes that it 
made to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988.  The bill allowed for 
amendments that affected the United States Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive 
Heath Care and the National Commission on Children.  This Omnibus Budget for 1990 
was sponsored by the House Committee on The Budget and reported by Representative 
Panetta (D-DC) The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 contained several 
provisions that increased the benefits provided by Medicare.  It expanded the coverage 
that beneficiaries could receive to cover inpatient services. It amended part A of title 
XVIII of the Social Security Act to allow patients to pay only one deductible per year in 
situations in which multiple hospital stays were necessary.  Prior to this amendment, 
beneficiaries were required to pay deductibles for every event in which hospitalization 
was required.  In addition to changing the policy on deductibles, the Act removed 
limitations on durations of hospital stays with the exception of inpatient psychiatric 
services.  Coinsurance requirements for inpatient care were also eliminated. 
The Act allowed beneficiaries over the age of 65 to buy into the Hospital 
Insurance program and imposed a coinsurance rate equivalent to 20% of the average 
reasonable cost for the first eight days of service in a calendar year.  Post-hospital 
extended care was provided for 150 day per calendar year.  This is a change from the 
previous coverage of 100 days for each “’spell of illness’”. The restrictions on extended 
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care services which were not post-hospital extended care services were eliminated.  
Coverage for hospice care was extended an additional 30 days.   The deductible for the 
first three pints of blood received during a calendar year was reduced.  The Federal 
Hospital Insurance Catastrophic Coverage Reserve Fund was established for the purpose 
of transferring funding outlays for part A, catastrophic coverage, with the exception of 
outpatient drug benefits. 
 Beginning in the year 1991 coverage for catastrophic expenses for outpatient 
prescription drugs and insulin would be available under the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act.  By 1990 coverage for immunosuppressive drugs for two years beyond 
organ transplant surgery would be available.   Medicare coverage also became available 
for mammograms for women over the age of 65 every other year and for women between 
the ages of 40 and 49 who were not considered at high risk for developing breast cancer 
and also for women between the ages of 35 and 40.   
The Rules Committee sponsored House Resolution 245 which passed the House 
and allowed consideration of H.R. 3299 with 6 hours of general debate and a waiver of 
all points of order against consideration of the bill.  Debates on all amendments would 
have to adhere to the time limits specified in the Rules Committee’s report.  Debate on 
amendments referring to catastrophic health insurance and child care would adhere to the 
step by step format (Congressional Record 1989, www.Thomas.gov). 
Representative Donnelly of sponsored House Amendment 268 which proposed 
the changes to the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act that were to take place with 
the passage of HR 3299.  Under this amendment Medicare benefits would return to the 
levels that existed before the law that created the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act 
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was implemented.  The Donnelly amendment passed with a vote of 360 for and 66 
against it. 
Representative Stark (D-CA) of sponsored House Amendment 269 which would 
have altered the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Act by deleting the supplemental premium 
and returning to the flat-rate premium for benefits including prescription drugs, respite 
care, improved home health and hospice care, mammogram coverage and spousal 
impoverishment.  The Stark amendment failed by a vote of 156 for and 269 against. 
 The changes proposed in H.R. 3299 in 1989 were primarily intended to repeal 
these provisions made in the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act.  Additionally, it 
contained measures to reduce payments for capital-related costs associated with inpatient 
hospital care for the last three quarters of 1990 by 15%. It increased the distance that 
defined a sole community hospital to more than 35 miles away from another hospital. 
 The medicare payment for operating costs of inpatient services was increased by 
the market percentage increase in the same costs.  Payments to hospitals that served a 
disproportionate amount of low-income patients were increased and payment adjustments 
were authorized to sole community hospitals which experienced a decline of more than 
five percent of hospitalization cases when uncontrollable circumstances impacted 
services rendered.  The adjustments were granted to cover fixed operating costs.  Further 
measures, such as developing and supporting emergency transportation services and 
planning and implementing rural healthcare networks, were added to increase the 
accessibility to hospital care for persons living in rural areas.7 Appropriations were 
authorized for fiscal year 1990 through 1992 for this type of program.  H.R. 3299 also 
                                                 
7 A rural healthcare network is an organization consisting of  at least one essential access community 
hospital, one rural referral center, or urban regional referral center in addition to one or more rural primary 
care hospitals which participate in the deliverance of health care. 
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extended the Rural Health Care Transition Grant Program through 1992.  Under this 
provision, hospitals would be able to use grants under this program to pay for instruction 
and consultation by way of telecommunications to physicians in areas with health care 
personnel shortages. 
Legislator’s Reactions 
 This bill was extremely controversial and drew remarks from several 
Congressmen regarding various elements of the bill such as the abundance of extraneous 
legislation that was embedded in H.R.3299 and the lack of fostering economically sound 
policy.  Representative Conte stated his objection to the extraneous matters that were 
included in the bill and addressed the problems that he perceived resulted from them.  In 
his view the manner in which H.R. 3299 was handled was detrimental to the legislative 
process and also prohibited the House from passing a satisfactory budget plan in a timely 
manner. 
Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce a House resolution to reform the budget process 
here in the House by prohibiting extraneous matters on reconciliation bills. This 
change in the House rules is made necessary by the budgetary mess in which we 
find ourselves. On October 16, just a few days away, the Congress is about to 
experience a train wreck in the budget process. On October 16, there will be a 
final report issued by the Office of Management and Budget, accompanied by a 
final order signed by the President, indicating that we have failed to meet our 
budgetary targets for fiscal year 1990, and invoking across-the-board spending 
cuts in discretionary Federal programs of at least 4.3 percent for defense programs 
and 5.3 percent for domestic discretionary programs. How did we get ourselves 
into this mess? Because we failed to pass a reconciliation bill in a timely fashion. 
That reconciliation bill is the vehicle in our budgetary process that makes the 
programmatic savings in entitlement and other programs necessary to meet the 
savings targets in the springtime budget resolution. Under the Budget Act, that 
reconciliation bill is to be passed by June 15. Yet here we are in October, debating 
the bill for the first time, with the Senate yet to act. Unlike the Senate, which has 
certain restrictions against this kind of piling on of legislation, the House has no 
rule against attachment of extraneous provisions. Mr. Speaker, the experience we 
are undergoing this year proves that such a rule is necessary. Consequently, I am 
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calling for the enactment of the resolution I introduce today. In fact, the best place 
to enact it would be as part of the reconciliation bill we have under consideration. 
(thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:8:./temp/~r101bregXQ). 
 
 H.R. 3299 drew criticism from Representative Craig Thomas (R-WY) who 
ultimately voted in favor of the bill even though he disagreed with its main objective on 
ideological grounds.  Thomas expressed that he did not believe that this budget plan 
outlined in H.R. 3299 was sound economic policy and thought it to be too far to the left 
and a product of “tax and spend” Democrats. He agreed, however, with the parts of the 
bill that altered social policies that he believed were too liberal.  Thomas’s reaction is an 
example of a legislator voting against his ideology in terms of economic policy because 
not doing so would have lead to the less desirable outcome of supporting poorly crafted 
social policy. 
I support the repeal of the catastrophic health plan that was 
forced upon the seniors of this country last year. In talking to 
hundreds of seniors over the past few months, they were in 
almost unanimous agreement that the catastrophic tax increase 
was a catastrophe. The plan forced many to pay for coverage that 
they already had and for services that they would never use. This 
is an issue that needs to be addressed in a serious manner, not as 
an amendment to a bill of this magnitude. Given the provisions 
that have been adopted by the House, I have little choice but to 
support H.R. 3299. But that does not negate the fact that these 
issues were bundled into a tax bill and not considered as stand-
alone legislation H.R. 3299 is apparently the `last train out' for 
the tax-and-spend crowd in this institution, so they wanted to 
make sure their `baggage' was all aboard. This is not right, and 
it's going to come back to haunt us. The taxpayers deserve better-
-much better. We have to address the deficit 
(www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:2:./temp/~r101sore5Y). 
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Outcome 
  HR 3299 was passed by a vote of 272 – 128 in the House (Roll call 379) on 
November 22, 1989.  It was agreed to by the Senate and cleared for the White House on 
the same day.  The bill was signed by the president on December 19, 1989 and became 
Public Law number 101-239 (www.thomas.gov). 
 
HR 3040: Unemployment Insurance Reform Act of 1991 (102nd Congress) 
Policy Background 
 House Rule 3040 of the 101st Congress was sponsored by Representative Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-IL) on July 25, 1991. This act repealed the Federal-State Extended 
Unemployment compensation Act of 1970 and was intended to establish a Federal 
Unemployment Insurance program. Such a program would provide Federal supplemental 
compensation to persons who had used the maximum benefits afforded them under State 
law; who had no rights to compensation under State law; or were not receiving 
compensation under Canada’s unemployment laws.  It required agreements on policy 
between the federal government and the state governments; a federal supplemental 
compensation account; supplemental benefit periods; payments to States having 
agreements for the payment of Federal supplemental compensation; and measures to 
address fraud and overpayments.  The program, as proposed, also required the repeal of 
the extended unemployment compensation program. The Federal government would then 
pay 100 percent of the funds to be distributed as benefits to individuals by the states.   
H.R. 3040 contained modifications to the following eligibility provisions.  The 
modifications included limitation on disqualifications under State Law; payments of 
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unemployment compensation to former members of the armed forces; optional benefits 
fore certain school employees; treatment of certain determinations; promotion for 
retraining of long-term unemployment compensation recipients; and treatment of certain 
youth service program participants (congressional record 1991).   
Additionally, the bill required the establishment of the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation consisting of seventeen members and the Secretary of 
Labor as the chair person. The council’s function was to evaluate the unemployment 
compensations program with regard to its countercyclical effectiveness, the adequacy of 
benefits available to participants, solvency and efficiency.  Eight members of the council 
were to be appointed by the president and eight by Congress.  Of the appointees, the bill 
intended, four to be members of Congress, four would be representative of business 
interests, four of labor, and four with interests of State governments. 
 
Legislators’ Reactions  
In his introduction of H.R. 3040 Representative Rostenkowski stated the need to 
pass this legislation acknowledging that the recession entailed the need to extend 
unemployment compensation.  He pointed out that under the bill the additional 10, 15, or 
20 weeks would be provided to those who lived in states where the unemployment rate 
was 6, 7, or 8 percent and only if the state’s unemployment rate had increased by at least 
20 percent of the state’s average rate over the previous two years.  Because of the 
recession, workers were running out of benefits at rate of 33 percent compared to 28 
percent at the beginning of the recession.  “This translates to over 1 million more workers 
running out of benefits this year compared to last year for a total that could reach 3.5 
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million” (Rostenkowski, Congressional record1991, www.thomas.gov).  Rostenkowski 
also pointed out that the Joint Economic Committee discovered that the job loss rate in 
the 1990’s recession was more severe than the average of the five previous recessions.  
The need was great and impossible to ignore according to Rostenkowski as he stated the 
following:  “At the same time, the current extended benefits program activated an 
additional 13 weeks in only eight States, and today it is activated in only three States.  In 
contrast, during the recession in 1980, all States were activated on extended benefits.  
What more evidence do we need?” (Rostenkowski, Congressional record1991, 
www.thomas.gov). 
Those opposed to HR 3040 argued that it would eventually translate into fewer 
jobs by increasing the payroll taxes on small businesses.  In essence, the bill would have 
exacerbated the same situation it was intended to remedy (Representative Ireland, 
Congressional record 1991).   
Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-KY) stated that the additional 30 weeks of 
unemployment benefits would benefit people in his home state of Kentucky who were 
jobless.  They could receive up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits.   The bill also 
addressed veterans and reservists returning from Operation Desert Storm.  They would 
only have to wait one week instead of four to qualify for unemployment benefits; they 
would have to be on active duty for 90 days instead of 180 to qualify; and they could 
receive up to 26 weeks of benefits instead of only the 13 weeks that were allowed. 
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D- MD) also voiced opposition to the 
Unemployment Insurance Reform Act of 1991:  “Mr. Speaker, expressions and symbols 
of concern such as the one issued by President Bush in response to long-term 
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unemployment will not answer the needs generated by his economic policies.  The 
consequences of the last decade of shutting down investments in our prosperity and 
selling ourselves short are now hitting California with full force.  We need more than 
symbols to sustain the loss of nearly 100,000 manufacturing jobs and more than 50,000 
construction jobs in the last year.  The State’s shrinking middle class is being doubly 
squeezed by the decline in high-paying and middle-paying skilled jobs and the cuts in 
public services needed by parents and children.  Many of those forced out of the job 
market in this unrelenting recession were the source of security for three generations” 
(Pelosi, remarks, September 16, 1991 www.thomas.gov).  Ms. Pelosi was in favor of 
legislation that would extend unemployment benefits because there had to this point been 
no evidence of economic recovery during the recession that she referred to which left 
many workers jobless for extended periods of time. 
 
Outcome 
H.R. 3040 was passed in the House on September 17, 1991 by a recorded vote of 
283-125 (Roll number 267).  On June 19, 1992 the bill was placed on the Senate 
Legislative Calendar with the following amendments proposed:  Senate amendment 1185 
provided for a substitute amendment and was proposed by Senator Dole (D-KS). Senator 
Graham (R-SC) proposed Amendment 1187 that would include, in the bill, provisions for 
work, savings, and investments for the purpose of stimulating economic growth, the 
creation of jobs, and opportunity. Senator Brown (D-OH) proposed Amendment 1189 to 
encourage negotiators to reach an accord in the interests of American coffee consumers. 
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Senator McCain (R-AZ) proposed Amendment 1190 to require a 60 vote majority for the 
Senate to pass any bill that would raise taxes 
 On October 1, 1991 the bill was cleared for the White House and was signed in 
the Senate on October 9th it was presented to President Bush who vetoed it. The veto 
override failed to win a two thirds majority with a vote of 65 in favor and 35 against on 
October 16, 1991.  Federal legislation designed to increase benefits to the unemployed 
failed to be enacted. 
 
HR 5679: Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban  




HR 5697 was sponsored by Representative Bob Traxler (D-MI) in the 102nd 
Congress.  It made changes and provided funding for the Departments of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  For the VA, it made 
appropriations for the year 1993 for the Veterans Benefits Administration including the 
Native American Veteran Housing Loan Program Account.  Appropriations for the 
Veterans Health Administration (including the Health Professional  Educational Loan 
Payment Program) and departmental administration.  The bill authorized the transfer of 
funds between specified appropriations, the use of those appropriations for consultant 
services and to pay the prior year’s obligations for some benefits (Congressional record; 
www.thomas.gov). 
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 More of this bill, however, pertained to HUD.   It made appropriations for fiscal 
year 1993 to fund housing programs, community planning and development, research and 
technology, fair housing activities, and management and administration.  It imposed 
limits on the amounts of specified loan obligations and guaranteed commitments of the 
Government National Mortgage Association. 
 The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act was amended by HR 
5679 to allow institutions of higher learning to become eligible for pubic housing youth 
sports programs and for payment of transportation costs associated with these programs.  
Grants for these programs were to be used for residents of public housing in which 
substantial drug problems existed (Congressional Record; www.thomas.gov).  
 Funds were made available for the renewal of expiring low-income subsidy 
contracts, grants for public-housing agencies to implement measures to eliminate drug-
related crime in public housing projects, and rehabilitation programs to assist homeless 
persons. Additionally, the corporation Milton Residences for the Elderly, Inc., received 
special funding for development costs when operating in conjunction with a HUD 
project.  
 HR 5679 made specific references to several cities that were targeted for funding. 
The City of Springfield, Massachusetts was allowed to retain grants for housing 
development awarded for use in connection with the Symphony Apartments if the city 
commenced construction or substantial rehabilitation activities before October 1, 1993.  
The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was to retain grants for public housing awarded for 
use in connection with the Washington Square Phase II housing development project if 
construction or substantial rehabilitation activities began before October 1, 1993.  Certain 
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recaptured funds for housing projects in Camden, New Jersey were made available for 
housing projects and the Oklahoma Department of Commerce was authorized to use 
community development grant funds for the repayment of a loan for economic 
development.  Youngstown, Ohio was given environmental clearance waivers in order to 
receive funding for three urban development action grant projects (Congressional Record; 
www.thomas.gov). 
 The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was amended to provide 
authority for a low-rent housing project in Jefferson County, Texas.  Additionally, low-
income housing funds that were previously authorized for Port Arthur, Texas were 
reallocated to include Rockwall and Galveston. 
 This bill required that the Office of Lead Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning 
Prevention become based in the Office of the Secretary of HUD. The office was given 
responsibility for all matters related to lead based paint abatement along with research 
related to lead associated with housing as well as lead abatement.  HUD was required to 
make revisions to the fiscal year 1992 fund availability for public housing development/ 
major reconstruction of obsolete projects to eliminate limitations on the amounts of such 
funds available for public housing replacement activities.  The Secretary of HUD was to 
take the necessary steps to assist two projects of the United Cerebral Palsy of New Jersey, 
Inc., in Newark and Teaneck New Jersey.  The HUD secretary was also required to 
forego and forebear efforts to recapture funding from the Housing Authority of Seattle, 
Washington and to restore funds previously recaptured.  This was based on a finding 
regarding tenant utility allowances.  The HUD secretary was also required to forgive the 
debts of McLain, Mississippi related to public facilities loan.  McLain would therefore be 
  89 
relieved of its indebtedness to the Federal Government for the outstanding principle 
balance of the loan, accrued interest, and other fees and charges associated with the loan. 
 Several directives for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were 
also required. The FEMA director was required to promulgate a schedule of fees 
applicable to persons subject to its radiological Emergency Preparedness regulation.  
FEMA was allowed to store Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) to provide assistance for those 
in need during disasters or emergencies and to make them available to the Interagency 
Council of the Homeless for domestic, civilian assistance.  FEMA was also required to 
merge the National Preparedness Directorate with the State and Local Programs and 
Support Directorate. 
 Under this bill the Department of Veterans Affairs was prohibited from entering 
into any new lease of property in excess of what was specified without a report submitted 
to the congressional Committees on Appropriations.  The Resolution Trust Corporation 
was directed to report to Congress no less than once each month on its review of 
insolvent institution cases resolved by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC). 
 The Environmental Protection Agency was directed to report to Congress with 
recommendations on the reauthorization of the Safe Drinking Water Act and to conduct a 
multi-media risk assessment of radon.  The Science Advisory Board was to review the 
study and afterwards submit a recommendation to the administrator who would forward 
the recommendation with the EPA assessment to the proper Congressional committee. 
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Outcome 
 The bill was introduced in the House on July 23, 1992 and was passed by the 
House on July 29, 1992 by a vote of 314-92 (Roll Call vote 344).  It was passed by the 
Senate by a vote of 92-3 on September 9, 1992.  The bill was signed by President Clinton 
on October 6, 1992 and became Public Law Number 102-38. 
 
 
HR 4: Work Opportunity Act of 1995 (104th Congress) 
Policy Background 
 Sponsored by Representative Clay E. Shaw (R-FL), the Work Opportunity Act of 
1995 contained major legislative changes to social welfare programs which were 
addressed in Titles 1 through 2 of the Act.  Title I addressed the use of the block grant 
system to provide TANF funds to the states. The purpose of the legislation was to 
promote flexibility in states which administered programs that assisted families with 
minor children; provided job opportunities and preparation for families in need; and 
attempted to lower the number of out-of –wedlock pregnancies, especially among 
teenaged girls, with established goals to do so in fiscal years 1996 through 2000.       
Title II addressed several areas involving Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  It 
ordered that persons would not be considered disabled if alcoholism or drug addiction 
contributed to a person’s determination of disability by the Commissioner of Social 
Security. If, however a person is disabled and eligible for benefits and also has an alcohol 
abuse problem or drug addiction the Commissioner would be required to refer the person 
to the appropriate State agency in charge of implementing the State’s plan for treatment 
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of alcoholism and substance abuse, and his or her benefits would be directed to a 
representative payee so that the disabled person would not escape receiving treatment for 
alcoholism or drug addiction. 
 SSI benefits would be denied to individuals or dependent spouses if the person 
had fled to avoid prosecution or has violated the terms his or her parole.  Title II of the 
Work Opportunity Act of 1995 also established the National Commission on the Future 
of Disability which it charged with the development and execution of studies of all 
matters related to the adequacy of Federal programs that served persons with disabilities. 
 Children under the age of 18 who are determined to have mental or physical 
impairments resulting in limitation of functions which could lead to death or last longer 
than 12 months were considered eligible for SSI benefits as they had in the past.  
Changes to SSI for children included the elimination of references to maladaptive 
behavior in regard to personal and behavioral functions.  Also, the Commissioner of 
Social Security was ordered to cease individualized functional assessments for children 
which had been mandated by title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  Each child that 
was determined to be disabled would need to be reevaluated by the Commissioner no less 
than every three years to judge whether or not the child was still in need of eligible for 
benefits. 
 Title III made changes to the food stamp program under Subtitle A, “Food Stamp 
Reform” and Subtitle B “Anti Fraud and Trafficking”.  Subtitle A amended the Food 
Stamp Act of 1977 by providing means for the transition of low-income families and 
households from economic dependence to self-sufficiency by requiring adults to work.  It 
also sought to promote employment “as the primary means of income support for 
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economically dependent families and households” and to strengthen families by 
promoting “healthy family functioning and family life” through the measures named. 
 Changes to the Food Stamp Act of 1977 included instituting a certification period 
not to exceed 12 months or 25 months if the adult members of the household are elderly 
or disabled, or primarily self-employed.  The inclusion of the following was introduced to 
the Act: “A state may establish criteria that prescribe when individuals who live together, 
and who would be allowed to participate as separate households – shall be considered a 
single household without regard to the common purchase of food and preparation of 
meals”.  Adults who exercise parental control over a child who has an absent parent may 
participate in the food stamp program if they are willing to assist state agencies in 
identifying of the child (when child’s parents are not married) and with securing child 
support or alimony payments.  Under the Act no person may receive food stamp benefits 
if he or she has not complied with court orders to pay child support and the penalty for 
participating in programs in two or more states is permanent disqualification.  Individuals 
are not eligible to participate in food stamp programs if, during the previous 12 months, 
they received benefits for six months or more during which time the person did not work 
at least 20 hours per week or failed to comply with the requirements of a work program 
for at least 20 hours per week.  This measure excludes those who are under 18 or over 50 
years of age; are medically certified as unfit for employment; or are a parent or member 
of a household with responsibility for a child.  
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Legislators’ Reactions 
President Clinton sent his veto message which acknowledged that Congress had 
made an effort to include his goals into that year’s welfare legislation but that H.R. 4 did 
not do enough to facilitate moving individuals from welfare to work.  He objected to the 
deep budget cuts that worsened welfare policies, not in just in terms of decreasing 
benefits but, by also causing life style changes that decreased the quality of life for the 
poor.  “I urge the Congress to work with me in good faith to produce a bipartisan welfare 
reform agreement that is tough on work and responsibility, but not tough on children and 
on parents who are responsible and who want to work” (President Clinton, January 22, 
1006, Congressional  Record www.thomas.gov). 
Representative Spector, who opposed the bill, voiced his reaction to the 
president’s veto addressing issues specific to the concept of welfare as federal entitlement 
and the problem of dependency that it creates.  He stated “There is no federal entitlement 
to welfare for individuals.  Each State devises its devises its own program.  The Federal 
Government provides a matching grant.   Abolish the matching grant and you can 
reasonably expect a race to the bottom.” (Representative Spector, January 10, 1996; 
Congressional Record www.thomas.gov). 
The Work Opportunity Act of 1995 included an amendment that required the 
immigration status of those seeking welfare benefits to be reported to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS).  This measure, it was argued by the New York City’s 
Mayor Rudolf Giuliani, was in conflict with the executive order issued by the Mayor of 
New York in 1984 which prohibited city employees reporting illegal aliens to the INS.  
The policy was ordered by the mayor to alleviate the fear of deportation that aliens had 
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which kept them from seeking help from public agencies when in need of medical 
attention, or when they were crime victims.   
 
Outcome 
H.R. 4, The Work Opportunity Act of 1995 was introduced in the House on January 4, 
1995.  It passed the House on March 24, 1995 by a vote of 234-199 and the Senate on 
September 19, 1995 by a vote of 87-12.  On December 29, 1995 it was presented to the 
President and was vetoed on January 9, 1996. 
 




The findings of Congress prior to the introduction of this legislation were that the 
number of households in which both parents or the only parent worked outside of the 
home was increasing at a significant rate.  It was determined that there was a great need 
for young children to have their parents available to them in early childhood and that 
parents should also be available to care for families with serious illnesses.  At the time 
there were no employment policies in place to secure a person’s job in the event that he 
or she needed time off to care for young children or sick family members. 
 The purpose of the Family and Medial Leave Act of 1993, sponsored by 
Representative  William D. Ford was to establish public policy that would “balance the 
demands of the workplace with the needs of the family, to promote the stability and 
economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity” (congressional record 1993).  The Act was intended to provide the entitlement 
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to employees to take up to twelve months leave to attend to medical situations, the birth 
or adoption of a child, the care of a child, spouse, or parent with a serious illness with 
consideration for the interests of the employers.  The Act was also intended to comply 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by minimizing the 
potential for gender discrimination by proposing that leave is made available for medical 
reasons as well as maternity-related disability. 
 Employees eligible to benefit form FMLA are those who, as defined by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203 (e)), have been employed for at least 12 
months and have worked at least 1250 hours with the employer from whom he or she is 
requesting leave during the previous 12 month period.  Excluded from the set of eligible 
employees are “any Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 
63 of Title 5, United States Code or any employee of an employer who is employed at a 
worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of 
employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that work site is less than 50. 
 Employees who take leave granted under FMLA may return to the job that he or 
she held before taking the leave or a position with equivalent, benefits, pay, and other 
employment terms.  Benefits are to remain as they were prior to the date the leave began. 
 
Legislators’ Reactions 
HR 1 was ready to be sent to President Clinton for signing only one month after it 
was introduced.  Its sponsor William D. Ford stated that “I admit to being as excited and 
hopeful for this country as I was in 1965  when I came to this floor for the first time to 
help President Lyndon Johnson by passing all those people programs which eventually 
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became known collectively as the Great Society.  I honestly believe that our people and 
our working families need our help as greatly today as they did then” (Congressional 
record, 1993, www.thomas.gov). 
Ford also thanked others who fought for the bill such as Democratic 
Representatives, Bill Clay (D-MO), Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Pat Williams (D-MT) and 
Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT).  He also acknowledged the help received from Republicans 
Marge Roukema (NJ) and Bill Goodling (PA).  The success of HR 1 in 1993 seemed to 
indicate to Ford an increase in bipartisan ship 
Republican Representative Doolittle (CA), however, voiced opposition to the 
Family and Medial Leave Act for the following reasons.  Although the bill is intended to 
be “pro-women” it would probably cause 45 percent of small businesses to favor hiring 
women past childbearing age.  Also, Doolittle claimed that government mandated leave 
would cause 55 percent of businesses to reduce or eliminate other employee benefits.  
Paid vacations, unpaid personal leave, and health insurance are likely to be affected.  
Forty-six percent of small businesses would likely reduce the number of jobs that they 
currently offer to low-skilled workers.  According to Doolittle’s interpretation of the bill 
it “hurts women, harms families, and kills jobs.  I urge Members to vote ‘no’” 
(Congressional record, 1993, www.thomas.gov). 
 
Outcome 
House amendment 4 was sponsored by Representative William F. Goodling (R-
PN).  Its aim was to allow employers the option of offering their employees a flexible 
benefit plan which could include FMLA as one of a set of options that the employees 
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could select.  Employers would not have to allow employees to take up to 12 week of 
family and medical leave if they had not chosen it as an option under the flexible benefit 
plan.  The amendment failed by a vote of 187-244. 
House amendment 6 was intended to reinstate previously deleted language which 
required employer reduced leave schedule for an employee. It was meant to state that 
unpaid leave could be taken under a “reduced schedule” if the employer was in 
agreement with such an agreement.  The amendment passed by a vote of 223-209. By a 
vote on passage of 265-163, H.R., 1 passed the House on February 3, 1993.  It passed the 
Senate by a vote of 71-27 and was cleared for the White House on February 4, 1993.  On 
February 5, 1993 the bill was presented to and signed by President Clinton and became 
Public Law No. 103-3. 
 






 This bill was sponsored by Representative Rick Lazio to provide decent, safe, and 
clean housing to low income families.  It would contribute to the supply of affordable 
housing by repealing the United States Housing Act of 1937 and deregulating and ending 
control over agencies that deliver affordable housing; encouraging mixed income 
communities; requiring accountability and recognizing effective management of public 
housing projects; generating economic opportunities for public housing residents to 
become self-sufficient and transit out of public housing and federally subsidized homes; 
changing the existing voucher program to a form that resembles the operation of the 
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private housing market; and replacing or revitalizing troubled public housing 
developments. 
 The terms of agreement proposed under the Housing Opportunity and 
Responsibility Act included measures to foster self-sufficiency. The intent of this 
legislation was to encourage heads of households to move their families away from 
assisted housing into unassisted housing.  Each adult member of households receiving 
assistance was expected to contribute at least 8 hour of work per month within the 
community (excluding political activities).  A target date by which the families intended 
to progress from assisted to non assisted housing was required.  Resources, services, and 
assistance to facilitate self-sufficiency were to be made available to the families. 
 Section 106 of the bill required the submission of specific local housing 
management plans.  Public housing agencies were to submit a five year plan to the 
Secretary of HUD which included: 1) its mission statement, 2) goals and objective and 3) 
capital improvement overview.  Agencies were to submit these plans for the 5 year period 
beginning with the first fiscal year that assistance was received by the agency under the 
Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of  1997 and each following fiscal year.   
 The report of the  annual local plan would address: 1) the needs of low and very 
low-income families residing in the community, 2) financial resources available to the 
agency, 3) the population served including requirements for eligibility, requirements for 
selection of eligible families, procedures for unit assignments, standards of occupancy 
requirements, procedures for maintaining waiting lists, criteria for denying housing 
assistance, 4) statements of rent determination, 5) operation and management 6) 
grievance procedures, 7) capital improvements, 8) demolition and disposition of housing 
  99 
developments owned or operated by the agency, 9) designation of housing for the elderly 
and disabled, 10) conversion of housing to public housing, 11) homeownership activities, 
12) economic self-sufficiency and coordination with other agencies, 13) crime prevention 
and safety measures, 14) annual audits, and 15) troubled agencies. 
 Financing for public housing agencies was to be in the form of block grants with 
the agreement that the agencies would provide the following:  housing that is healthy, 
safe, and clean; financially sound operation of the housing units; compliance with 
guidelines relevant to the use of the block grant amounts; opportunities for residents to 
take part in making decisions regarding quality of life in their housing communities;. 
 Public housing units may be rented only to families who are classified as low-
income families at the time of occupancy.  If the tenants’ income increases, the agency 
will not be penalized for noncompliance if the agency continues to rent other units that 
become vacant to low income families.  This act also included measures to prevent 
concentration of low-income families.  Section 222 of Section B of Title II of the 
Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act states that:  
 
A public housing agency may not, in complying with the requirements 
under paragraph (1), concentrate very low-income families (or other 
families with relatively low incomes) in public housing dwelling units in 
certain public housing developments or certain buildings within 
developments.  The Secretary may review the income and occupancy 
characteristics of the public housing developments, and the buildings of 
such developments, of public housing agencies to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of this paragraph (Congressional Record 1997, 
www.thomas.gov). 
 
Each agency that administers public housing is required to establish flat 
rental amounts for each dwelling unit.  It is to be based on both the rental value of 
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the unit and a structure that does not create a disincentive for moving out of 
public housing.  The rental rate should not exceed 30 percent of the families’ 
monthly adjusted income or 10 percent of the families’ monthly income. 
Minimum rental rates can be no less than $25 per month or more than $50 per 
month. 
 Home ownership plans may be implemented by public housing agencies in 
accordance with this act and with the local housing management plan.  Units 
transferred to public housing residents may be part of existing public housing 
dwelling units or project or other units used as public housing by the agency. 
 Eligible purchasers are low-income families already receiving public 
housing assistance or those who are not.  Other entities with the purpose of 
facilitating homeownership by low-income families may purchase units for the 
purpose of selling them to low-income families.  The must sell the units acquired 
to low-income families within 5 years after purchase.  The agencies may place 
additional requirement on potential buyers such as employment, participation in 
employment counseling programs, evidence of regular income. 
 The major changes to public housing that occurred with this bill were the 
repeal of certain provisions of (1)the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974; specifically the assisted housing allocation for elderly and handicapped 
families. (2) The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (public 
housing rent waivers for police, excessive rent data, Indian housing childhood 
development, one-stop perinatal services, energy efficiency demonstration, 
mixed-income new communities demonstration, youth sports programs); (3) 
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Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (certificate and voucher 
holders, comprehensive transition demonstration); (4) Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1992 (opportunity for fair housing, Omaha homeownership 
demonstration);  (5) Housing Act of 1954;  (6) Housing and Community 
Development Amendments of 1981 (development managers’ payment); (7) 
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Development, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1991; (8) Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery 
Act of 1983 (childhood development); (9) Department of Housing and Urban 
Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988; and (10) the 
Department s of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and 
Independent agencies Appropriations Act of 1996 (public housing conversion). 
 
Legislator’s Reactions 
  Representative Bobby L. Rush (D-IL) voiced opposition to H.R. 2 referring to it 
as “Dooms Day Legislation” and another example of the “Contract on America”.  Rush 
asserted that the power  the bill gave to local public housing authorities would result in 
thousands of low-income families being driven out of public housing which should be 
preserved for those who need it most.  H.R 2, he stated, did nothing to help poor families 
secure jobs that paid wages sufficient to support their move from public housing.  The 
language in the bill that required 8 hours of community service to be performed by adults 
who did not have jobs was, according to Rush, draconian since volunteer work is not 
required of others who receive other types of aid. “Do we require ‘volunteer work’ in 
exchange for the right to receive other types of Federal assistance in the forms of farm 
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subsidies, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), corporate 
welfare, or loan guarantees?” (Congressional record; May 7, 1997, www.thomas.gov). 
 The main problem with The Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act was that 
it required families to move toward self-sufficiency but included no provisions by which 
low-income families could do this.  The focus on self sufficiency should be on securing 
jobs that generated living wages with the idea that moving from public housing would 
follow. 
 It was reasoned that the very poor would suffer under the Housing Opportunity 
and Responsibility Act by Congressman Velazquez.  The government, he argued was 
abandoning its commitment to the poor by giving a $300 billion tax cut to the wealthiest 
Americans while taking money away from the poor who lived in public housing.  Under 
this act, poor families would have to spend more of their income on housing or face 
homelessness. “Mr. Speaker”, stated Velazquez “is this what the Republicans stand for; 
giving tax breaks to the rich while throwing poor children onto the street?  H.R. 2 is 
extremely unfair and must be stopped.” (Congressional Record; April 16, 1997; 
www.thomas.gov). 
 Representative James A. Leach, who supported the act called upon liberal 
democrats who opposed the Act to consider the position of Tony Blair who had just 
warned against laws that promoted dependency on the government instead of self 
sufficiency. “Much like Prime Minister Blair’s ‘New Labor philosophies, H.R. 2 creates a 
mutuality of obligation between public housing residents and the Federal Government.  
The approach contained in the House bill is intended to help end the cycle of poverty, 
where generation follows generation in an environment devoid of hope and opportunity, 
  103 
and instead encourage self-sufficiency and the process of moving people from welfare to 
work” (Congressional Record; June 26, 1997; www.thomas.gov). 
Outcome 
 The Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997 was introduced in the 
House on January 7, 1997 and passed by a vote of 293 to 132 (Roll no. 127, 1997) on 
May 14, 1997.  The bill was sent to the Senate but not to President Clinton. 
 




 Title V, Subtitle A of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education 
Reform Act of 1998 contained provisions to restore benefits to those who had been 
eligible to receive food stamps but because of Public Law 105-33, the budgetary 
legislation passed in 1997 lost this benefit.  President Clinton was insistent on S. 1150 
containing provisions that would restore food stamp eligibility to legal immigrants.  
Under the 1997 budget law 935,000 legal immigrants lost their eligibility status to receive 
food stamps (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, C-11).  Specifically, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA- Public 
Law 104-193) mandated restrictions which affected certain legal immigrants. “The 1996 
welfare law barred most legal aliens from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the 
Food Stamp Program.  Also, states may limit alien access to Medicaid and Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, which replaced AFDC). ‘Qualified aliens’ 
arriving after August 22, 1996, are barred from these and most other means-tested 
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programs for 5 years after arrival”  (CRS Library of Congress, Joyce Vialet, Education 
and Pubic Welfare Division, June 30, 1998) 
  While the major focus of this bill was agriculture research Democrats and 
President Clinton were able to fashion a conference report, House Report 105-492, that 
mandated the allocation of $818 million to restore food stamp benefits to legal 
immigrants who were elderly and disabled.  The benefit was specifically targeted to those 
in the above category who had been in the United States at the time this particular welfare 
law was signed (ibid).  Of the 935,000 immigrants who lost their food stamp benefits 
250,000 would have them restored (ibid). 
 Title V amended the Food Stamp Act of 1977 to reduce funding for fiscal year 
1999 and 2000 employment and training.  It set limits for reimbursements to states for 
administration of food stamp programs with consideration of other reimbursements for 
Medicaid and AFDC.  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 were also amended to extend the eligibility period from five to seven years 
for refugees and asylees (Congressional Research Service, 1998; Thomas.gov).   
Legislator’s Reactions 
 This measure added to S. 1150 met with opposition from the Republican (then the 
majority party) leadership in the House lead by Majority Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas.  
The rule to consider the bill in the House would have eliminated the food stamp provision 
from the bill entirely however, the rule was voted down and the food stamp provision 
remained after pressure from others members of congress forced the Republicans to 
  105 
abandon their position (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, C-11).  A new rule for 
considering S. 1150 which kept the provision for legal immigrant was passed by a vote of 
364-50 (ibid). 
  Dave Camp, R- Michigan expressed on behalf of his party that restoring the food 
stamp benefit was a welcome change.  He stated that action “would protect elderly 
disabled immigrants while ‘maintaining the underlying policy on welfare for newly 
arriving immigrants achieved in the welfare law, that those who arrived after 1996 must 
work or naturalize before becoming eligible’” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, 
20-16).  
Outcome 
S. 1150 was passed in the House under the provisions of House Resolution 365 which 
removed the language “An Act to ensure that federally funded agricultural research, 
extension, and education address high-priority concerns with national or multistate 
significance, to reform, extend and eliminate certain agricultural research programs, and 
for other purposes” (Congressional Research Service, 1998).  This statement was 
replaced by the following:  “An Act to reform, extend, and repeal certain agricultural 
research, extension, and education programs, and for other purposes’, as passed by the 
House” (ibid).  The final passage vote in the House took place on June 4, 1998 and the 
bill passed by a vote of 364 for and 50 against (Roll No. 204).  S. 1150 was signed by 
President Clinton on June 23, 1998 and became Public Law Number 105-185 
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Chapter 4.  Macro Analysis of Roll Call Votes 
 
The previous chapter was an historical outline of changes in the United States’ 
welfare state between 1972 and 2002.  It discussed the shift from more to less state 
sponsored help for those who are in economic need and for those who need to have their 
futures financially secured in retirement.  A closer look into the causes for these 
substantial changes is warranted because economic stability is necessary for the 
perpetuation of civil society.  Civil society depends on its members having the means to a 
decent, safe, and secure way of life.  Each member must have at least a modicum of basic 
necessities to live a decent life (Sales, 1991).  To begin the analysis of what causes 
change in support for social welfare bills that are meant to preserve and enhance the 
American welfare state, this chapter reports the findings of four tests regarding how 
macro level environmental factors determined the votes of legislators on social welfare 
bills between 1972 and 2002.  It also discusses the methodology used and how it provides 
information on changes in the voting behavior of members of the House of 
Representatives. 
Methodology 
 I check to see if there is empirical support for the hypothesis that if certain factors 
become more important to the legislators than personal ideology, in regard to achieving 
their personal goals, then they will override personal ideology as the determinant of the 
vote and also for the following related hypotheses: 
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1.  If the president has high approval ratings then legislators are more likely to support his 
policy preferences.  Approval ratings reflect how well the president is doing his job and 
how accountable the public holds him for crisis or scandal. 
2.  When party leadership is strong, legislators are more likely to vote according to the 
preferences of the party leadership. 
 These related hypotheses specify the possible influence of the president and the 
party leadership since the literature surrounding Congressional behavior includes 
empirical evidence of the president and party leadership having influence on 
Congressmen and Congresswomen’s votes (Neustadt,  and Aldrich et al.).  They are 
included in this study in order to test whether or not any one factor explains influence on 
Congressional voting behavior and that the strengthening of influence from one source 
may impact voting decisions at one time while another source of influence may become 
stronger and more influential at another time.   
 An important element of the main hypothesis is that factors affecting legislators’ 
behavior change in importance to each legislator.  At one time a particular factor can be 
the most important determinant of the vote and at other times it may not matter at all.  
The analyses presented in this chapter explain changes in the importance of a set of 
factors.  The method of analysis is Ordinary Least Squares Regression and change is 
captured by the coefficients that are significant in the analyses.  These coefficients 
represent the rate that legislators voted in favor of a bill meant to improve or sustain a 
particular social welfare program because of the factor represented by that independent 
variable.  If a variable is insignificant, the interpretation is that it did not cause any 
statistically significant change in the vote.  If a variable is significant it affected support 
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for social welfare bills at the rate indicated by its coefficient.  A positive significant 
coefficient of 34.4, for example, means that the variable increases the rate that the 
legislators will support social welfare bills by 34.4 for every unit increase in that variable. 
 These tests are expected to determine whether or not the hypotheses intended to 
support the theory should be accepted or not accepted.  If all the equations are significant 
then the hypothesis are accepted and the theory can be considered valid.  If all the 
equations are insignificant then the hypothesis cannot be accepted and the theory is 
incorrect based on the analyses presented here.  This would occur if the model is 
misspecified; that is if the variables chosen to explain variation in the legislators’ votes 
fail to account for the changes in the dependent variable.  Another reason for the models 
to fail to achieve significance is an insufficient sample size.  If the number of cases is too 
low the analysis will not be able to determine with an acceptable degree of confidence, 
the effects of the explanatory factors on the variation of the votes.  If any of the equations 
are significant then the theory can be accepted and one or more of the hypotheses can be 
accepted based on the variables that are significant in the significant equations. 
 Because the theory being tested emphasizes the changing importance of factors 
associated with legislative voting behavior it is not surprising that some equations may be 
insignificant.  The presence of some insignificant equations does not lead to an 
acceptance of the null hypotheses as long as there is at least one significant equation.  
Rather, the presence of both significant and insignificant equations demonstrates the 
aspect of the theory that addresses the idea that particular influences on legislators’ 
voting decisions come and go and change in order of importance.   As previously 
discussed the analyses are used to demonstrate that factors that influence voting decisions 
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change in importance.  The variables used in the aggregate level analyses represent the 
same type of variables over the three subsets of the thirty years studied. 
 Each set of years contains president and economic conditions as variables.  For 
the second two sets of years, 1983 through 1992 and 1993 through 2002 the presence of 
scandals is also included as explanatory variables.  This method is an effective way to test 
whether or not the effect of the variables changes over time; time being a proxy for 
changes in the political climate in which members of Congress vote.  The concept of 
passing time is reflected in the chronological order of the votes that are analyzed.                                                                             
 The variables analyzed in the macro level analyses are president operationalized 
as dummy variables coded 1 for is president and 0 for is not president for Presidents 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush.  Each variable 
representing president was interacted with the presidential approval variable to form the 
variable representing president used in the analyses.   That is, the value for each case of 
the president variables is multiplied by the corresponding value for each case of the 
presidential approval variable.  The interacted variables identify the time that each 
president in the study was in office in relationship to the dependent variable and the 
degree of popularity that each president had at the time the legislators voted on each bill.  
The combination of president and presidential approval is a better indicator of influence 
on the vote than president and presidential approval used separately in the analysis.  It 
indicates when a president is in office and when he is not while simultaneously indicating 
his approval rating.  For these analyses, the president variable is a useful indicator of 
legislators’ voting behavior since popular presidents have historically had success in 
promoting their agendas among members of Congress.  As an independent variable, 
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president is used to determine if social welfare bills were supported or not supported by 
members of Congress because of presidential influence.   
The presence of scandals is used in the analysis to determine whether or not they 
impeded the ability of sitting presidents to advance their agendas on social welfare 
policy.  The purpose of including scandals is as follows: Even if the scandal does not 
affect presidential approval it is possible for it to divert public attention from domestic 
policy making, thereby nullifying the effect of presidential influence.  Public attention 
was more focused on scandals such as Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal and the 
Lewinsky scandal than on the legislative agenda.  This was so no matter what effect the 
scandals had on presidential public approval.  Additionally, the presence of scandal may 
decrease the amount of effort that the president is able to devote to furthering certain 
items on his legislative agenda.  The scandals included are the Iran Contra scandal, the 
Iran Hostage Crisis, and the Lewinsky scandal all operationalized as dummy variables 
coded 1 for present at the time the bill was considered and 0 for not present at the time 
the bill was considered.   
During the Iran Hostage Crisis President Carter’s approval rating declined 
(Gallup). Reagan’s approval rating declined during the Iran-Contra Scandal (Gallup).  
President Clinton’s approval rating during the Lewinsky scandal was higher than it was 
before the scandal broke and after the impeachment took place (Gibson and Gleiber, 
1999).  The different reactions to scandals by the public are important to the theory I 
propose because it highlights the possibility of varying responses to similar phenomena.  
For example Nixon’s approval rating fell during the Watergate scandal and his impending 
impeachment.  In contrast, Clinton’s approval rating rose during the Lewinsky scandal 
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and his impeachment (Gallup).  One difference between the former and latter case was 
the difference in the performance of the economy.  Clinton presided during a time of 
economic prosperity and this accounted for his increasing public approval. 
Because Newt Gingrich was reported to have exerted an unusually large amount 
of influence on the Republicans in the House of Representatives thereby increasing 
voting cohesion, a variable representing Gingrich’s presence is included and coded 1 for 
present and 0 for not present.  Economic indicators are used to measure the effect of the 
condition of constituents on the legislators.  Constituent awareness and opinion of the bill 
may be important in some studies; however, on the subject of social welfare, public 
opinion polls may not directly reflect the need for social welfare provisions as well as 
economic indicators.  For example, persons who may have benefited from a social 
welfare program such as unemployment insurance may not feel compelled to support 
maintaining or enhancing social welfare programs.  Because their need may have been 
short term, their experience with receiving welfare benefits may be limited.  Not 
perceiving themselves as dependent on welfare programs may transfer to not perceiving 
the need for providing social welfare programs to the extent that they are in the United 
States.  Similarly awareness will not indicate opinion or need.  The economic conditions 
that constituents face, therefore, were determined to be the best measure of constituent 
influence on the legislators.   The legislators would be more informed about the overall 
economic conditions of his or her district than each individual constituent would may be 
since they are each equipped with staff to keep them abreast of this type of information.  
This variable is operationalized as the interaction of the national unemployment rate and 
the change in the consumer price index. 
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Because party leadership is expected to have an effect on Congress members’ the 
Republican and Democratic votes and analyzed separately.  Pressure for voting cohesion 
by the Democratic Party leadership is not expected to have an effect on the voting 
patterns of Republican members of Congress. The converse is also true.  Additionally, 
party members in Congress are not expected to vote out of loyalty to a president of the 
opposite party.  Further, it is established that Democrats traditionally have supported 
sustaining or increasing social welfare programs through legislation at a higher rate than 
Republicans.  To analyze the votes of Democrats and Republicans together would fail to 
address ideas implicit in the theory.  Republican Party leadership affects members of the 
Republican Party in Congress while Democratic Party leadership affects Democrats in 
Congress.  The theory attempts to account for changes in voting patterns, therefore, two 
different types of voting patterns cannot be effectively analyzed for variance at once. 
Results 
 The analyses include bills voted on over a span of thirty years; 1972-2002.  The 
dependent variable is the percentage of the two party votes by continuing legislators.  The 
data are separated into three sets of ten year time spans to maximize the number of 
continuing legislators’ votes that are analyzed.  The president variables for Nixon, Ford, 
Reagan, Bush, and George W. Bush are expected to yield negative coefficients for the 
Republican Congress members indicating that the presence of a popular Republican 
president increases the likelihood the legislator will not cast votes favoring social welfare 
bills.  The signs are expected to be opposite when the Democrats votes are analyzed 
indicating that the presence of Republican presidents does not decrease the likelihood of 
Democrats to vote in favor of social welfare bills.  The Economy variable is expected to 
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yield positive signs when the Democrats’ votes are analyzed indicating that as inflation 
increases so does support for social welfare bills.  This variable is not expected to have 
the same effect on the Republicans’ votes.  The Iran-Contra variable is expected to have a 
positive sign for both Democratic and Republican votes.  The presence of this scandal 
may have coincided with a perceived weakening of presidential approval and, therefore, a 
departure from supporting the president’s legislative preferences may have occurred for 
Republicans.  The Gingrich variable is expected to have a negative coefficient for 
Republicans and a positive coefficient for Democrats.  This result is expected because of 
the control that Gingrich exerted over Republican members of Congress and especially 
those in key positions on committees (Evans and Oleszek, 1999 and Sinclair, 2000).  
One-tailed tests for significance are used because the theory posits a direction of 
causality from the independent variables to the independent variables. The results are 
reported in Tables one, two, and three.  The three tables below report the results from the 
OLS Regression analyses.
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Table 4.1. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1972 and 1982 
 
 
Republicans    Democrats 
 
 
Variables              Coefficient Sig.     Coefficient      Sig.  
 
Nixon   -.179  (.278)     .060  (.351) 
Ford   -.172  (.261)     .049  (.362) 
Carter   -.376  (.037)     .061  (.289) 
Reagan  -.372  (.095)     .146  (.160) 
Economy  -.198  (.348)     .263  (.205) 
Constant          59.425  (.000)            73.207  (.000) 
N=152 
 
   Sig. .214         Sig. .886 








Table 4.2. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1983 and 1992 
 
 
Republicans    Democrats 
 
 
Variables              Coefficient Sig.    Coefficient Sig.  
 
Reagan  .139  (.342)        .068 (.344) 
Iran Contra          13.431  (.052)       3.399 (.202) 
Bush   .075  (.392)        .004 (.487) 
Economy  .277  (.362)        .313 (.210) 
Constant         42.781  (.018)    77.539 (.000) 
N=117 
 
   Sig. .471          Sig. .528 
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Table 4.3. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1993 and 2002 
 
 
Republicans    Democrats 
 
 
Variables              Coefficient  Sig.                   Coefficient   Sig.  
 
Gingrich            -15.410  (.025)**       .529   (.455) 
Lewinsky  34.463  (.004)***   -7.107  (.178) 
Clinton      .506   (.123)        .078   (.382) 
WBush      .264   (.243)        .059    (.389) 
Econ      -.004  (.496)       -.470   (.039)** 
N=231 
**  95% confidence 
*** 99% confidence 
    Sig.= .008    Sig.= .314 


























The equations estimated for the first two sets of votes were insignificant while 
the equation in the third set in which the Republican vote was the dependant variable 
was significant.  The equation in the third set in which the Democratic vote was the 
dependant variable was also insignificant.  All are presented here to demonstrate that 
the null hypotheses can be rejected even though this actually occurs only in the later 
of the thirty years and only with Republican members of Congress.  Reporting the 
insignificant equations demonstrates that the theory is validated in stating that 
legislators’ behavior and the effect of exogenous influence varies over the course of 
the thirty years studied.  It was expected that the variables would have different 
effects in each equation and the significant results for the Republican equation in the 
third decade of the study supports the theory that factors expected to have influence 
on voting behavior change in their effectiveness. 
The variables in the significant equation, 1993-2002 Republicans, that explain 
most of the variance are the presence of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and 
the presence of the Lewinsky scandal.  The Gingrich variable was expected to be 
significant because of the reported control that Gingrich exerted over House 
Republicans in order to generate the increased cohesion necessary to advance the 
agenda of the Republican leadership. As Evans and Oleszek report, the Republican 
Party leadership was unusually active in encouraging voting cohesion in order to 
enact the Contract with America.  The same model would produce substantive 
information that may prove interesting if used with data describing different types of 




congress might vary8.  One consideration is that the influence of the president may 
have a different effect because of the differences in the relationship between congress 
and the presidency from issue to issue.  Examining a different type of policy for the 
purposes of testing the model in a different area is not necessary for this study since 
the goals are: 1) to explore the consistency or lack of consistency in support for social 
welfare policy and 2) to reject the null hypothesis which is that legislators do not 
change their voting patterns as a result of outside influences. 
 The coefficient for the Gingrich variable is negative indicating that support 
for social welfare bills declined among Republican legislators while Gingrich was 
Speaker of the House.  Because the dependant variable is operationalized as the 
percent of the vote supporting social welfare bills by continuing members of the 
Republican Party in the House of Representatives, this negative coefficient validates 
the second related hypotheses that members voting patterns changed because of 
Gingrich’s influence.  Specifically, the coefficient indicates that among continuing 
members of the House of Representatives the members voted in favor of enhancing or 
preserving the status quo of social welfare policy with a probability of –15.410.  This 
means that the Gingrich had the ability to influence change in the vote among 
Republicans and that influence caused a decline in support for social welfare policy. 
 With a positive coefficient of 34.463, the variable representing the Lewinsky 
scandal carried the most explanatory power in the equation estimated with 
Republican votes as the dependent variable in the third equation.  During the time 
                                                 
8 Steven Shull demonstrates that the relationship between the president and congress changes from 
issue to issue.  He develops a typology to predict when will oppose one another and when they will 
agree and looks over time from the Eisenhower to the Clinton administration to examine changes of 




between the news of President Clinton’s involvement with Monica Lewinsky and the 
impeachment that followed, support among Republicans for social welfare bills 
increased.  This is explained by the fact that Clinton’s approval rating was higher 
during the Lewinsky scandal than it was before and after (Gallup).  The Clinton 
variable which is an interaction of presidential approval ratings and the dummy 
variable representing the dates that Clinton was in office is insignificant possibly 
because the Lewinsky variable explained so much of the total variance in the 
equation.  Although the equation for the Democrats’ voting behavior on the same set 
of bills was insignificant, it is still necessary to discuss this result in comparison to the 
Republican equation estimated for those bills.  The fact that the analyses yielded a 
significant result for Republicans and not Democrats indicates that outside factors 
expected to bring about changes in voting behavior on social welfare bills failed to do 
so when Democrats were considered.  The explanation for this result is that there is 
less variance associated with Democratic votes on social policy legislation than there 
is with Republican voting. 
 The Republican analysis indicates that Gingrich’s influence had a significant 
impact only within his party.  Democrats were not influenced by Gingrich’s presence, 
however the theory and methodology dictate that inclusion of this variable is 
necessary for the purpose of distinguishing the importance of the factors thought to 
influence behavior.  Similarly, the Lewinsky variable had an effect on Republican 
members; making them more likely to favor social welfare policy. However, in the 





 When considering the theory of this study, that when certain factors become 
more important than a legislator’s personal ideology he or she may make a vote 
choice that is contrary to his or her ideology, and the hypotheses that are tested, the 
conclusion reached is that factors expected to influence voting behavior on the 
continuing members of congress used in the analyses did not have an effect in the 
first twenty years indicating that voting patterns were consistent.  In the last ten years 
two factors were reported to have influenced voting behavior among Republican 
members of the House of Representatives.  The Democrats in the last ten years 
remained unaffected. 
 The R squares reported in each equation are low indicating low goodness of 
fit of the models.  In this case low R squares are acceptable because the intention of 
the analyses is descriptive instead of inferential.  The goal is to prove that voting 
patterns change as a result of factors external to the legislators’ ideology.  It is not 
meant to suggest that the results reported here will predict future behavior even if 
associated with a similar situation.  Instead it is meant to show that Congressional 
voting behavior is stochastic enough that the theories that attempt to explain it are 
successful in certain instances.  As the theory states, influence varies, therefore the 
purpose of the analysis is not to demonstrate that external factors influence voting 
behavior in all cases but to show empirically that it does.  Even though the analyses 
are meant to be descriptive rather than inferential, more investigation into factors 
associated with various levels of support for social welfare bills is warranted.  This is 




 This chapter examined voting behavior by members of Congress at the macro 
level.  To gain more knowledge on why legislators voted in favor or against social 
policy legislation, a micro level examination of roll call votes is necessary in order to 
determine the effects of district level conditions.  Chapter 6 contains analysis of the 
votes on 10 key social welfare policy bills between 1972 and 2002.  The next chapter 
describes the relationship between the two levels of analysis and discusses the 

















Chapter 5.  The need for two levels of analysis 
Explaining the relationship between the macro and micro level analyses. 
Considering the contributions that many theories make to understanding 
phenomena is important to scientific inquiry because along with accepting the idea 
that multiple indicators are necessary to account for variance in subjects studies it is 
also understood that the effects of explanatory variables increase or decrease in 
strength over time.  The structure of this study does not lend itself to the use of Time 
Series analysis because the data are not arranged in equal time intervals.  Change over 
time can still be measured, however, using techniques that assume the general linear 
model. 
The analysis in this dissertation addresses the behavior of continuing members 
of the House of Representatives on one type of bill. The use of one type of bill 
eliminates the need to include a measure of ideology as an explanatory variable.  A 
legislator can only vote yes or no on a single bill, therefore his or her ideological 
orientation, with regard to that particular issues, is either for or against that particular 
type of legislation.  For example, if a legislator is generally against providing welfare, 
his or her votes would routinely reflect that he or she was against the bills that 
favored maintaining or increasing social welfare benefits.  A shift from a position of 
not supporting social welfare legislation to one of supporting social welfare 
legislation designed to maintain or increase programs would indicate a departure from 




Researchers cannot determine what thought processes a legislator may have 
(Carson and Oppenheimer, 1984).  One can only observe outward behavior.  Thus, 
the ideal points discussed in other areas of the legislative behavior literature are 
primarily based on observable behavior.  This study is justified then in classifying 
changes in observable voting behavior as a move away from an ideal point to vote in 
concert with another.  It may be argued that this is simply a change from one ideal 
point to another; however, there are two lines of reasoning to address this claim.  
First, if a legislator changes from one ideal point to another, this action is still 
classified as a change in behavior.  It is still the case that the original ideal point has 
been abandoned.  Understanding the reasons for the change in ideal points if the 
purpose of this research. Second, a legislator may not change ideal points but for 
some other reason casts a vote that is inconsistent with his or her established, 
observed ideal point.  The reasons for this behavior are addressed in this research. 
The above discussion serves to reinforce the basic tenant of this project which 
is that within scientific inquiry it is important to proceed with the assumption that 
research can only be conducted on observable phenomena.  Specifically, accounting 
for variance in voting behavior can only be achieved through the observation and 
study of behavior.  Researchers can discuss indicators of ideal points based on actions 
that legislators take. 
In the macro level analysis presented in this dissertation, the votes of 
continuing members of congress are analyzed.  There are two reasons for proceeding 




votes that is consistent with regard to issue area.  This is the only way that change in 
voting preferences for a bill type can be assessed.  The use of votes by non-continuing 
members would prevent detection of change because it would be impossible to 
disentangle changes in one person’s vote from changes in the vote outcome resulting 
from substitutions of voters while using macro level data. 
Second, because this study is concerned with the situation described by the 
conversion hypothesis rather than the replacement hypothesis, it is best served by 
using continuing members.  Discussions of these two hypotheses have dealt with the 
most effective way of accounting for general shifts in position by congress.  The first 
asserts that shifts are due to changes in members’ voting behavior due to forces that 
come into effect.  The second attributes shifts in the legislative outcomes to change in 
the make up of the two houses of congress as new members replace outgoing 
members.  This study is concerned with changes in legislative outcome due to the 
conversion of members, or to members voting differently than their ideal point or 
usual voting pattern would suggest. 
A possible question that may arise when considering this research design is 
does using only continuing members introduce an endogeneity problem to the 
research?  It could be argued that a legislator’s longevity is affected by the votes he or 
she casts or that he or she votes a certain way in order to win future elections.  The 
expectation here would be that a direction of causality between longevity and voting 
behavior is unclear or that the voting behavior is a function of constituent voting 




behavior is inconsequential to this research because longevity is not an independent 
variable in this analysis.  In fact in the equations estimated there is no variance in 
longevity at all.  The aggregate votes of members who were in office during the same 
range of years were analyzed. 
If it can be determined in a different study that the behavior of some is 
dependent on constituent preferences there is still no effect on the internal validity of 
this study since the purpose of the macro level analysis is to demonstrate that it is 
possible for legislators to vote differently than their ideal point would suggest.  Thus 
this research assumes that there are ideal points although they are not fixed.  
Demonstrating this claim is the function of the macro level analysis. 
 The macro level analysis stops at demonstrating that change occurs.  This 
demonstration is one of the main goals of this project.  It is now necessary to discuss 
what is expected of the explanatory variable in the macro analysis.  The discussion 
that follows refers to the reasons certain independent variables were included in the 
analysis.  It differs from the discussion in the previous chapter in which the results of 
the analysis is presented.  Instead this discussion concentrates on explaining and 
justifying the structure of the methodology that is used for the macro level analysis. 
 Time series analysis is able to demonstrate change over time with data that 
occur with equal time intervals.  The general linear model and in the case of Ordinary 
Least Squares regression is also able to demonstrate change that occurred at various 
points in time.  The coefficients representing the effect of the independent variables 




equation below indicates how change in the independent variables results in change in 
the dependent variable. 
Y= a + Bx1y1+ Bx2y2+ e 
 On the right side of the equation the expression Bx1y1 symbolizes that for 
every unit increase in x there is a B unit increase in Y on the left side of the equation.  
B, of course, represents the numerical coefficient identified in the out put generated 
by computing the equation.  If, for example, Y the dependent variable represents the 
percentage of Democrats voting in favor of bills to increase or maintain social policy 
programs, then that percentage may increase as the value of the independent variable 
x, increases.  The amount that the value of the independent variable changes is 
reflected in the coefficient B.  Accordingly, if the independent variable x increases by 
2 and the B coefficient is equal to 20 then the dependent variable is increased by 40.  
Where x1 represents party influence and Y represents the percentage of Democrats 
supporting the social welfare bills increases by 20.  Therefore, in the macro level 
analysis it is expected that the presence or non presence of Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
Reagan, George Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush as presidents would have an 
effect on the percentage of Democrats and Republicans voting in favor of social 
policy bills.  This effect or rate of change would be reflected in the coefficients 
corresponding to those variables.  The same is expected for variables representing 
party strength and economic performance. 
 The design of the macro level analysis is such that change over time is 




The design is limited however, because it is unable to provide a deeper understanding 
of why the (macro level) independent variables have the effects observed while 
demonstrating that change in levels of support occurs.  The overall project is 
enhanced if exploration of those effects is included.  Inquiry into reasons for variance 
in support for social policy needs to be included in this study and is the reason for the 
inclusion of the micro level analysis. 
Structure of Micro Level Analysis  
 While the macro level analysis only demonstrates that legislators don’t always 
vote in a manner consistent with their ideal points because of national level external 
factors the micro analysis investigates voting behavior at the district level.  
Specifically, district level variables are used to analyze votes on bills with the 
legislator as the unit of analysis.  The explanation of how micro or district level data 
has the effect of deconstructing macro level events is as follows.   
 It is demonstrated by the aggregate level tests that the presence of Newt 
Gingrich as Speaker of the House and the Monica Lewinsky scandal had significant 
effects on Republican support for social policy bills.  This effect does not however 
explain factors at the district level which may have enable these variables to have an 
effect.  The reasoning here is that the conditions such as economic well being and 
other demographics may condition the effect of the variables used in the macro level 
analysis.  For instance, in districts with higher median income levels the members of 
Congress elected are likely to have more in common ideologically, with the 




the members have blue collar jobs, the representative may be ideologically opposed 
to the Republican Party leadership.  These district level differences affect the 
relationship between the effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable in the macro level analysis. 
 The macro level dependent variables are functions of the district level 
variance analyzed in the micro level analysis.  This is the linkage between the micro 
and macro level analyses and the reason for conducting both in the study.  Treating 
the congress member as the unit of analysis in the micro analysis deconstructs the 
macro level unit of analysis which is the vote on bills included.  This methodology 
illuminates the effects that were at work to make up the aggregate level data and 
results.  It is necessary to conduct micro and macro level analyses in this study 
because ultimately the micro level data influence the macro level data. 
 One concern is whether or not the macro level analysis creates a situation of 
ecological fallacy.  This research flaw occurs when the researcher tries to infer from 
the aggregate level, conclusions about the micro level.  This study avoids the 
ecological fallacy problem because the aggregate level data and analysis is not 
expected to provide explanations for district level events.  It is intended, as stated in 
throughout in discussions regarding, theory, hypothesis, and research design that it is 
used to trace aggregate change in the vote of groups of continuing members of 
congress.  The aggregation that results in the data that make up the variables used in 
the macro level analyses has the effect of canceling out micro level variance.  For 




differ from each other therefore the effects of low values and high values are 
cancelled out. It supplements this information that is gained the micro level analysis 
is included for the purpose of demonstrating the effects of district or micro level 
variables. 
Expectations of Micro level variables 
 The variables selected for the micro level analysis are those representing 
district level phenomena which are thought to affect the type of representative that 
would be elected from a district and therefore how he or she would vote on social 
policy bills.  The set of independent variables represent district level demographic 
factors that reflect the socioeconomic status and, ultimately, the needs of the districts 
population. 
 It is expected, for instance, that the variable representing the percentage of the 
districts’ population that has passed the age of 65 (OLDER 65) will reveal the effect 
of the presence of senior citizens in the population.  The expectation is that the higher 
the percentage of the population over the age of 65 the more likely the congressman 
or congresswoman is to support legislation aimed at enhancing or maintaining 
benefits that directly impact that group such as OASDI and Medicare. 
 BLUE COLLAR and FINANCE offer information on the economic status of 
the districts while BANK addresses the amount of funds held in the banks of each 
district.  Separately, each of these variables has the potential of affecting the voting 




aggregation of votes of legislators is considered and these percentages are no longer 
separated it is only possible to observe their combined effects as they are manifested 
in the aggregated vote choices analyzed in the macro level analyses.  The same is true 
for the district level variables FORBORN, POPSQUAREMILE and 
UNEMPLOYMENT. 
 The analysis of votes at both the aggregate and district level provides first, a 
demonstration of legislators voting differently from their ideal points.  This is the sole 
purpose of the aggregate level analysis.  Secondly, through the individual level 
analyses, the district level effects that contribute to the voting outcomes can be 
observed.  The micro level analyses therefore support the macro level analyses by 
deconstructing the macro level dependent variable.  Using this approach allows a 
broader understanding of the reasons legislators seem to vote differently than their 




Chapter 6. Micro –level analysis of Key Roll Call Votes 
The macro level analysis presented in the Chapter 4 gives a description of  
conditions at the National level that affected congressional voting behavior on social 
policy bills.   To add to the understanding of how legislators arrive at voting decisions 
on social policy bills; an analysis of district level indicators is necessary.  This 
chapter addresses conditions at the district level by using the Congressional district as 
the unit of analysis. Ten key bills, pertaining to social policy, that made changes to 
parts of the welfare state and are each part of the overall focus of this research, are the 
dependent variables.  Certain years were left out because the vote did not have 
enough variance to be analyzed or because there were no social policy key votes in 
that year. This is a common occurrence since the House meets in two year terms and 
certain policy areas may be addressed in one year of the term or the other. Included in 
the set of bills analyzed were those that affected public housing, emergency housing, 
the Family Medical Leave Act, Veterans’ affairs and HUD, food stamps, and social 
security.  A brief description of the bills is presented in this chapter. More details of 
the evolution of each bill were presented in chapter five which contains the case 
studies of these bills. 
 The bill that was analyzed for 1981 was HR 4331/ HR 3982, Minimum Social 
Security Benefits/ Budget Reconciliation.  Sponsored by Bolling, a Democrat from 
Missouri, this bill was intended to end debate and avoid an amendment to the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 which would restore minimum Social 




 HR 1, in 1986, a Housing Act, was sponsored by Bartlett, a Texas 
Republican.  Its purpose was to limit the obligation of funds to repairing existing 
public housing instead of constructing new public housing except in limited 
circumstances.  The amendment was adopted by a vote of 223 to 180.   
For the year 1989 HR 3299 was analyzed.  It was the Fiscal 1990 Budget 
Reconciliation/Alternative Revenue Package.  The bill was an amendment which 
would exclude a capital gains cut included in the reconciliation bill.  The amendment 
also substituted restored deductibility for Individual Retirement Accounts and 
provided a deficit-reduction trust fund plus an increase the marginal tax rates from the 
highest incomes from 28 percent to 33 percent.  
 HR 3040 was analyzed for the year 1991.  The vote on this bill was the 
passage vote for the permanent extension of unemployment benefits for up to an 
additional 20 weeks over the normal period of time.  The estimated cost for this 
measure was $6.3 billion at the time the bill was considered.  A funding cut of $1.2 
million to the Veterans Administration and HUD was the aim of HR 5679 in 1992.  A 
nay vote was a vote in favor of President Clinton’s position.  For the year 1993 the 
Family and Medical Leave Act was considered. 
For the year 1995 the vote on the final passage of HR 4 was analyzed.  This 
was the final passage vote on the Welfare Overhaul process.  If passed the legislation 
would have ended entitlement status of welfare programs replacing it with five 
predetermined block grants. The bill passed with a vote of 234 for and 199 against. 
President Clinton was against passage.  A similar type of bill was voted on and 




replace low-income housing programs with block grants.  A no vote was one in favor 
of President Clinton’s position.  The bill was passed with 227 votes for it and 132 
against it. 
S 1150, in 1998 was an adoption of a rule to allow a point of order necessary 
to reduce by $818 million the funding to give food stamps to legal immigrants.  It was 
rejected by the House by a vote of 120 for and 289 against it.  
 This set of social policy bills offers the opportunity to compare the impact of 
the independent variables on the vote during different years and on different types of 
bills within the set of social welfare bills. They are the types that assist those facing 
economic hardship as well as those who earned the benefits offered through military 
service or by paying into the social security system before retirement as well as the 
Family and Medical Leave Act which allows employees to take leaves of absence for 
personal illness or family illnesses or events such as the birth or adoption of a child. 
District level analysis has the ability to give a direct representation of the effects of 
variance in economic and demographic factors on the legislators’ voting behavior.  
For example, some districts may have higher levels of unemployment or higher 
percentages of retirees. 
The following discussion of the ten logistic regression analyses focuses on 
comparing the effects of the independent variables with their counterparts across the 
equations.  The central research question in this study is what influences legislators’ 
vote choices, therefore the coefficients related to the Log- odds are reported and 
compared because a discussion and comparison of the converted logit coefficients 




support for social policy bills which is the focus of the research question.   Discussion 
of the independent variables compared across equations, however, provides 
information on the motivations for the votes from year to year.    
 The independent variables used in the analyses are the percentage of persons 
over the age of 65 in the district (OLDER65);  the number of persons in the district 
who held blue-collar jobs (BLUECOLLAR); the number of person in the district who 
were born in a country other than the United States (FORBORN); the number of 
persons in the district who held jobs in the finance industry (FINANCE); the amount 
of funds held in the banks in the district (BANK); the number of persons who were 
unemployed in the district (UNEMPLOYMENT); and the average population per 
square mile of the district (POPSQUAREMILE).  The data were obtained from the 
Congressional District Database at the University of Colorado.  In the discussion that 
follows, each independent variable is discussed in terms of which equation it 
achieved significance and in comparison to its explanatory power across the other 
equations. 
 OLDER 65 is used to measure the effects of the number of persons who were 
old enough to receive OASDI and Medicare benefits on legislators’ votes on bills that 
affected those programs.  It is expected that as this number increases the legislators 
would be more likely to support bills that improved the lives of their constituents 
specifically through these programs and also through other programs that serve those 
with limited income since many incur a further reduction in income around the age of 
65.  The effect of this variable was expected to be positive in the more recent years 




benefits.  OLDER 65 was significant only in the year 1998.  The dependent variable 
for that year was the key social policy bill, S 1150 Food Stamps for Legal 
Immigrants, was intended to decrease the availability and amount of food stamps to 
legal immigrants.  A vote no was a vote to keep funding for legal immigrants at the 
current level and, therefore, a vote favoring social policy.  The bill was rejected 118-
98 by Republicans and 2- 190 by Democrats. 
 FINANCE and BLUECOLLAR were included to determine whether or not 
the types of jobs that constituents held influenced the legislators’ support for social 
policy bills.  The FINANCE variable was negative and significant in the years 1981 
and 1997.  It was positive and significant in 1986 and 1992.  The BLUECOLLAR 
variable was positive and significant in 1991.  These results suggest that legislators 
are more responsive to the needs of white-collar workers than they are to blue-collar 
workers. 
 BANK is negative and significant in 1973 and 1992.  The bills analyzed for 
those years pertained to Emergency Housing and H.R. 5679 which addressed both 
Veterans Affairs and HUD. This bill was an amendment to decrease funding for the 
Veterans Administration and for HUD.  A vote no was a vote in favor of preserving 
the current level of funding.  BANK is positive and significant in 1981 when H.R. 
3982, the bill to restore Social Security benefits, is the dependent variable.  A yes 
vote is a favorable vote.  The indication here is that when the amount of cash assets in 
a district have an effect on the legislators’ vote on social policy bills it is likely to be a 
negative effect. Taken together, the results of these three equations suggests that even 




consideration of the two tiered welfare state still exists. This Social Security bill 
benefited older people.  It improved the part of the welfare state that is considered to 
benefit the “deserving” poor. 
 The variable representing the number of persons who were born in a country 
other than the United States, FORBORN, was positive and significant in 1973, 1991, 
and 1998. It was negative and significant in the years 1981, 1986, and 1991. The bills 
1973, 1991, and 1998 funding for emergency housing, H.R. 3040 to provide 
extensions in unemployment insurance and, S. 1150 which provided food stamps for 
legal immigrants. The bills considered in 1973, 1981 and, 1986 were AFDC, Social 
Security, and H.R. 1 a proposal to limit the obligation placed on funds for new 
construction of public housing units to repair of existing units where possible.  The 
analyses indicate that the presence of those who were not native born citizens had a 
negative influence on the vote for these types of bills.  Social Security, public housing 
and AFDC are more long term assistance type programs than Emergency housing, 
unemployment insurance and food stamps.  The later three types of welfare assistance 
appear to be of the type that are needed quickly and for a shorter period of time than 
the others discussed here.  As the immigrant population in an area rises there is 
frequently a housing shortage and a shortage of jobs.  Emergency housing, 
unemployment insurance, and food stamps offer immediate assistance while the 







Table 6.1  Influence of Foreign Born Population and District Wealth 
 
 1973 Emergency Housing 1981 Social Security 
FORBORN 1.67E0-05  (p=.0313**) -1.4E-05 (p=.0328**) 
BANK -6.5E-06(p=.00865**) 3.48E-05 (p=.1001*) 
 
This results for 1973 and 1981 contrast with respect to the BANK variable.  
The signs of the coefficients in equations in which BANK was significant are the 
opposite of their counterparts for the FORBORN variable. The indication here is that 
as cash assets increase the support for emergency housing decreases while it 
simultaneously increases as the number of immigrants increases.  Conversely, when 
increasing Social Security benefits are considered, support is positively influenced by 
cash assets and negatively influenced as the number of immigrants increases.  
 FINANCE was negative and significant in 1981 and 1997.  It was positive and 
significant in 1986 and 1992.  The dependent variables for which FINANCE was 
negative and significant are Social Security and Public Housing.  This result indicates 
that there was less support for these programs in districts with larger numbers of 
persons with careers in the finance industry in the years analyzed.  The dependent 
variables for which FINANCE was positive and significant were public housing 
(1986) and Veterans Affairs/HUD (1992).  The indication is that funding for housing 
and veterans affairs/ HUD was supported more in districts with higher numbers of 




 UNEMPLOYMENT was negative and significant in 1986, 1989, and 1997.  It 
was positive and significant in 1973, 1991, 1992, and 1993.  The dependent variables 
for the years that UNEMPLOYMENT was negative and significant were bills 
pertaining to public housing in 1986 and 1997 and medicare 1989.  These are bills 
that seem to have no obvious linkage to the unemployment rate. However, as 
mentioned earlier, public housing tends to be a longer term form of welfare assistance 
where as unemployment for individuals is more sporadic even when the rate of 
unemployment fluctuates.  Medicare affects those who are retired and are not 
considered unemployed.  It is logical, therefore, that the percentage of those 
unemployed in a district would have an inverse relationship with the likelihood of a 
member of Congress to support a medicare bill. 
 POPSQUARMILE was positive and significant in1981, 1992, 1993, and 1997 
and negative and significant in 1973 and 1986.  With the exception of 1993 all of the 
bills for which POPSQUARMILE was positive and significant dealt with housing 
assistance.  As the population per square mile increased the likelihood of a vote 
supporting emergency housing (1973), Veterans Affairs/HUD (1992), and public 
housing (1997) also increased.  Population per square mile also had a positive impact 
on the likelihood of supporting the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993. 
 Social security (1981) and Public Housing (1986) were affected negatively by 
POPSQUAREMILE.  The results for the analysis of 1986 and 1997 are of interest 
since the effects of the population per square mile are opposite one another for the 
same variable in each year.  This result shows that there is change in support for 




the membership replacement hypothesis of vote change rather than the membership 
conversion hypothesis.  This level of analysis is only able to demonstrate replacement 
while the macro level is able to demonstrate the occurrence of conversion.  The tables 
reporting the results of the analyses are below.    
Table 6.2  Emergency Housing 1973 
Independent variables  B  SE  P 
Bank  -6.5E-06  2.722E-06  .00865** 
Unemployment  .0001  4.6956-85  .0043** 
Popsqumile  3.88E-05  2.548E-05  .06405* 
Forborn  1.67E-05  8.990E-06  .0313** 
Finance  4.91E-06  2.613E-05  .4255 
Bluecollar  -1.6E-06  7.439E-06  .4144 
Over65  1.66E-06  8.264E-06  .4204 
Constant  -.5738  .8346  .24585 
N= 485 
95% confidence ** 






Table 6.3  Minimum Social Security Benefits/Budget Reconciliation 1981 




 B  SE  P 
Older 65  1.03E-05  8.471E-06  .1114 
Bluecollar  -1.0E-05  7.533E-06  .0880* 
Bank  3.48E-06  2.718E-06  .1001* 
Forborn  -1.4E-05  7.481E-06  .0328** 
Finance  -3.8E-05  2.449E-05  .0597* 
Unemployment  -4.9E-05  4.091E-05  .1165 
Popsquaremile  -2.0E-05  1.515E-05  .0915* 











 B  SE  P 
Older 65  -4.4E-06  4.352E-06  .1584 
Bluecollar  5.12E-06  1.047E.05  .3123 
Bank  6.20E-07  1.391E-06  .3278 
Forborn  -3.0E-05  6.985E-06  .0000*** 
Finance  4.43E-05  2.890E-05  .0268** 
Unemployment  -8.3E-05  2.657E-05  .0009*** 












Table 6.5  Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/ Catastrophic Repeal  




 B  SE  P 
Older 65   -8.2E-07  5.610E-06  .4417 
Bluecollar  -1.5E-06  1.271E-05  .4518 
Bank  -3.2E-07  1.680E-06  .4250 
Forborn  -4.6E-06  4.506E-06  .1515 
Finance  2.87E-05  3.511E-05  .2072 
Unemployment  -9.9E-05  2.036E-05  .0002*** 
Popsquaremile  -1.1E-05  2.036E-05  .292 
N= 435 








 B  SE  P 
Older 65  1.79E-06  4.282E-06  .3381 
Bluecollar  1.98E-05  1.043E-05  .0289** 
Bank  -1.5E-06  1.429E-06  .1461 
Forborn  1.75E-05  6.226E-06  .0025*** 
Finance  3.36E-06  2.698E-05  .4505 
Unemployment  .0002  3.103E-05  .0000*** 
Popsqaremile  -9.2E-06  2.620E-05  .3627 
N= 435 
95% confidence ** 






Table 6.7  Fiscal 1993 Veterans Affairs and HUD,  
                  Independent Agencies Appropriations/ Space Station Cuts 1992   




 B  SE  P 
Older 65  4.05E-06  4.059E-06  .1590 
Bluecollar  1.22E-05  9.520E-06  .1045 
Bank  -3.0E-08  1.382E-06  .0151** 
Forborn  -5.3E-08  3.952E-06  .4947 
Finance  5.56E-05  2.512E-05  .0134** 
Unemployment  9.86E-05  2.466E-05  .0000*** 
Popsqaremile  2.84E-05  2.188E-05  .0970* 
Constant  -3.3238  .8420  .0000 
N= 435 
90% confidence * 
95% confidence ** 








 B  SE  P 
Older 65  5.9E-06  5.410E-06  .1688 
Bluecollar  -8.6E-06  1.074E-05  .2117 
Bank  2.50E- 07  6.929E-07  .3593 
Forborn  -6.3E-07  3.805E-06  .4342 
Finance  -1.6E-05  2.033E-05  .2132 
Unemployment  .0001  2.878E-05  .0000*** 
Popsqaremile  .0004  .0001  .0007*** 
Constant  -1.5143  .9243  .0507 
N= 435 




















 B  SE  P 
Over 65  -3.7E-06  4.828E-06  .2246 
Bank  -4.5E-07  6.217E-07  .2362 
Bluecollar  3.17E-06  9.210E-06  .3694 
Forborn  -5.7E-06  2.453E-06  .0104** 
Finance  1.05E-05  1.659E-05  .2638 
Unemployment  6.55E-07  2.106E-05  .4876 
Popsquaremile  1.69E-05  2.071E-05  .2078 









 B  SE  P 
Over 65  -7.3E-06  4.997E-06  .0718* 
Bluecollar  -1.1E-06  1.000E-05  .4572 
Bank  -7.7E-07  6.409E-07  .1143 
Forborn  -2.2E-06  2.396E-06  .1827 
Finance  -4.5E-05  1.751E-05  .0049** 
Unemployment  -3.4E-05  2.240E-05  .0666* 
Popsquaremile  3.33E-05  2.250E-05  .0694* 
Constant  2.8726  .8172  .0002*** 
N= 435 
90% confidence * 
95% confidence ** 











 B  SE  P 
Over 65  -5.5E-6  5.560E-06  .1612 
Bluecollar  -8.0E-07  1.047E-05  .4697 
Bank  -9.2E-07  7.786E-07  .1189 
Forborn  2.74E-06  3.106E-06  .1886 
Finance  -2.3E-06  1.974E-06  .4536 
Unemployment  -2.4E-05  2.603E-05  .1758 











The goal of this chapter was to complement the macro level analyses 
presented in Chapter 4 by providing a district level analysis to give more details 
regarding conditions at the district level that may have an effect on the legislators’ 
votes or a conditioning effect on the macro level independent variables.  The results, 
while not addressing the theory and hypothesis of this study in directly, do add to the 
total information that the study is able to provide.  Information gained regarding 
district level indices is valuable in that they point to explanations as to individual 
legislator’s behavior at single points in time.  Changes in aggregate legislative voting 
behavior overtime are better measured at the macro level but the micro level analyses 
give a closer look at factors that possibly contribute to the macro level results.  The 
macro level results speak to changes due to outside influence other than ideology and 
district level concerns that are not able to be measured using district level data.  These 
micro level analyses, however, provide information that could serve to launch more 













The hypothesis that the quantitative analysis at the aggregate level was meant 
to support is that vote choices are influenced by factors other than the legislators’ 
personal  
political ideology.  Ideology can be thought of as the set of political beliefs that one 
holds which generally predict a person’s opinions on various subjects or his or her 
preferences when having to choose between more than one option. 
 In the context of this study, an appropriate example of a legislator making a 
vote choice based on ideology would be a Representative who believes that citizens 
live day to day with no significant influence on the economy in which they interact in 
order to provide themselves with life’s necessities.  Believing that each person is 
entitled to posses at least the basic necessities to sustain life and that an event, such as 
unemployment, that takes away one’s ability to obtain basic necessities is considered 
a problem associated with the economy rather than the personal failure, that legislator 
would prefer to support legislation that provides unemployment benefits.  Since the 
theory holds that it is possible for the legislator in the above example to vote against 
bills that would help a group of individuals that he or she believes deserves 
assistance, the aggregate level analysis measures the extent to which this situation 
occurs.  
 The element of the methodology used to measure this phenomenon is the 
observation of change in voting behavior over time.  The observation is made through 




Squares analyses.  The percentage of the legislators voting in favor of continuing or 
expanding social policy programs is analyzed for groups of continuing members of 
the House of Representatives.  Following the median voter theory and the Pivotal 
Politics theory the initial assumption is that the legislators are voting according to 
their political ideologies.  When percentages vary across similar bills the question of 
why this occurs needs to be addressed.  According to the analysis presented here, 
during the years 1972 through 2002 variation in the percentage of support among 
continuing Republicans was attributed to the presence of Newt Gingrich s Speaker of 
the House and the time frame during which the Lewinsky scandal occurred.  
Specifically, the coefficient corresponding to the Gingrich variable was negative and 
significant, in the equation analyzing the Republican’s votes, indicating a decline in 
the support for maintaining or improving social welfare programs.  Conversely, the 
coefficient related to the Lewinsky variable was positive and significant indicating a 
rise in support for maintaining or expanding social welfare programs. The implication 
of the empirical evidence of varying levels of support for social welfare bills is that 
theories that maintain that ideology is the sole determinant of vote choice are 
falsified.  As the coefficients generated by the OLS regression analyses indicate, the 
effect of each variable partialed out from the optimal combination of all the variables 
justify the claim that these two factors influenced the vote.   
 The findings of the aggregate analyses invite normative discussion of the 
consistency in which social welfare is provided in the United States.  Are social 
welfare benefits available consistently because of the need for the for the government 




the provision of social welfare benefits to be subject to interferences in the decision 
making processes of duly elected legislators chosen to represent their constituents?  
The normative arguments by democratic philosophers and economists described 
earlier suggest the former. 
 In terms of the accountability that legislators have to their constituents, the 
district level analyses provide a portrayal of what conditions influenced votes on key 
social policy bills.  As discussed, legislators voted on key bills according to the needs 
of their districts.  For example, regarding HR 3040, unemployment benefits extension 
in 1991, as the percentage of blue collar constituents increased so did the likelihood 
of supporting an extension of unemployment benefits.  This variable was significant 
with a confidence level of 95%.  The variable representing the percentage of those 
unemployed also increased the likelihood of a vote in favor of this bill with a 
confidence level of 99%. 
 The district level analyses were included in addition to the national level 
analyses to give further insight into congressional behavior in general.  The findings 
of the district level analyses indicate that members of Congress were responsive to 
the conditions in their districts in most cases.  Variables that indicated poverty such as 
the percent of those unemployed or who are elderly had positive effects on the votes 
if the bill was one that served people in need.  Similarly, those that indicated wealth 
had the opposite effect on those types of bills.  The details of the bills analyzed were 
given in the case studies of those bills so that readers could have a more in depth 




 Among those who take a position of advocating the provision of social 
welfare benefits are political actors who sponsor bills intended to preserve social 
policy initiatives, the political philosophers discussed earlier, and citizens who either 
benefit from these benefits or simply believe that they are a necessary part of 
democratic society.  Because support by policy makers is ever changing, advocates 
must make their preferences known.  Brady et. al (1995) document that legislators are 
responsive to constituents that make their policy preferences known.  They also make 
the distinction between which groups are more and less likely to become politically 
active to the degree necessary for their preferences to be heard.  Those who are the 
least efficacious, they show, are most in need of social welfare benefits.  Thus, the 
preferences that are most often heard, according to Brady et. al are the middle to 
upper class constituents.   
 These findings reported by Brady et. al are from aggregate level analysis.  The 
district level analyses presented here demonstrate that demographic factors impact the 
probability of voting in a manner that supports social welfare policy.  These two sets 
of empirical results both indicate that the provision of benefits generated by social 
policy legislation will decline if advocates do not remain active. 
 The purpose of this project was to demonstrate that members of Congress 
sometimes vote in accordance with factors other than their preferences.  It was also 
meant to demonstrate that the United States welfare state is affected by changes in 
levels of support for policies that make up social welfare programs.  These tasks were 
accomplished in the national level analysis since it showed, in the last ten years 




of Congress.  This result allows the rejection of the null hypothesis which is that votes 
do not change because of factors outside of political ideology. 
 Overall, the implications of the findings of the empirical analyses are that 
when researching congressional behavior, the stochastic nature of the actions of 
Congress as an institution must be taken into account.  Chapter two relates many 
different theories of Congressional voting behavior each with empirical 
demonstrations.  What we learn from my research and other theories is that 
competing explanations exist because congressional voting behavior is not constant.  
It is affected by factors both internal and external to the institution.  This observation 
in turn has substantive implications for social welfare policy. 
 In researching congressional voting behavior in regard to social welfare bills it 
was noted that surges and declines in Congressional support for these bills creates 
inconsistency in the degree to which social welfare benefits are provided.   This is an 
inconsistency that matters in the degree to which many citizens are able to be 




Apendix A.  











1972 230.7 17.08% 7.33% 
1973 245.7 19.62% 6.80% 
1974 269.4 20.42% 7.50% 
1975 332.3 19.14% 7.73% 
1976 371.8 19.55% 8.20% 
1977 409.2 20.45% 8.11% 
1978 458.7 20.14% 7.67% 
1979 504 20.36% 7.60% 
1980 500.9 23.38% 8.98% 
1981 678.2 20.33% 7.61% 
1982 745.7 20.64% 6.95% 
1983 808.4 20.84% 7.04% 
1984 851.9 20.67% 6.81% 
1985 946.4 19.70% 6.57% 
1986 990.4 19.84% 6.67% 
1987 1004.1 20.43% 6.97% 
1988 1064.5 20.37% 7.24% 
1989 1143.6 20.15% 7.35% 
1990 1253.2 19.67% 7.51% 
1991 1324.4 20.14% 8.70% 
1992 1381.7 20.64% 10.21% 
1993 1409.5 21.43% 11.10% 
1994 1461.9 21.68% 11.66% 
1995 1515.8 21.99% 11.98% 
1996 1560.5 22.24% 12.00% 
1997 1601.2 22.63% 12.12% 
1998 1652.6 22.76% 12.12% 
1999 1701.9 22.74% 12.45% 
2000 1788.8 22.70% 12.65% 
2001 1863.9 23.04% 12.96% 







Aggregate Data Set 
 
Bill  Date of vote % Rep vote aid type % Dem vote 
ICPSR     
v348 8/9/1972 74 socsec 90 
v498 8/9/1972 12 foodstam 6 
v510 8/9/1972 86 oldamer 86 
v547 8/9/1972 26 welfare 91 
v566 8/16/1972 8 welfare 80 
v645 8/16/1972 62 welfare 80 
v38 3/13/1973 65 oldamer 90 
v75 4/18/1973 96 oldamer 83 
v122 5/31/1973 86 pubhth 83 
v235 6/30/1973 59 unempl 80 
v237 6/30/1973 80 socserv 78 
v260 7/19/1973 5 foodstam 68 
v262 7/19/1973 12 foodstam 77 
v264 7/19/1973 18 foodstam 77 
v343 9/13/1973 41 schlunch 91 
v344 9/13/1973 88 schlunch 94 
v408 10/18/1973 18 schlunch 52 
v417 10/31/1973 31 pubhth 88 
v589 3/4/1974 78 pubhth 75 
v611 3/19/1974 90 eldrcare 62 
v764 3/20/1974 78 houspub 68 
v770 7/21/1974 18 foodstam 56 
v771 7/28/1974 6 foodstam 46 
v847 7/31/1974 82 unempl 83 
v954 10/2/1974 51 oldamer 81 
v1026 11/26/1974 86 welfare 86 
v1051 12/12/1974 90 unempl 94 
v1073 12/18/1974 74 unempl 93 
v71 3/24/1975 19 schlunch 73 
v73 3/25/1975 96 schlunch 51 
v79 4/8/1975 79 oldamer 93 
v86 4/9/1975 92 schlunch 92 
v122 4/20/1975 8 schlunch 67 
v123 4/28/1975 10 wic 74 
v124 4/28/1975 19 schlunch 71 
v206 6/5/1975 73 pubhth 74 
v260 6/24/1975 58 houspub 92 
v271 6/25/1975 40 pubhth 86 
v388 9/8/1975 44 houspub 74 




v696 3/16/1976 90 socsec 85 
v776 4/29/1976 12 foodstam 75 
v780 4/30/1976 4 unempl 30 
v847 5/26/1976 12 houspub 33 
v848 5/26/1976 54 houspub 63 
v905 6/16/1976 15 foodstam 74 
v937 6/22/1976 98 foodstam 96 
v957 6/24/1976 73 oldamer 60 
v1004 7/1/1976 29 daycare 75 
v1126 8/26/1976 87 socsec 88 
v1127 8/26/1976 2 socsec 41 
v1128 8/26/1976 35 welfare 53 
v1130 8/30/1976 54 socsec 82 
v1211 9/20/1976 12 medcaid 71 
v32 2/24/1977 22 unempl 57 
v33 2/24/1977 26 unempl 46 
v72 3/15/1977 10 unempl 74 
v110 3/31/1977 90 pubhth 79 
v158 4/28/1977 69 houspub 81 
v221 5/13/1977 37 unempl 57 
v229 5/17/1977 61 unempl 88 
v243 5/18/1977 10 foodstam 69 
v244 5/18/1977 8 foodstam 67 
V245 5/18/1977 28 foodstam 75 
v322 6/4/1977 59 socsec 88 
v326 6/15/1977 8 oldamer 79 
v340 6/21/1977 10 foodstam 85 
v442 7/27/1977 8 foodstam 72 
v443 7/27/1977 10 foodstam 86 
v444 7/27/1977 4 foodstam 61 
v445 7/27/1977 41 foodstam 75 
v446 7/27/1977 18 foodstam 68 
v447 7/27/1977 22 foodstam 81 
v448 7/27/1977 43 foodstam 93 
v449 7/27/1977 14 foodstam 82 
v451 7/28/1977 12 foodstam 82 
v452 7/28/1977 45 foodstam 89 
v475 8/2/1977 53 foodstam 93 
v485 8/4/1977 39 oldamer 63 
v549 9/23/1977 73 medcaid 79 
v608 10/13/1977 94 medcaid 65 
v651 10/26/1977 92 socsec 90 
v652 10/26/1977 88 socsec 90 
v653 10/26/1977 45 socsec 78 
v654 10/26/1977 10 socsec 68 
v655 10/26/1977 51 socsec 75 
v657 10/27/1977 0 socsec 58 




v695 11/30/1977 10 socsec 67 
v696 11/30/1977 0 socsec 65 
v701 12/6/1977 22 welfare 48 
v1133 6/22/1978 6 foodstam 72 
v1226 7/21/1978 67 socsec 57 
v1232 7/25/1978 75 socsec 79 
v1261 8/1/1978 92 socsec 90 
v1309 8/9/1978 86 unempl 49 
v1310 8/9/1978 6 unempl 63 
v1338 8/16/1978 0 welfare 74 
v1369 9/8/1978 18 unempl 65 
v1370 9/8/1978 55 unempl 58 
v1437 9/22/1978 16 unempl 82 
v1438 9/22/1978 33 unempl 72 
v1511 10/12/1978 96 oldamer 89 
v107 5/2/1979 25 foodstam 88 
v125 5/8/1979 4 welfare 32 
v142 5/14/1979 18 welfare 49 
v 160 5/23/1979 31 welfare 39 
v178 6/6/1979 75 welfare 84 
v184 6/7/1979 57 houspub 78 
v302 7/11/1979 39 foodstam 92 
v314 7/16/1979 71 pubhth 84 
v403 8/27/1979 0 welfare 72 
v404 8/2/1979 92 welfare 95 
v417 9/6/1979 63 socsec 39 
v453 9/2/1979 6 welfare 62 
v488 9/28/1979 47 welfare 53 
v575 11/7/1979 92 foodstam 91 
v576 11/7/1979 0 welfare 73 
v577 11/7/1979 18 socsec 72 
v694 1/30/1980 14 unempl 69 
v695 1/30/1980 18 welfare 73 
v882 5/8/1980 31 foodstam 88 
v883 5/8/1980 29 foodstam 78 
v884 5/8/1980 43 foodstam 85 
v885 5/8/1980 18 foodstam 77 
v886 5/8/1980 4 foodstam 57 
v887 5/8/1980 22 foodstam 82 
v891 5/13/1980 78 foodstam 95 
v899 5/14/1980 75 foodstam 80 
v911 5/22/1980 92 socsec 92 
v1048 7/21/1980 100 socsec 85 
v1105 8/21/1980 14 houspub 74 
v1112 8/22/1980 55 pubhth 64 
v1211 9/30/1980 22 unempl 87 
v1212 9/30/1980 59 unempl 89 




v188 7/31/1981 84 socsec 96 
v270 7/31/1981 25 foodstam 85 
v295 11/16/1981 6 welfare 80 
v357 12/16/1981 94 socsec 96 
v370 2/10/1982 31 welfare 70 
v470 5/26/1982 49 welfare 87 
v471 5/26/1982 61 welfare 84 
v504 6/16/1982 2 houspub 37 
v505 6/16/1982 2 houspub 37 
v593 8/4/1982 14 unempl 78 
v594 8/4/1982 39 unempl 82 
v595 8/4/1982 12 unempl 80 
v596 8/4/1982 74 unempl 82 
v604 8/10/1982 82 welfare 82 
v607 8/10/1982 12 foodstam 78 
v687 9/21/1982 35 foodstam 66 
v26 3/3/1983 67 unempl 83 
v30 3/9/1983 12 socsec 70 
v53 3/24/1983 50 socsec 63 
v135 5/24/1983 86 oldamer 95 
v199 6/16/1983 88 unempl 93 
v242 7/13/1983 26 houspub 96 
v303 8/2/1983 68 unempl 53 
v309 8/3/1983 10 socsec 89 
v310 8/3/1983 28 socsec 80 
v324 9/13/1983 41 welfare 43 
v339 9/21/1983 3 unempl 77 
v341 9/21/1983 26 unempl 92 
v344 9/22/1983 17 welfare 60 
v346 9/22/1983 59 welfare 86 
v354 9/29/1983 24 unempl 91 
v444 11/8/1983 19 welfare 89 
v522 2/2/1984 89 welfare 91 
v529 2/9/1984 91 welfare 91 
v578 4/11/1984 20 foodstam 90 
v601 5/1/1984 35 foodstam 86 
v602 5/1/1984 62 foodstam 96 
v746 6/26/1984 91 welfare 98 
v810 8/1/1984 31 foodstam 93 
v811 8/1/1984 30 foodstam 90 
v812 8/1/1984 100 foodstam 86 
v825 8/8/1984 93 oldamer 98 
v880 9/26/1984 92 oldamer 93 
v885 10/2/1984 98 socsec 96 
v127 5/23/1985 53 socsec 99 
v128 5/23/1985 89 socsec 83 
v242 7/25/1985 6 houspub 64 




v244 7/25/1985 17 houspub 75 
v246 7/25/1985 72 houspub 90 
v290 9/18/1985 34 foodstam 93 
v291 9/18/1985 18 foodstam 92 
v292 9/18/1985 36 foodstam 92 
v293 9/18/1985 75 foodstam 96 
v309 10/2/1985 46 welfare 98 
v324 10/8/1985 43 foodstam 73 
v404 12/5/1985 77 welfare 95 
v802 9/12/1986 65 houspub 77 
v803 9/16/1986 84 welfare 98 
v867 10/9/1986 3 houspub 26 
v22 1/27/1987 67 homeless 86 
v27 3/5/1987 62 homeless 93 
v28 3/5/1987 47 homeless 78 
v29 3/5/1987 66 homeless 87 
v33 3/5/1987 60 homeless 87 
v155 5/28/1987 66 oldamer 86 
v156 5/28/1987 67 oldamer 87 
v157 5/28/1987 79 oldamer 72 
v158 5/28/1987 62 oldamer 85 
v159 5/28/1987 86 oldamer 87 
v173 6/10/1987 55 houspub 91 
v175 6/10/1987 64 houspub 82 
v176 6/10/1987 58 houspub 94 
v236 6/30/1987 68 homeless 92 
v274 7/22/1987 43 medcaid 94 
v276 7/22/1987 68 medcaid 93 
v321 9/22/1987 79 houspub 92 
v473 12/16/1987 76 welfare 62 
v475 12/16/1987 52 welfare 88 
v608 5/10/1988 88 foodstam 97 
v657 6/2/1988 74 medcaid 93 
v687 6/22/1988 37 houspub 50 
v689 6/22/1988 85 houspub 96 
v710 7/7/1988 38 welfare 67 
v746 8/3/1988 48 homeless 86 
v758 8/9/1988 84 houspub 95 
v788 9/9/1988 76 welfare 66 
v855 9/30/1988 62 welfare 91 
v147 7/20/1989 23 houspub 90 
v267 10/4/1989 92 medcaid 74 
v268 10/4/1989 13 medcaid 57 
v273 10/5/1989 10 headstrt 83 
v375 11/21/1989 92 medcaid 69 
v377 11/21/1989 79 medcaid 76 
v430 29-Mar 8 headstrt 82 




v432 3/29/1990 7 welfare 94 
v433 3/29/1990 24 welfare 83 
v438 4/3/1990 82 foodstam 88 
v465 5/3/1990 95 foodstam 86 
v479 5/16/1990 98 headstrt 94 
v480 5/16/1990 88 headstrt 97 
v553 6/20/1990 99 welfare 79 
v554 6/20/1990 93 welfare 95 
v606 7/18/1990 21 foodstam 75 
v660 8/1/1990 68 foodstam 83 
v43 3/7/1991 5 houspub 82 
v71 3/22/1991 72 welfare 77 
v80 4/17/1991 34 medcaid 90 
v95 4/17/1991 23 entitlme 95 
v150 6/6/1991 71 houspub 39 
v151 6/6/1991 9 houspub 55 
v152 6/6/1991 3 houspub 67 
v153 6/6/1991 85 houspub 79 
v209 6/26/1991 69 unempl 97 
v210 6/26/1991 57 medcaid 95 
v263 8/2/1991 69 unempl 94 
v267 9/12/1991 81 oldamer 86 
v269 9/16/1991 64 unempl 73 
v274 9/17/1991 5 unempl 25 
v275 9/17/1991 74 unempl 70 
v277 9/17/1991 31 unempl 86 
v295 10/1/1991 35 unempl 91 
v357 10/29/1991 18 welfare 80 
v392 11/6/1991 22 welfare 81 
v406 11/14/1991 83 unempl 95 
v417 11/19/1991 61 medcaid 88 
v458 2/4/1992 83 unempl 92 
v540 4/9/1992 54 oldamer 63 
v541 4/9/1992 69 oldamer 76 
v633 6/9/1992 18 unempl 88 
v825 8/6/1992 1 welfare 86 
v826 8/6/1992 14 foodstam 89 
v833 8/11/1992 77 foodstam 77 
v50 2/24/1993 8 unempl 88 
v51 2/24/1993 19 unempl 90 
v63 3/4/1993 20 unempl 87 
v119 25-Mar 93 socsec 95 
v199 5/26/1993 2 welfare 93 
v229 6/14/1993 81 medcaid 80 
v290 28-Jun 88 houspub 21 
v296 6/29/1993 92 houspub 19 
v305 6/29/1993 80 foodstam 59 




v321 6/30/1993 34 welfare 91 
v338 7/14/1993 0 socsec 91 
v339 7/14/1993 0 socsec 96 
v399 8/2/1993 36 houspub 93 
v416 8/5/1993 0 welfare 87 
v518 10/15/1993 28 unempl 88 
v519 10/15/1993 42 unempl 89 
v554 11/4/1993 1 unempl 64 
v608 11/21/1993 97 medcaid 97 
v619 11/22/1993 10 welfare 83 
v625 11/23/1993 40 unempl 95 
v794 11/12/1994 98 socsec 97 
v802 5/17/1994 98 socsec 98 
v928 6/29/1994 100 welfare 8 
v929 6/29/1994 48 welfare 96 
v932 6/29/1994 18 houspub 92 
v935 6/29/1994 8 houspub 97 
v936 6/29/1994 3 houspub 0 
v937 6/29/1994 55 welfare 95 
v959 7/19/1994 69 welfare 95 
v969 7/21/1994 94 welfare 93 
v970 7/21/1994 98 welfare 99 
v971 7/21/1994 45 welfare 91 
v973 7/22/1994 2 imigrati 76 
v1071 8/11/1994 62 socsec 87 
v1059 9/22/1994 48 welfare 94 
v1119 10/6/1994 100 socsec 97 
v1129 10/7/1994 90 medcaid 97 
v50 1/25/1995 99 socsec 90 
v54 1/26/1995 99 socsec 71 
v60 1/26/1995 3 socsec 90 
v72 1/30/1995 0 homeless 71 
v73 1/30/1995 0 homeless 78 
v74 1/30/1995 0 welfare 70 
v76 1/30/1995 0 medcaid 66 
v78 1/30/1995 0 medcaid 85 
v79 1/30/1995 1 oldamer 62 
v84 1/31/1995 0 welfare 73 
v87 1/31/1995 0 welfare 65 
v90 2/1/1995 0 welfare 84 
v267 3/22/1995 2 welfare 98 
v268 3/22/1995 2 welfare 86 
v270 3/22/1995 96 welfare 61 
v271 3/22/1995 94 welfare 63 
v272 23-Mar 93 welfare 92 
v273 3/23/1995 57 foodstam 98 
v274 3/23/1995 98 child 100 




v276 3/23/1995 3 welfare 52 
v277 3/23/1995 99 welfare 48 
v279 3/25/1995 3 welfare 94 
v307 4/6/1995 99 houspub 94 
v308 4/6/1995 2 medcaid 85 
v311 4/6/1995 1 medcaid 90 
v312 4/6/1995 96 medcaid 90 
v352 5/18/1995 8 socsec 41 
v353 5/18/1995 71 socsec 96 
v355 5/18/1995 0 medcaid 95 
v375 5/18/1995 2 medcaid 90 
v389 6/14/1995 97 homeless 32 
v448 6/29/1995 0 medcaid 96 
v477 6/30/1995 95 medcaid 62 
v552 7/20/1995 2 foodstam 94 
v553 7/20/1995 34 foodstam 98 
v598 7/27/1995 1 houspub 93 
v599 7/27/1995 4 houspub 88 
v600 7/27/1995 8 houspub 75 
v601 7/27/1995 71 houspub 91 
v602 27-Jul 37 houspub 88 
v603 27-Jul 1 houspub 92 
v604 7/27/1995 95 homeless 21 
v624 8/2/1995 24 welfare 83 
v629 8/3/1995 22 medcaid 77 
v631 8/3/1995 85 welfare 88 
v736 10/19/1995 0 medcaid 0 
v737 10/19/1995 0 medcaid 0 
v739 10/19/1995 0 medcaid 76 
v740 10/19/1995 0 medcaid 94 
v741 10/19/1995 1 medcaid 99 
v743 10/24/1995 97 oldamer 95 
v750 10/26/1995 96 socsec 94 
v751 10/26/1995 2 medcaid 28 
v800 11/14/1995 1 welfare 100 
v811 11/16/1995 0 welfare 94 
v822 11/17/1995 1 welfare 98 
v847 12/5/1995 99 socsec 95 
v870 12/14/1995 94 socsec 93 
v871 12/14/1995 1 socsec 95 
v885 12/21/1995 0 welfare 94 
v886 12/21/1995 1 welfare 97 
v887 12/21/1995 1 welfare 86 
v923 2/1/1996 0 socsec 92 
v925 2/1/1996 90 socsec 94 
v978 3/21/1996 1 welfare 93 
v992 3/28/1996 97 socsec 1 




v997 3/28/1996 86 socsec 61 
v1002 3/29/1996 93 foodstam 52 
v1048 5/8/1996 7 houspub 98 
v1049 5/8/1996 2 houspub 79 
v1051 5/9/1996 8 houspub 92 
v1054 5/9/1996 73 houspub 98 
v1055 5/9/1996 6 houspub 94 
v1056 5/9/1996 1 houspub 57 
v1071 5/16/1996 98 medcaid 65 
v1073 5/16/1996 0 medcaid 60 
v1074 5/16/1996 1 medcaid 97 
v1114 6/6/1996 98 welfare 64 
v1115 6/6/1996 0 welfare 98 
v1116 6/6/1996 0 welfare 67 
v1131 6/12/1996 3 welfare 98 
v1154 6/20/1996 40 welfare 67 
v1155 6/20/1996 25 welfare 78 
v1165 6/25/1996 10 houspub 58 
v1167 6/26/1996 83 houspub 84 
v1168 26-Jun 18 medcaid 69 
v1203 7/12/1996 8 socsec 97 
v1204 7/12/1996 96 socsec 99 
v1223 7/18/1996 10 foodstam 87 
v1224 7/18/1996 97 foodstam 80 
v1225 7/18/1996 5 welfare 99 
v1226 7/18/1996 2 welfare 85 
v1248 7/24/1996 96 medcaid 97 
v1274 7/31/1996 0 welfare 90 
v1276 7/31/1996 0 foodstam 84 
v1277 7/31/1996 1 foodstam 74 
v1278 7/31/1996 97 foodstam 44 
Thomas.gov     
rc55 19-Mar 100 child 98 
rc56 3/19/1997 88 uemploy 100 
rc57 3/19/1997 2 uemploy 87 
rc58 3/19/1997 1 uemploy 97 
rc59 3/19/1997 10 uemploy 99 
rc72 4/8/1997 98 houspub 95 
rc73 4/8/1997 100 foodstam 89 
rc96 4/30/1997 100 child 100 
rc100 5/1/1997 3 houspub 77 
rc101 5/1/1997 30 houspub 96 
rc102 5/1/1997 5 houspub 88 
rc103 5/1/1997 1 houspub 74 
rc104 5/6/1997 1 houspub 83 
rc106 5/7/1997 0 houspub 85 
rc119 13-May 0 houspub 85 




rc121 5/13/1997 1 houspub 100 
rc122 13-May 1 houspub 46 
rc123 5/13/1997 1 houspub 77 
rc126 5/14/1997 0 houspub 87 
rc127 5/14/1997 1 houspub 75 
rc137 5/16/1997 3 uemploy 83 
rc138 5/16/1997 73 uemploy 95 
rc246 7/8/1997 0 child 0 
rc276 7/16/1997 64 houspub 92 
rc277 7/16/1997 26 houspub 100 
rc280 7/16/1997 90 uemploy 100 
rc286 7/22/1997 6 uemploy 100 
rc287 7/22/1997 1 uemploy 94 
rc289 7/22/1997 99 uemploy 99 
rc569          7/22/1997 16 uemploy 97 
rc26 3/3/1998 91 homeless 99 
rc116 4/29/1998 100 socsec 98 
rc162 5/19/1998 100 houspub 99 
rc197 6/4/1998 100 uemploy 98 
rc228 7/11/1998 4 uemploy 87 
rc295 7/17/1998 4 houspub 93 
rc297 7/20/1998 99 child 89 
rc332 7/23/1998 28 houspub 92 
rc352 7/29/1998 92 houspub 23 
rc426 9/14/1998 81 houspub 85 
rc462 9/25/1998 100 socsec 2 
rc464 9/25/1998 100 socsec 9 
rc516 10/10/1998 99 medcaid 100 
rc533 10/15/1998 94 foodstam 92 
rc164 5/26/1999 100 socsec 96 
rc256 6/25/1999 92 child 87 
rc257 6/29/1999 100 veterans 100 
rc392 9/8/1999 74 houspub 65 
rc393 9/8/1999 12 houspub 63 
rc394 9/8/1999 21 houspub 77 
rc401 9/9/1999 91 houspub 81 
rc403 9/9/1999 93 houspub 18 
rc451 9/27/1999 99 oldamer 99 
rc490 10/7/1999 23 health 100 
rc513 10/19/1999 97 socsec 100 
rc573 11/5/1999 95 socsec 86 
rc13 2/13/2000 100 socsec 94 
rc208 6/28/2001 61 houspub 100 
rc209 6/28/2001 27 houspub 100 
rc210 6/28/2001 34 houspub 98 
rc221 7/11/2001 96 houspub 100 
rc252 7/19/2001 0 welfare 86 




rc281 6/26/2001 77 houspub 88 
rc282 6/26/2001 2 houspub 66 
rc283 1-Jun 1 houspub 25 
rc285 6/26/2001 100 houspub 42 
rc286 6/27/2001 0 houspub 73 
rc287 6/27/2001 9 houspub 87 
rc288 6/27/2001 9 houspub 97 
rc289 6/27/2001 4 houspub 90 
rc293 6/30/2001 91 houspub 73 
rc294 6/30/2001 12 houspub 76 
rc295 6/30/2001 4 houspub 100 
rc297 6/31/2001 97 houspub 67 
rc328 8/2/2001 2 health 92 
rc329 8/2/2001 4 health 100 
rc330 8/2/2001 6 health 100 
rc332 8/2/2001 0 health 100 
rc378 10/11/2001 60 health 100 
rc379 10/11/2001 71 health 97 
rc380 10/11/2001 34 health 98 
rc381 10/11/2001 84 health 98 
rc441 11/15/2001 0 oldamer 94 
rc442 11/15/2001 0 oldamer 83 
rc467 12/4/2001 99 socsec 97 
rc16 2/12/2002 99 homeless 100 
rc90 4/11/2002 11 oldamer 96 
rc92 4/11/2002 99 oldamer 16 
rc160 5/14/2002 100 socsec 100 
rc168 5/16/2002 3 welfare 99 
rc170 5/16/2002 1 welfare 94 
rc282 6/28/2002 99 socsec 3 

























Aggregate Level Analysis 
 
Variables Source 
Bills and Votes ICPSR and Thomas.gov 
Nixon’s Approval Rating Gallup 
Ford’s Approval Rating Gallup 
Carter’s Approval Rating Gallup 
Reagan’s Approval Rating Gallup 
Bush’s Approval Rating  Gallup 
Clinton’s Approval Rating Gallup 
G.W. Bush’s Approval Rating Gallup 
 
 
District Level Analysis 
 
Variables Source 
Bills and Votes Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
BANK (amount of dollars in district 
banks per capita) 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
UNEMPLOYMENT (% of district 
Unemployed) 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
FORBORN (% of population born in 
outside of the United States 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
FINANCE (% of district employed in 
financial industry jobs) 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
BLUECOLLAR (% of the district 
employed in bluecollar jobs) 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
POPSQRMILE (the average number of 
persons living in one square mile) 
University of Colorado; Congressional District 
Data Set 
OVER65 (% of the district over the age of 
65) 
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